University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
5-1-1995

Betraying their trust: The dispossession of the Omaha Nation,
1790-1916
Judith A. Boughter
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork

Recommended Citation
Boughter, Judith A., "Betraying their trust: The dispossession of the Omaha Nation, 1790-1916" (1995).
Student Work. 503.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/503

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

BETRAYING THEIR TRUST: THE DISPOSSESSION
OF THE OMAHA NATION, 1790-1916

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Judith A. Boughter
May 1995

UMI Number: EP73141

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP73141
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest’
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University
of Nebraska at Omaha.

Committee

Name

Department
y
^

/ ^ f ‘5 7//Cr~Z^r

f

X

Chairman
Date

o? 3 , X ? 9 S '

ABSTRACT

Most Americans are familiar with the Indian wars that raged on the western frontier
during the nineteenth century. Images of Little Big Horn are firmly etched in the nation's
collective memory and its popular culture. Wounded Knee has become a symbol for all that
was wrong with United States— Sioux relations, and the Apache wars of the Southwest
have been fodder for countless books and Hollywood films. Less well-known is the tragic
story of the Omahas, a small Indian nation of present-day northeastern Nebraska which fell
victim to geography, disease, shifting trade patterns, and white land hunger. The Omahas
never clashed with the United States Army; instead, they became entangled in government
"red tape" and fought a losing battle with federal bureaucrats, reformers, land speculators,
and Nebraska politicians.
Because their ancestral lands lay in the path of westward expansion in 1854, the
government forced the Omahas onto a small reservation along the Missouri River in
Nebraska's northeast comer. And because the Omaha Reservation included some of the
most accessible and fertile land in the state, local white settlers and land syndicates
conducted a relentless campaign to alienate Indians from their property. Most Omahas
reluctantly ended their buffalo hunts and resisted adopting agriculture as their sole means of
subsistence. But their peaceful nature made them prime candidates to become
homesteaders, and because of the actions and words of only a few "progressive" tribal
leaders, both the government and reformers overestimated the tribe's degree of
acculturation.
Due to this misconception, and often without their concurrence, the unfortunate
Omahas became the prototype for several disastrous government programs during the
assimilationist era. Omaha allotment preceded the 1887 Dawes Act by five years; whites

infiltrated the Omaha Reservation by leasing Indian lands long before the Indian
Department formulated a broader leasing plan for tribes throughout the nation, and the
Omahas were the first tribe to begin losing their lands as the result of competency
commissions. All of these "firsts" had disastrous effects on the Omaha people. But most
eastern reformers and many Indian Department officials, anxious to free Native Americans
from wardship and to assimilate them into the national "melting pot," ignored the tragic
results of the Omaha experiments. Although forewarned by a few concerned reformers and
by Indian agents in the field, the government nevertheless allotted more tribal lands and
allowed more white leasing and land purchases.
Unlike the Nebraska "land sharks" who preyed upon the Omahas, and Nebraska
lawmakers whose primary interest was reelection, most reformers and Indian Office
officials had good intentions. The Indian "problem" was a huge one with no quick or
simple solution, and for decades the Department of Indian Affairs felt its way, trying to
determine what was best for Native Americans, while at the same time bowing to the
pressures of Manifest Destiny. Unfortunately, paternalistic reformers mistook the Omahas'
desire to retain their tribal lands as a request for individual farms. The reformers' major sin
was condescension; in their zeal to "help" the Nebraska tribe, they ignored Omaha
traditions and made no attempt to understand the Indian concept of land tenure. By 1916,
bureaucratic bungling, "special" legislation, and the misguided efforts of reformers had left
many Omahas landless and facing an uncertain future.
The Omahas were just one of many Indian tribes who suffered at the hands of
reformers and the government in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ultimate
tragedy is found in how much the Omahas suffered, and how little government officials
learned from their own mistakes. This study traces those mistakes, introduces the persons
most responsible for them, and provides a better understanding of the government's overall
Indian policy during this period in American history.
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INTRODUCTION

Then another [Omaha] man advanced in front of the [sacred] pipes, leading liis
four-year-old son. The man and boy were both in the dress of the white man. He had long
been living and working on his farm, in every way committed to our mode of life, which
added to the pathos of his act. "The pipes," he said, "were the care of my fathers. My son
is bom into their rights. Now we do not often see them." Tears filled his eyes, and with
breaking voice he added, "I want my boy to touch the pipes of my fathers." 1
Alice C. Fletcher, circa 1893

Centuries ago, a nation of people who would become known as the Omahas
followed the buffalo from as far east as the West Virginia mountains and eventually settled
among the fertile, rolling hills along the Missouri River in what is now Nebraska. Today,
the Omahas are one of only a few plains and prairie tribes who continue to live on a portion
of their ancestral homeland. Unlike their unfortunate neighbors and kinsmen, the Poncas,
they were not removed to Oklahoma, and unlike the Sioux bands, they never waged a
disastrous war against the United States Army. Instead, they befriended and emulated
whites, even intermarrying with traders. Having been attacked time and again by the Sioux,
the Omahas hesitated to leave the relative safety of the Bellevue Agency when they ceded
their lands to the government in 1854. But with a promise of military protection, they
reluctantly returned north along the Missouri River to their beloved Black Bird Hills, where
their ancestors lay buried and where they had seen their happiest days.
But Black Bird Hills had changed. The Omahas would pay a terrible price for their
choice of these lands and for some of their leaders' affinity for white ways. White settlers
and land speculators resented Indian ownership of fertile northeastern Nebraska lands, and
beginning with the early 1850s, used every means at their disposal to separate the Omahas
from their real estate. Unfortunately, Nebraska senators and congressmen worked closely
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with land speculators to promote special legislation which little by little, law by unfair law,
encouraged Indians to lease, and eventually sell, most of their land.
Because a few tribal leaders appeared ready to be assimilated into white society, the
Omahas became sociological "guinea pigs." Totally ignoring the reality that the majority of
Omahas knew little English, understood nothing of capitalism, and had no desire to be
farmers, government officials and reformers made them the prototype for nearly every
disastrous Indian program of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Omaha lands
were allotted five years prior to the 1887 Dawes Act; the tribe was allowed to informally
lease grazing lands long before Congress enacted a leasing act for all Indians; and the very
first Indian competency commission operated on the Omaha Reservation in 1909-1910.
Time and again, Congress and the Indian Office ignored the warnings of economic collapse
from this Nebraska reservation. Despite obvious problems with Omaha allotments, the
Dawes Act extended the process to nearly all Indians throughout the United States, and
leasing irregularities on the Omaha and Winnebago reservations did not prevent the
government from legalizing the practice nation-wide. Despite the wholesale land loss
resulting from the work of the Omaha competency commission, "progressive" bureaucrats
later expanded the commissions to a majority of reservations, with the same tragic results.
The Omahas had not always been victimized by whites. Their first European
contacts had been French traders, and during the late-eighteenth century, as the most
powerful Indian nation on the middle Missouri River, they defined the terms of their own
trade, as well as that of tribes further upstream. But a smallpox epidemic in 1800 claimed
the lives of hundreds of Omahas, including their brilliant, autocratic chief, Black Bird. The
tribe's influence and population quickly waned. The Sioux, earlier held in check by Black
Bird, now preyed upon the hapless Omahas, and many observers predicted the tribe's
demise. The Omahas survived, but their traditional leadership and tribal customs were
subsequently undermined by government officials and fur traders who created "paper
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chiefs" and introduced the Indians to whiskey and greed. Tribal autonomy also began to
slip away, as the Omahas recognized the supremacy of the United States government in
"peace treaties" signed in 1815 and during the 1820s.2 In two subsequent agreements, at
Prairie du Chien, Michigan Territory in 1830, and at Bellevue, six years later, the
government robbed the Omahas of much of their hunting grounds and left the people
without their full payment of annuities and without adequate protection from their Sioux
adversaries.3
During the 1840s, the Omahas came face-to-face with Manifest Destiny as waves of
white emigrants crossed Indian country, killing off small game, polluting streams, and
decimating the buffalo herds. Most emigrants continued west along the Platte River Trail,
but the Mormons remained in their "winter quarters" on Omaha lands for two full years,
creating problems for the Indians and a political dilemma for the government. During their
controversial stay, the Mormons did provide the Omahas some degree of protection against
the Sioux, but upon the Mormon departure for Salt Lake, the Dakota bands escalated their
raids against the unprotected and badly outnumbered Omahas.
Fur traders and westbound emigrants had shown no interest in owning Omaha
lands, but in the late 1840s, to clear a path for further westward expansion and for, a
railway to the Pacific Ocean, the government devised a plan to move all Indians either north
or south of the main emigration corridor along the Platte River. Railroad advocates,
expansionist lawmakers, and Nebraska "boomers" all agitated for the creation and
settlement of a Nebraska Territory. At virtually the same time as the passage of the KansasNebraska Act in 1854, a new treaty forced the Omahas to relinquish their remaining
Nebraska lands and to relocate on a tiny fraction of their former domain.
The original reservation provided for the Omahas in their 1854 treaty proved
completely unsatisfactory to the tribe. 4 In efforts to relocate them away from white
populations, the treaty framers planned to settle the Omahas on a reserve near their historic
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enemies, the Sioux. Frightened and confused, the Omahas retreated southward to the Platte
River and refused to go farther north until they were guaranteed protection in a home of
their own choosing. Once the Indian Department coaxed the Omahas onto their present
reservation in Thurston County, the government broke nearly every promise it had made to
the Indians when they relinquished their lands.
Politics, greed, and corruption combined to create controversy during the Omahas'
early reservation period. Agents seldom remained for long, and most proved dishonest,
inept, or dictatorial. Rivalries among "progressive" and "traditional" tribal leaders split the
Omahas politically and culturally, leaving the reservation in chaos. Ethnocentric
Presbyterian missionaries further undermined tribal unity by favoring progressive Omahas,
ignoring the majority of the tribe, and by attempting to rob Omaha children of their
"Indianness." In 1869, President Ulysses S. Grant’s Peace Policy brought Quaker agents
and more dissention to the reservation, as these Friends and the Presbyterians fought
bitterly for control of the mission school and Omaha souls.
In 1865 and again in 1873, the already small Omaha reserve was further reduced
when the government coerced tribal leaders into selling part of their lands to the
Winnebagoes, who had fled their desolate reservation in South Dakota and had sought
shelter with the Omahas. The 1865 Winnebago Treaty also provided for the first Omaha
land allotments, which were completed in 1871.5 But six years later, when Omaha allottees
questioned their land titles in the wake of the Poncas' forced removal to Indian Territory,
they found that they held nothing but worthless paper.
When pioneering anthropologist Alice C. Fletcher visited the Omahas in 1881,
concerned tribal leaders asked for her help in confirming their rights to the land. As a result
of Fletcher's lobbying, Congress passed an allotment act in 1882, granting the Omahas
land in severalty, complete with tax-free status for twenty-five years.6 A year later,
Fletcher, with the aid of Omaha Francis La Flesche, allotted nearly 79,000 acres of
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reservation land to 954 Indians. Allotment left the tribe in a precarious legal position and
created more problems than it solved. Subject to Nebraska laws, but denied services due to
their tax-exempt status, the Omahas made an unsuccessful attempt to govern themselves
and run their own mills and shops. While the tribe floundered in legal and political limbo,
local "land sharks" pounced on Omaha lands, renting them from Indians for a pittance, and
re-leasing them at huge profits. Those who resisted the "Pender Ring," as the land
syndicate was called, found themselves embroiled in ugly and expensive court battles.
The perceived success or failure of Omaha allotment left lawmakers and reformers
divided over the subject of a general allotment act. While many in policy-making positions
supported land in severalty, many more, including members of the House Indian Affairs
Committee, saw it as a potential disaster.^ Ignoring negative reports on the Omaha
"experiment," Congress followed the advice of Alice Fletcher and other proponents and
compounded its earlier error by passing the 1887 General Allotment (Dawes) Act, which
applied to Indians throughout the United States.^ In 1893, all but about 5,000 acres of the
remaining Omaha lands were allotted, and in 1909, proceeds from the sale of these few
acres were scheduled to be divided among 520 landless Omaha children bom after 1893.9
In the 1890s, leasing made the Omahas idle landlords, but beginning in 1902, laws
legalizing and even encouraging land sales made them paupers. A 1902 law allowing heirs
of deceased Indians to sell their lands was closely followed by a disastrous clause in the
Burke Act of 1906, which authorized the Interior Secretary, at his discretion, to declare an
Indian competent to receive his land with no sale or tax restrictions. 10 This short paragraph
in a bill otherwise designed primarily to protect Indians, paved the way for the first
competency commission, whose irresponsible and arbitrary actions left many Omahas
landless and destitute.
By late 1916, after decades of exposure to reformers' good intentions, the Omahas
were left with mortgages, tax bills, and a generation of children with no land to call their

6

own. The irony and tragedy of the Omaha story is that this small peace-loving Indian tribe
whose "progressive" leaders truly wished to "walk the white man's road" were led part
way down that road and then expected to continue on their own without the necessary skills
or resources to survive in the world that had been created for them. This paper will attempt
to explain the many events and forces that shaped the Omahas' world during those
unfortunate times, and will introduce the characters, good and evil, both Indian and white,
who influenced this crucial period in Omaha tribal history.

When I began this project, I had no idea how complex it would become or how far
it would lead. I would like to thank those individuals who helped me create what I hope is a
coherent story from the numerous and varied materials on Omaha-white relations. The staff
of the Federal Records Center in Kansas City kindly supplied me with finding lists and was
most helpful when I visited their facility to do research. I would like to thank Nebraska
State Historical Society personnel for promptly filling my interlibrary loan requests for
microfilm and for their assistance in the use of their archival materials. My sincere thanks to
Jo Behrens of the University of Nebraska at Omaha for sharing her rare volumes of
Council Fire, and to Dr. Richmond R. Clow of the Native American Studies Department at
the University of Montana for making his research notes on Omaha taxation available to
me. I owe a special thank you to Mary Mick and Catherine Walker of the University of
Nebraska at Omaha's Interlibrary Loan Department, who kept their good humor despite my
almost daily requests for microfilm, rare books, and articles from obscure journals.
My thesis committee chairman, Dr. Michael Tate, deserves many thanks for his
good advice, his careful and thoughtful editing, his patience with my tendency to write long
chapters, and especially for his invaluable bibliography on the Omaha Indians, which led
me to many important sources. My thanks also to Dr. Charles Gildersleeve of the
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Geography Department for serving on my thesis committee, and to Dr. Harl Dalstrom for
sharing his extensive knowledge of Nebraska history. I am also grateful to the University
of Nebraska Foundation for the Presidential Graduate Fellowship which allowed me to
devote eighteen months to research and writing. My sincere thanks to my daughter, Lisa,
for her artistic input and her constructive comments. As always, I appreciate my husband's
support and encouragement. And thank you, Molly and Charley, for keeping me company
during my marathon late-night writing sessions.
Finally, I am grateful to the Omaha Indians who left their own accounts of these
events in testimony, petitions, and especially in wonderful personal letters which revealed
their private thoughts on events that shaped their lives. Unfortunately, only a few of the
people left written records, and the overwhelming majority of Omahas from those earlier
generations must remain forever silent. Hopefully, this study will provide a glimpse into
their lives, thoughts, and actions over that great expanse of time.
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NOTES

1Alice C. Fletcher, "Personal Studies of Indian Life: Politics and 'Pipe-Dancing'",
Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine 45 (November 1892-April 1893): 455.
^Charles J. Kappler, comp, and ed., Indian Affairs: Laws andTreaties, vol. 2
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 115. Treaty with the Mahas.
American State Papers. Indian Affairs, vol. 2, 226. Kappler, Indian Laws and Treaties,
vol. 2, 260.
^Kappler, Indian Laws and Treaties, vol. 2, 309. Kappler, Indian Laws and
Treaties, vol. 2, 479.
4Kappler, Indian Laws and Treaties, vol. 2, 611.
^Kappl er, Indian Laws and Treaties, vol. 2, 872.
^22 Statutes at Large 341.
7U. S. Congress. House. Lands in Severalty to Indians. H. Report 1576, 46th
Cong., 2nd sess., 1880, 2-6. [Ser. set 1938].
^24 Statutes at Large 388.
^U. S. Congress. House. Disposal of Unallotted Lands of the Omaha Indian
Reservation. H. Doc. 1479, 60th Cong., 2nd sess., 1909, 2. [Ser. set 5557].
1034 Statutes at Large 182.

CHAPTER ONE
FROM RULERS OF THE RIVER TO AN EMBATTLED CULTURE,
1790s-1830

The white people speak of the country . . . as "a wilderness". . . without human interest or
history. To us Indians it was as clearly defined then as it is today; we knew the boundaries
of tribal lands, those of our friends and those of our foes; we were familiar with every
stream, the contour of every hill. . . . It was our home, the scene of our history, and we
loved it as our country. 1
Francis La Flesche, 1900

In 1854, the Omaha Indians signed a treaty with the United States government in
which they relinquished what remained of their ancestral lands and agreed to settle on a
300,000 acre reservation in the northeast comer of present-day Nebraska. The 1854 treaty
was the most damaging of a series of acts, agreements, and dealings that would drastically
reduce the Omaha land base and nearly destroy the tribe's ancient and intricate culture. To
appreciate the Omahas' loss, it is important to understand their past—their tribal legends,
their reverence for the land, their almost total dependence on the buffalo, their rise to
power, and the beginning of their tragic decline by the early nineteenth century. The
Omahas were never a large tribe, but in the late eighteenth century, their strategic location
and a powerful leader gave them an importance out of proportion to their numbers. For
years, they dictated trading terms on their stretch of the Missouri River and reduced the
threat from upstream tribes by denying them access to white traders and guns. But by the
early 1800s, weakened by disease and with their leader dead, they began to lose control of
their lands and their destiny.
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The Omahas were relative latecomers to the Plains who left few clues to their
eastern woodlands past. Because they quickly adopted Plains Indian culture and European
trade goods, there is no distinct archaeological record of the tribe prior to the late 1700s,
and their early migrations are preserved only in legends that are difficult to prove or
disprove.^ Fortunately, these oral traditions were recorded by frontier explorers as well as
professional ethnographers, and recent archaeological findings have given further credence
to some of these interpretations. A few sources claim that the Omahas and their cognate
tribes came from somewhere north of the Great Lakes, moved south, crossed the
Mississippi River, then settled where Europeans first contacted them.3 But most legends
agree that the Omahas' ancestors emigrated from the east, probably following the buffalo
herds, and migrated in a northwesterly direction to the present Iowa-Nebraska region,
where they made their initial contact with whites (Map 1).
The most often repeated version of the Omaha Sacred Legend says that long ago,
the Omahas lived with the Poncas, Osages, Kansas, and Quapaws "near a great body of
water" east of the Mississippi River, where the Illinois tribes referred to them collectively
as the "Arkansas." As they moved west, the tribes separated at the mouth of the Ohio
River— the Quapaws going downstream and the rest of the Arkansas continuing up the
Mississippi, taking the descriptive name, U-man/-hanf "those going against the wind or
current."4 The two groups must have gone their separate ways prior to 1540 A. D., since
the Spanish explorer Hernando de Soto encountered the Quapaws on the Arkansas River at
about that time, and made no mention of an affiliated people.^ This date is reinforced by a
Siouan time concept that refers to a period of about seventy years as an "old man." In
1880, the Omahas claimed to be under their fifth old man, thus dating their existence as a
separate tribe to the early 1500s.6 At the Osage River, the remaining four tribes parted
company. The Omahas and Poncas crossed the Missouri River, and after wandering for
m any

years,

arrived
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the

Red
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quarry

in

M in n eso ta.^
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James Owen Dorsey, Omaha Sociology.
Third Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1884), Plate XXX.
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Omaha ethnographers and tribal spokesmen disagree as to the location of the people
when they cut their Sacred Pole and organized their government. According to legend, the
Omahas received the Sacred Pole and the two Sacred Pipes, and assigned customs and
taboos to specific clans while living near Lake Andes in Dakota Territory, but tribal
historians disagree. W herever the Sacred Pole appeared, it was apparently after a
government had formed, since its purpose was to conserve the new tribal order. Legends
also say that the Omahas lived in the Upper Mississippi region when they selected as their
leaders a council of seven wise, generous, and kind men.8
The Omahas' migrations did not end with their arrival on the Missouri; they traveled
in Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, and Nebraska, moving from river to river, establishing
villages as they went (Map 2). The Omahas first appeared on European maps in the 1670s,
on lands in present-day southwest Minnesota and northwest Iowa, where tradition says
they arrived by following the Des Moines River. By 1702, they had moved westward, to
the Big Sioux River, where they built at least one village. The bitter animosity between the
Omahas and the Sioux probably began here, where the Omahas met defeat at the hands of
the Yanktons or the Brule Tetons. The vanquished Omahas fled further west, toward the
Missouri River, and 1714 found them in South Dakota near the mouth of White River, in
Arikara country. The Omahas borrowed aspects of Arikara culture during their troubled
stay that produced constant warfare and a series of poor harvests.^
After a tribal split that resulted in the defection of the Poncas, the Omahas moved
southeast along the Missouri River to a site on Bow Creek, Nebraska, where they built an
earth lodge community that became known as "Bad Village" due to a murder and intra-tribal
warfare that divided the tribe. But legends say they reunited about 1750 near what is now
Ponca , Nebraska, and by 1758 could call on 800 men living in forty villages. Warfare
with the Sioux and a desire to position themselves closer to Spanish trade routes drew the
Omahas away from Ponca, and they moved even farther south into present-day Dakota
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Om aha village sites: A- “Hill Rising from the Center o f a Plain” (25SY14,
1846-1854); B= “Little Village” (25DD1, 1841-1843); C- Stanton site (25ST1,
1819-1833); D - “Big Village" (25DK5, 1775-1819, 1834-1841, 1843-1845);
E= tti-ttqga zig a (mid-1700s); F=* “Bad Village" (early 1700s) and “Little Bow’s
village" (late 1700s); G= Omaha locale on the White River (early 1700s); H=
possible late-l600s Omaha village near modem Sioux Falls; I* Blood Run site
(13L02, possible late-l600s Omaha village).
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County, to the banks of what is now known as Omaha Creek. Here they built their "Large
Village."10
The new Omaha village became a familiar sight to Spanish and French traders
plying the Missouri River, and two representatives of the Missouri Company described it in
their reports. In 1796, Jean-Baptiste Truteau placed the Omaha village "two leagues distant
from the banks of the Missouri," and a year later, James Mackay wrote in his "Table of
Distances" that "the village is situated in a beautiful Prairie near to the foot of the hills a
league from the Missouri." More observant than Truteau, he also mentioned Omaha
Creek. 11
But the Omahas would not remain in their idyllic home. During the winter of 18001801, smallpox struck the village, and in their confusion and despair, the people
abandoned their infected towns on the Missouri River and embarked on a "mourning war"
against other Plains tribes. In 1804, upon finding no sign of Omaha occupancy where their
village had stood, Meriwether Lewis wrote, "[They] have become a wandering nation. . . .
They rove principally on the waters of the . . . Rapid River" (the

N io b r a r a ).

12 Eventually,

the tattered remains of the tribe returned to Big Village, only to face renewed Sioux raids.
Afraid to stay on Omaha Creek, the Omahas turned southwest, to an unnamed village on
the Elkhom River. Big Village was never again continuously occupied, though the people
still returned there to bury their

dead.

13 In 1841, Little Village, at the mouth of Logan

Creek, in what is now Dodge County, became the Omahas1temporary home. The people
returned briefly to Omaha Creek, but when the Sioux burned their village in the summer of
1845, they fled to the relative safety of the Indian agency at Bellevue, Nebraska, where
they remained until they traveled north to their reservation. 14
As the Omahas wandered along the Missouri River in search of a permanent home,
they were not isolated from white men. Their first white contact may have been with
Hudson's Bay traders, but the tribe was known to the French before 1724, when traders
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built a post on the Missouri River to halt Spanish

in f lu e n c e d

In 1763, as a result of its

defeat in the Seven Years' War, France ceded the region west of the Mississippi River to
Spain to keep it out of British hands. Therefore, the Omahas' first regular white contacts
were French-speaking Spanish subjects. 16 These early meetings appear to have been
amicable; in fact, in 1795 the trader James Mackay spent the winter in a cabin he built
among the Omahas. In a grandiose gesture, Mackay dubbed his crude sanctuary "Fort
C h a r le s ."

17 Thus the records show that whites contacted the Omahas early and often; by

1854, when they signed the treaty creating their reservation, they had been exposed to
white influence, with all its political, social, and economic effects, for over 150 years.
In the years between the coming of the first French traders and the devastating 1854
treaty, two Omaha constants remained—com and the buffalo. For as long as tribal tradition
had existed, buffalo and maize were the chief Omaha foods, the buffalo representing the
hunter and maize the horticulturist. l&In one of the earliest documentations of Omaha food
sources, Lieutenant-Governor Francisco Cruzat of Spanish Illinois implied that horticulture
had some importance to the tribe, but was secondary to the hunt. According to Cruzat, the
Omahas had always survived by "hunting beaver, deer, buffalo, and stags . . . ," and "their
. . . cultivation of the soil extended only to the planting of maize and pumpkins for their
necessary support." 19 At one time, com was probably more sacred than the buffalo since it,
sprang from Mother Earth, and the Omahas conducted elaborate ceremonies dedicated to
com cultivation. But by 1700, guns and horses had changed Omaha culture from a
traditionally horticultural one to a society that depended heavily on the buffalo, whose
religious symbolism also became increasingly significant. Siouan tradition saw corn and
buffalo as inseparable; the com would not grow without the buffalo, and if planting rituals
were ignored, the buffalo would not c o m

e .2 0
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Although the Omahas continued to plant gardens in small tracts along the rivers,
over half of their food came from hunting, and in their search for game, they may have
ranged far and wide, from the Des Moines River in the east to the Nebraska Sand Hills in
the west (Map 3).21 One western traveler claimed that the Omahas "owned" the country
north of the mouth of the Great Platte, but ownership was too strong a word. The trader
Auguste Chouteau explained that different tribes often claimed the same lands, making it
difficult to determine tribal limits. He admitted that the Omahas claimed a large area
bounded roughly by the Missouri and Platte rivers, but he could not pinpoint a western
boundary. 22
Like other Nebraska tribes, the Omahas acquired and held territorial hunting rights
by use and warfare, and these claims terminated only when a band no longer wished to
hunt in a given area. Of course, hunting grounds were sometimes disputed, and rivalries
caused contention among the tribes. Compromise was possible, however. For example,
\
after fighting for years over territory near the Republican and Elkhom rivers, the Omahas
and Pawnees decided to hold the land in common; when hunting above the Platte, the
Omahas directed the hunt, and when south of the river, the Pawnees took c h a r g e . 23
Omaha culture was elaborate and beautiful. The people revered all living things,
treasured the land, and respected each other. Behind their complicated tribal organization
lay a system of duality: the sky was father, the earth mother, and their union was essential
to life. The tribal divisions, or moieties, consisted of the Earth People, responsible for all
rites and duties related to the tribe's physical well-being, and the Sky People, in charge of
all things supernatural. Duality also demanded two principal chiefs and two sacred pipes
that could never be

sep a ra ted .

24

The Omahas spent little time in their permanent villages, as they followed the
buffalo for months at a time. In adhering to a traditional Plains "annual round," they spent
only about three months of the year in their fixed villages. When the summer crops were
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well established, the tribe conducted its annual buffalo hunt, returning in September for the
important com harvest. With the com safely stored, they once more deserted their villages
to trap along the rivers. A winter bison hunt completed the round. 25 Preceded by elaborate,
lengthy rituals, the annual hunt was orchestrated so that individual hunters did not alarm the
herds and cause the entire tribe to go hungry. Consequently, the highly social Omahas
acted as a unit, with the benefit of the tribe taking precedence over individual hunting
prowess.26
As their tribal government evolved, the Omahas recognized the need for something
visible and accessible to the people that would symbolize tribal unity. The two tribal pipes,
with their complex rituals, did not fill this need, but the Sacred Pole did.27 The revered
pole was cut from a magical tree that burned in the night and was home to the Thunder
birds. The Omahas cut down this tree, decorated it, and called it a man. The chiefs said of
this "mystery tree": "Whenever we meet with troubles we shall bring all our troubles to
Him, We shall make offerings and requests. All our prayers must be accompanied by
gifts."28 The Sacred Pole is cottonwood, but to the Omahas he was and is a person— a
man who would provide for and protect his people through all their travails. He migrated
with the tribe to their home on the Missouri River and stood for tribal identity when they
\
controlled a portion of the river. Through conflict and sickness, he never deserted them. As
a symbol of the chiefs' power, the pole had special significance during the annual buffalo
hunts, when it was carried quite visibly on its "keeper's" back. On the hunt, the Sacred
Pole's presence was vital, for it held the tribe together at a time when they might s c a t t e r . 29
/j
Sources disagree as to when the modem Omaha socio-political organization began,
but legend speaks of seven old men who visited the tribe and set its government in motion.
Two "old" men of the tribe carried out the mythical visitors' plan, and were given
responsibility for the two sacred pipes, which became their "badges of honor."30 Perhaps
in deference to the legendary seven, early tribal government was controlled by a council of
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seven chiefs whose functions were to "maintain order, keep the peace, and . . . preserve
decorum within the tribe." But above all, the seven chiefs answered to W akon/da for the
tribes' welfare. The council reigned supreme; its members could not be unseated except by
resignation or death, and their decisions, coming directly from the Supreme Being, could
never be questioned.^ 1
The traditional Omaha hierarchy included two chiefly orders, one unlimited in
membership and the other much more exclusive. The lower order, brown chiefs, referred
to the color of the earth. Until a brown chief achieved greatness, he was indistinguishable
from all others, like the color of the ground. Dark chiefs, on the other hand, represented
elevated objects visible from a distance. A chief who performed great and generous deeds
rose above the others and appeared as a dark figure against the

h o r iz o n .3 2

Contrary to the

popular image of Indian chiefs, Omaha leaders did not advance primarily due to their
courage or military skills. Among Omahas, generosity, gift-giving, and wisdom were
revered, and of the seven dark chiefs, the two who had distributed the greatest number of
gifts became the principal leaders, each representing one half of the tribe. Dark chiefs could
not be removed from office, but when a principal chieftainship did become available, it was
filled by the remaining chief who could "count" the most gifts.33
Chiefs were elected, and a man with a spotty reputation could become a tribal leader
in the hope that his new responsibilities would make him a better person. Character,
however, was the main criterion. Usually, a candidate for chiefdom had to demonstrate
leadership qualities and be tenacious. Alice Fletcher wrote, "The path to honor is open to
every man in the tribe who has the courage, ability, and persistency to reach distinction,"
but above all, "A chief must be a man who can govern himself."34 However, this idealistic
"bootstrap" approach to chiefdom was only part of the picture.
Clever horse stealers, savvy traders, and men who had been told the secrets of the
gift-giving process could use their wealth and inside information to enter the chiefly ranks.
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Trade goods often opened the door to chiefdom; seen as magical, these goods were
associated with the Indian elite, who "used them to legitimize their sanctity as leaders."35
In addition, if a member of the Omaha oligarchy resigned when he became old or ill, he
'7
kept his title and could designate his successor, a process which could become quite
political, since the retiring ch iefs favorites had an advantage.3 6 jn the words of
anthropologist Reo Fortune, who disputes Fletcher's "achievement by ability" explanation,
"The social theory [was] aggressively democratic. The social practice [was] prevailingly
aristocratic."37 Even Alice Fletcher and Francis La Flesche admitted that nepotism was
alive and well among the Omahas: "The order and value of these . . . acts were not
generally known to the people. . . . Those who became possessed of this knowledge were
apt to keep it for the benefit of their aspiring kinsmen. "38 It appears, then, that the path to
Omaha chieftainship was strewn with contradictions. In theory, generosity made chiefs, yet
if the secrets of the gift-giving requirements were limited to certain individuals, did this not
make chiefdom in a way hereditary?^
The Omahas' early ethnographers differed on interpretations of chieftainship
traditions and never reached a consensus about whether leadership was achieved through
elaborate gift-giving or by inheritance. In short, they disagreed about methods of acquiring
chieftainship and also about when, why, or even if methods of power transfer changed.
However, recent scholarship has shed new light on Omaha leadership in the 1800s. Using
treaty signatures and James Owen Dorsey's tribal genealogies, researchers have shown that
principal Omaha chiefs definitely inherited their offices, and that there was traditionally a
third "quorum" leader, chosen from the "weaker" Earth moiety. Between 1815 and 1870,
Omaha chiefs' signatures on at least seventeen government documents reveal a recurring
hierarchical order; signing first on nearly all the documents were the two principal chiefs,
followed by the quorum chief and the four remaining members of the seven-man council.
The "Elk" gens, the "On the Left Side" clan, and the clan of the "Earthlodge Maker" were
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heavily represented among the first three signers of many treaties, indicating that principal
chieftainship was largely confined to these three groups. W ith the aid of Dorsey's
genealogies, the researchers demonstrated that within these clans, chiefdom was hereditary,
based on primogeniture, and "concentrated among a limited number of families within
specific lineages.. . . " But despite its strong argument in favor of hereditary chieftainship,
not even this definitive new study completely rules out competition as a factor, and Indian
agents' reports refer to "paper chiefs" as a constant threat to traditional leaders.40
Oddly, the first chiefs in Omaha recorded history were usurpers who gained their
influence not through normal channels, but by being courted and declared "chiefs" by white
men. In the late 1700s, an Omaha of uncertain identity visited St. Louis, and upon his
return announced that he had been made a chief. This unknown chief then appointed
"soldiers," one of whom was young Black Bird. A handsome Indian, Black Bird
impressed the St. Louis traders, who awarded him a chieftainship. As early as 1777,
traders dealt with "principal chiefs," showing that individuals held power and negotiated
for the tribe. In his report on favored Indian tribes, Francisco Cruzat listed the ambitious El
Pajara Negro (Black Bird) as leader of the Omahas.41
After the Louisiana Purchase, Americans continued the award-giving policy begun
by the Spanish and British; in 1806, the Omahas Hard Walker and a different Black Bird
received "commissions," accompanied by medals.42 Obviously, government meddling in
Omaha politics continued; five years later, on May 13, 1811, Big Elk and White Cow,
rivals for Omaha leadership, entered the camp of an American exploring party and asked
the party's leader to decide which of them should be the tribe's principal chief.43 The
Omahas had come a long way from the leadership of "seven wise men."
In their glory days, the Omahas saw themselves as "the most powerful and perfect
of human beings. "44 For a quarter of a century, they controlled a significant section of the
Missouri River, influencing neighboring tribes and dictating to colonial governments. The
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Omahas were at their most powerful between 1775 and 1800. Under their despotic chief,
Black Bird, they ruled the river, pitting English, Spanish, and eventually American traders
against each other. And because they had guns, they had no rivals among Missouri River
tribes.45 By 1775, Spanish documents listing Missouri Valley trading partners assigned
two traders and 5,000 pounds of trade goods to the "Mahas," and when the Missouri
Company incorporated in 1794, it assigned the mighty Omahas three traders and twelve
percent of its trade goods. 46 Personal bribes, in the form of medals, flags, and gifts, also
flowed up the Missouri River. The trader Jean-Baptiste Truteau considered the Omaha
village a perfect spot to establish a post from which to supply the Upper Missouri trade, but
he knew his scheme would require Black Bird's permission. To gain and keep the great
chiefs goodwill, Truteau suggested giving him a medal, a large flag, and annual
presents.47 Continuing the gift-giving process begun by the colonial powers, Lewis and
Clark ascended the Missouri River well-supplied. Before leaving in the spring of 1804,
they packed fourteen bales of Indian presents, including a large Jefferson peace medal for
the current chief of the Omahas.48
Despite the gifts that came their way, the Omahas traded on their own terms.
Because of commercial agreements with the Sauks, Foxes, and Grand Pawnees, they had
no real need for Spanish trade goods, and they made traders' lives miserable. From the
bluffs overlooking the Missouri, Black Bird and his warriors would watch vessels
approach, then stop them and demand that the traders unload their wares and carry them to
the village, where the chief would bargain. The traders complained of "insults and
violences" at the hands of Omaha and Ponca chiefs, and apparently, several were killed by
Black

B ir d .4 9

Truteau stated emphatically that the most dangerous spot for a trader

ascending the Missouri was passing the Omahas and Poncas, and to overcome this
obstacle, the Spanish protected their storehouses with palisades armed with swivel guns.50
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Heading upriver with a load of firearms in August 1794, the hapless Truteau tried
to think of ways to keep his guns from falling into Omaha hands. Because it was late
summer, the trader knew the tribe would soon be returning from their buffalo hunt, and he
doubted that he could get beyond their village undetected.^ 1 Truteau had reason to worry.
When Spanish traders did meet the Omahas, the Indians usually profited. Both Big Rabbit,
a second-ranking chief, and the clever Black Bird forced the long-suffering merchant to
grant them "credit," which was thinly-disguised

t h e f t .5 2

The Missouri Company sent three

expeditions upriver after 1796. The first safely passed the Omahas, the second did not, and
the third was only allowed through after paying tribute to Black Bird, his minor chiefs, and
the entire Omaha tribe.53
The Omahas were justified in their halting of Spanish traffic on the Missouri River.
They realized that their positions as middlemen would end if the Missouri Company
managed to reach tribes further upriver, but even more important, they wanted to keep their
enemies unarmed and under their control. Being politically astute, the Omahas knew they
could continue their hegemony only if traders were kept

d o w n str e a m .

54 But by attacking

Spanish trade missions and commandeering merchandise, much of which was earmarked
for them anyway, Black Bird and company may have hurt their own cause. So serious was
the Omaha problem that in 1801, the Missouri Company decided to reroute its trade to the
tribes of the Upper Missouri via the Platte River, bypassing the troublesome Omahas and
Poncas. ^ ^
No one man is more closely associated with the rise and fall of the Omaha tribe and
the Missouri River fur trade than the enigmatic Chief Black Bird. Known to the French as
Oisseau Noir, and called El Pajaro Negro by the Spanish, he is described alternately as a
"paper c h ie f" and a "pliant tool" of traders, and as a beloved, gentle

le a d e r .5 6

Similarly,

some accounts of Black Bird's autocratic rule stress his cruelty and vindictiveness, while
others say his power was

s p ir it u a l.5 7

According to ethnographers, explorers, and traders,
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Black Bird was an Indian "Borgia," controlling his people with poisons supplied by traders
who wished to see him remain in control. Arsenic gave the chief seemingly supernatural
powers; it was easy for him to play on his people's beliefs by foretelling a rival's death,
then to poison him to ensure that the prediction would come true.^8 One especially
ethnocentric observer saw fear and awe as major sources of Black Bird's power, but
condoned his methods since "ignorant and savage man" is best ruled that w

a y .^ 9

As a trader, Black Bird managed to ingratiate himself to whites while he cheated
them. He worked both sides of the street, managing to enrich both himself and the traders.
When a merchant unloaded his goods, Black Bird confiscated the lion's share for himself,
then allowed his trading partner to so severely overcharge the rest of the Omahas that he
still made a huge profit.60 On one occasion, after choosing his share of a trader's goods,
the wily chief comforted him, saying, "Now, my son, the goods which I have chosen are
mine, and those in your possession are your own. Don't cry, my son; my people shall
trade with you at your own price. "61
Black Bird liked to be called "the Prince of the Nations," since he wielded complete
power over neighboring tribes, especially the Poncas, who considered "this great rascal of
the Omahas" their protector. In 1796, Jacques Clamorgan, director of the Missouri
Company, ordered medals for the Poncas, but refused to distribute them without Black
Bird's concurrence.62 Realizing the Omaha chiefs importance to his trading company's
financial success, James Mackay argued that although Black Bird was "more despotic than
any European prince," it was absolutely essential to keep him "elevated above every other
chief." When suggesting an expensive annual gift to the prestigious Omaha, Mackay
reasoned that, "It is better to fatten one who rules as a despot over various tribes, than to
fatten many at less expense. "63
In 1800, the mighty Black Bird finally met an enemy he could not subdue when he
contracted smallpox after visiting a neighboring village. Always larger than life, he
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remained so even after death. According to romantic tales of his burial, the chief asked to
be buried astride his favorite horse on a hill overlooking the Missouri River, so he could
forever watch the traders come and go.64 g0 lasting was the late Black Bird's reputation as
a power on the Missouri that in 1804, when Lewis and Clark set out on their journey,
among their bags of gifts was a special one for the leading Omaha chief. The bag contained
red leggings, an army jacket, and an American flag.65 Regardless of his methods or
motives, Black Bird was a powerful presence on the Missouri in the late 1700s, and under
his leadership, the Omahas had few equals.
Big Elk, who died in 1853, was, along with Black Bird, the best-known of the
powerful Omaha chiefs. A diplomat rather than a despot, he held whites in high regard and
at one point expressed a desire to someday "be a white man

h im s e lf." 6 6

A signer of treaties

in 1815, 1825, 1830 and 1836, Big Elk tried to lead his people into the future. He was also
a prophet. After returning from a visit to Washington, D.C., shortly before his death, he
told his people:
There is a coming flood which will soon reach us, and I advise you
to prepare for it. Soon the animals which Wakon>da has given us for
sustenance will disappear beneath this flood to return no more, and
it will be very hard for you. Speak kindly to one another; do what
you can to help each other, even in the trouble with the coming
tid e . 6 7

Troubles did come, in the forms of disease, warfare, and the cumulative social,
economic, and cultural problems associated with over-dependence on the fur trade. While
Sioux and Sauk attacks were an unfortunate fact of life for the Omahas, and the fur trade
slowly robbed the tribe of its culture, it was smallpox that caused almost overnight
devastation, turning the rulers of the Missouri into a forlorn band of prairie nomads.
Shortly after 1800, the Skidi Pawnees conquered the mighty Omahas without a fight. Chief
Black Bird, engineer of many Omaha successes, probably caused the tribe's downfall by
carrying smallpox back from a Pawnee village. Within a few days after his return to camp,
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Black Bird was dead, and many of his people died before the epidemic ran its

c o u rse.

68

Having lost their chief and possibly as many as 400 warriors, the Omahas could no longer
control the trade or assaults by neighboring tribes, and were forced to loosen their
stranglehold on the Middle M

is s o u r i.
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Understandably, the death of an autocrat such as Black Bird created a leadership
vacuum, and the late chiefs successor, Big Rabbit, was soon challenged by the traditional
chiefs Big Elk and White Cow. The Sioux wasted no time; taking advantage of the power
struggle and the Omahas' weakened condition, they resumed their attacks. In addition, the
smallpox-ravaged Omahas soon lost control of their hunting grounds along the Middle
Platte. With so much of their spiritual and cultural life revolving around the buffalo, their
shrinking hunting grounds were a "psychological blow. "70
Sources do not always agree on the dates of the Omaha smallpox outbreak, but a
letter from Louisiana's Governor-General to all traders ordering them to avoid the Omaha
camps since the tribe had "suffered last winter from smallpox," dates the epidemic to the
winter of 1800-1801.71 Likewise, informants dispute the severity of the outbreak; the
reported number of dead varies from 400, to two-thirds of the tribe, to all but 300 Omahas,
and William Clark referred ambiguously to the deaths of "400 men & Women & children in
perpoposion[sic]."72 Some whites thought the Omahas would become extinct. In 1810,
Washington Irving predicted that the Omahas "before long will be numbered among those
extinguished nations of the west that exist but in tradition."73 Others believe casualty
reports among the Omahas were exaggerated, since their social organization remained
intact, and a French trader who may have visited the tribe in 1802 reported 600 men and a
huge cache of furs.74 Regardless of the numbers, smallpox devastated the Omahas
socially. The people did not understand the disease, and believing that their unborn children
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would also be disfigured, the survivors reportedly entered into a tribal suicide pact that they
hoped would take them all to "Some better countrey [sic]. "75
In the epidemic's aftermath, the Omahas once again fell prey to their longtime
enemies, the Sioux. For over one hundred years, with only a respite under Black Bird, the
Dakota bands had raided Omaha villages and forced the people to relocate along the
Missouri River. In the late seventeenth century, the Omahas had neither horses nor guns,
making them easy marks for armed enemies. Omaha traditions say that their people who
lived near the Pipestone Quarry were "attacked and slaughtered" by the Yankton Sioux after
about 1680. The people fled to near present-day Sioux Falls, but were once again raided.
The Omahas' next home, near the mouth of the Big Sioux River, proved to be an
unfortunate choice, since the Dakotas' war parties regularly traveled along that river.
Attacked several times between 1700 and 1740, the practically unarmed Omahas had no
choice but to flee.76
After 1723, the Omahas, once again pressured by the Sioux, moved up the
Missouri River, leaving good agricultural soil for marginal lands. French records show that
attacks were planned against the Missouri River tribes in 1727 and 1729.77 in 1729, two
French emissaries explained to their minister that a band of Sioux failed to appear for a
scheduled parlay because a "number of the prairie sioux" had enlisted their help in a war
with the

O m a h a s.

"78About 1750, the Omahas, Iowas, and Poncas relocated in northern

Nebraska, but the Sioux followed. Keeping ahead of their enemies, the Omahas moved
farther south to Omaha C

reek .

79

The Sioux threat intensified during the early 1800s, in part because, unlike almost
all the other Plains tribes, they actually grew in numbers, since many who were in the path
of smallpox had been

v a c c in a te d .

80 Members of the Lewis and Clark expedition recorded a

major battle in late August or early September 1804, in which the B rules destroyed forty
Omaha lodges, killed sixty-five to seventy-five men, plus some boys and children, and
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took forty-eight prisoners, including twenty-five women. A soldier with the exploring
party described in horror the grisly spectacle of Sioux women dancing while holding poles
decorated with Omaha scalps.81 This deadly battle may have been the result of a tragic
error. The Sioux had no central government, and bands acted independently. According to
reports, one band of Brules had agreed to a truce with the Omahas and Poncas, but another
had not, and continued to attack. When the Poncas took revenge on the wrong Sioux
village, the truce fell apart, resulting in the Omaha

s la u g h t e r .8 2

Threatened by the Sauks as well as the Sioux, the Omahas fled to the Elkhom
River about 1820 and remained there, not wanting to face the Yankton Sioux who had
taken over their lands in northeastern Nebraska. 83 The Omahas nearly starved during the
war-torn 1820s when they were reduced to eating only com since they were "too busy
fighting the Yankton and Brules to hunt. "84 The depredations continued; in 1821, the
Sioux attacked the Omahas near Fort Atkinson, killing two of Big Elk's brothers.85 in a
report accompanying the 1825 Fort Atkinson treaty, General Henry Atkinson and Major
Benjamin O'Fallon informed the Secretary of War that the Omahas "are at peace with their
immediate neighbors, but at war with the

S io u x .

"86

The Sioux continued to control northeastern Nebraska throughout the late 1820s,
but the well-armed Sauks, who had moved across the M issouri River, now posed a
problem. It may have been the Sauks, not the Sioux, who drove Big Elk and his tribal
faction from Big Village in 1829.87 Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Clark,
desperate to restore order among the Nebraska Indians, invited the Missouri River tribes to
an 1830 peace parlay at Prairie du Chien. Frightened of the Sauks, the Otos refused to
attend. The Omahas decided to go, but certain that the Sauks would murder him en route,
their negotiator Big Elk left his precious peace medal behind for his son.88 Just thirty years
earlier, an Omaha chief had ruled the Missouri River; now an Omaha leader risked his life
to make peace.
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Smallpox left many Omahas dead, and the hostile Sioux and Sauks kept the tribe on
the run, but fur traders who injected themselves into Omaha lives undermined traditional
leadership, disrupted the tribal economy, and nearly destroyed the people's culture. Ever
since its inception, the cornerstone of Omaha government had been traditional chiefs whose
legitimacy came directly from W ako^da. Traders were a divisive influence, and as a result
of their interference, two kinds of chiefs came to be recognized: 1) "paper chiefs," sonamed because whites gave them documents supporting their leadership claims, and 2)
traditional chiefs established by tribal right and custom. 89 Meddling by traders and
governments diluted traditional chiefs' influence; superior hunters favored by traders
became important, as did newly-appointed paper chiefs, many of whom had no right to the
title. Because they claimed to have government support, paper chiefs could become
influential, but their strength was practical rather than

s p ir it u a l.9 0

Traders understood the vulnerability of traditional chiefs and knew which tribal
members could be "bought." In a letter to the Governor-General of Louisiana, Spanish
Illinois' Lieutenant-Governor Zenon Trudeau claimed there were men among the Omahas
who would be willing to undermine the authority of unfriendly chiefs in exchange for
medals and blank commissions.91 Acting on this knowledge, traders showered pro-trade
chiefs and head men with gifts, as "medals were hung about their necks. . . .And efforts
were made to keep them loyal to the trading companies. . . ."92 Clever "trade chiefs"
sometimes went to great lengths to ingratiate themselves to whites. In competing for trade
and its potential profit, some Indian entrepreneurs married their daughters to traders,
arrangements that gave the brides financial security and led traders to believe they were
assured of their fathers-in-laws'
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Contrary to romantic accounts that picture Indians as commercial "babes-in-thewoods," the Missouri River tribes were quite familiar with barter; for centuries they had
traded their surplus among fellow Indians. Well aware of the value of goods, these people
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were "horse traders" in both senses of the word.94 But practical, established trade customs
changed with the coming of European goods, which were mostly items that could be
accumulated— durable goods such as tools, guns, and cloth. No longer were only
necessities received in trade; now possession of "things" gave their owners new riches and
enhanced their status.95 Indians began to crave luxuries which eventually became
necessities. They no longer hunted only for food, but for what pelts could buy, and after
the War of 1812, the Omahas found themselves scrambling to supply traders with pelts so
they could procure the goods they had come to need.96
"Pelts for profit" became a major factor in the decline of Omaha culture. Always
before, the tribe had hunted buffalo without reducing the herds, but to traders, game was
money, and to meet commercial demands, the Omahas began to kill the animals
indiscriminately.97 in what may be the first letter from a member of the Omaha tribe, Chief
Big Elk in 1828 petitioned the government to help his people, whose method of subsistence
had changed so drastically. In his wisdom, Big Elk saw the economic problems caused by
fur traders: "The white people who have been in the habit of coming into my village have
had great influence with us and have consiquently [sic] kept us scouring the country in
search of skins untill [sic] the animals themselves have left u s ... ."98
As traders' demands increased, the Omahas began to ignore religious rites
associated with the hunt, and tribal bonds unraveled. Previously, hunting had been
accompanied by religious ceremonies paying homage to WakonVda, the great benefactor.
But since commercial hunting was inconsistent with religious customs, these observances
fell out of favor, weakening traditions and splintering the community.99 Historically,
Omahas were not self-centered or individualistic, and during annual hunts, the good of the
tribe had always prevailed over individual rights. Now, solitary hunters armed with
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modem weapons could kill at will and keep their prizes. Hunting in this manner had no
religious significance, but the pelts piled up for aggressive hunters. 100
The pursuit of game had, of necessity, always occupied much of the Omahas' time
and energy, but with dwindling buffalo herds and the raised expectations of white traders,
they now extended their hunts to the detriment of village life and egalitarianism. With no
one at home, villages suffered neglect, and new standards for wealth inflated the status of
hunters. No group paid a higher price for tribal greed than women; always hard workers,
wives found themselves overwhelmed by the huge numbers of hides to be processed for
traders. The end result of this wifely labor shortage was an increase in polygyny, especially
among wealthy and influential men. 101
Although goods acquired in trade introduced Indians to more efficient tools and
some new handcrafts, they also destroyed young Indians' incentives to learn traditional
skills. For instance, metal pots led to the disappearance of pottery-making, glass beads put
an end to quill work, and by 1920, Francis La Flesche could locate only two aged Omahas
who recalled the highly-skilled, ancient art of bow-making. 102
In what has become a modem tragedy, rival fur companies competing for pelts
introduced the Omahas to liquor. Ignoring the pleas of old chiefs and leading men and a
law forbidding liquor sales to Indians, traders continued to ply the Omahas with illegal
whiskey, since alcohol was cheap and fur profits huge. 103 Liquor destroyed lives and
clouded judgment; even talented Big Elk fell under the influence of traders after he
discovered whiskey. 104 Seeing liquor's debilitating effects on native buffalo hunters,
some traders suffered momentary attacks of conscience, but the race for Indian pelts went
on, and the liquor continued to f lo w .l^
An important agent for cultural change, the fur trade altered both inter- and intratribal relations, and with the exception of a few environmentalists, such as Edwin James,
of Stephen Long’s 1820 expedition, neither trading partner considered its future
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consequences. The fur trade returned large profits, and its investors had no incentive to
limit the number of furs brought out of the Missouri River region. 106 At the whites'
insistence, Indians slaughtered huge numbers of buffalo, and as the herds shrank, so did
the hunting grounds. Inter-tribal wars became commonplace, and with the buffalo gone,
the Plains Indians could no longer feed themselves. 107 The fur trade had more impact on
Indians than on whites. Indians lived where the trading occurred, and many along the
Missouri River spent their whole lives influenced by traders. Ultimately, the Indians paid
the price when the buffalo disappeared from this region and the fur trade ended. 108 jn
order to trade, Indians had abandoned their traditional subsistence patterns and now found
themselves politically as well as economically dependent upon the government. 109
The activities of white fur traders harmed the Omahas in many ways, but traders
had no interest in real estate, and after many years of white contact, the Omahas still held
their territory in common, not realizing that the land they treasured was coveted by
w h ite s .

110 "The only title to land recognized among the Nebraska Indians was continuous

occupancy and use," 111 and Omaha land tenure tradition extended even to garden plots
where occupancy was everything. A tract being cultivated was never intruded upon;
however, if left vacant, anyone could use it.l 12 In addition, the procedure by witich land
could be bought and sold meant nothing to Indians. In their thinking, land could not change
hands, but the right to occupy and use it was protected, and trespassers could be punished
under certain conditions. 113
Disregarding "occupancy and use," the conquering nations of Europe never truly
recognized Indian title to American lands, and based their own claims upon discovery and
exploration. When the lands that later became Nebraska passed to the new United States
after the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the United States Supreme Court, in a series of
decisions, ruled that the government had the right to "extinguish the [Indian] title, either by
purchase or conquest."! 14 But neither the Supreme Court, land claims of white pioneers,
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nor army occupation convinced some experts that the United States had established a "basis
for ownership of Indian lands." On the other hand, some thinkers have tried to rationalize
American ownership and the dispossession of the American

I n d ia n .! 1 5

j n an oration

delivered on the 1802 anniversary of the Sons of the Pilgrims, John Quincy Adams
expressed this latter groups' thoughts:
The Indian right of possession itself stands . .. upon a questionable
foundation. Their cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a
space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever they
have annexed to themselves by personal labor, was undoubtedly by
the laws of nature theirs. But what is the right of a huntsman to the
forest of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in
quest of prey?. . . Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the
virtues and enjoyments of civilization for himself, but shall he
control the civilization of the whole world?! 16
To Adams and like-thinking Americans, the answer was an emphatic "no."
None of the three colonial powers operating in the Nebraska region attempted to
claim Omaha lands— probably because it was unnecessary. Omaha land cessions did not
begin until long after the Louisiana Purchase. Some of the earliest Indian treaties, including
those with the Omahas, were touted as treaties of "peace and friendship," but were
preliminary to later agreements that would involve Indian land titles. !17
On July 20, 1815, at Portage des Sioux, near St. Louis, Black Bird's grandson
Waanowrabai, Big Elk, and six other Omaha chiefs and warriors affixed their "x" marks to
the initial treaty between the Omaha Indian tribe and the United States government
(Appendix I).H 8 Short and to the point, this original treaty of peace and friendship
returned relations between the Omahas and the government to pre-War of 1812 status and
forgave hostilities committed by either party. Peace was promised forever, and most
important for the future, the Omahas put themselves under the exclusive protection of the
United States.! !9
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The Omahas were one of a number of tribes influenced by British traders prior to
the W ar of 1812. By returning Omaha-white relations to "the same footing upon which
they stood before the late war," the United States intended to replace Great Britain as the
Omahas' trading partner, and as planned, shortly after the treaty signing, Americans did
establish trade with the Nebraska tribe. 120 With its promise of Omaha dependency, the
innocuous-sounding Portage des Sioux Treaty was a first step toward the fateful land
cession of 1854.
The Omahas' first actual land cession was temporary. In order to increase its
presence in the west, the United States Army needed land along the Missouri River to build
Cantonment Council Bluff (later Fort Atkinson), and it instructed Brigadier General Henry
Atkinson to procure the necessary territory. On September 23, 1820, Atkinson and the
Omahas signed a treaty by which the tribe would cede to the government a fifteen-squaremile parcel of land, with the new fort's flagpole at its center (Appendix II). If ratified by
Congress, the treaty provided that in return for their lands, the Omahas would receive
supplies, weapons, and ammunition by June 1821. In addition, the Omahas retained the
right to hunt on portions of the cession not needed by the army. 121 Congress failed to
ratify the treaty, but both the Omahas and the army continued as if it had. To its credit, the
government kept its promise to deliver goods to the Indians, and, content with the trade,
the Omahas never questioned the legality of their land cession. The unratified treaty became
obsolete in 1829 when the army abandoned Fort Atkinson in favor of Fort Leavenworth,
and the Omahas reoccupied the

la n d .

122

In 1825, the government began to assert its control over the Omahas. Billed as
another "peace and friendship" agreement, the October 6 Fort Atkinson Treaty (Appendix
IE), signed by General Atkinson, Indian agent Benjamin O'Fallon, and fourteen prominent
Om ahas, was condescending, restrictive, and one-sided. 123 Now the Omahas
acknowledged American supremacy as well as protection, and agreed that the United States
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should regulate their trade. The government offered the Omahas "crumbs": Article Two
arrogantly extended to the Indians "from time to time, such benefits and other acts of
kindness as may be convenient." Article Three further restricted trade, limiting Omaha
commerce to American traders and stated that the government would determine trade sites.
According to the fourth article, the government agreed to provide traders to the Omahas,
with the understanding that the Indians would protect them. 124
Article Five dealt with possible future crimes committed by either whites or Indians,
and, though ethnocentric, began fairly enough, allowing for equal punishment for criminals
of either race. But the article contained a disturbing proviso. The treaty provided for the
unconditional recovery and return of any property stolen by an Indian; yet the proviso
required p roof if a white man was accused of stealing Indian property. 125
Not one acre of land changed hands in the 1825 Fort Atkinson Treaty, but it was a
surrender of Indian rights and sovereignty, and set a precedent by which the United States
government took from the Indians and gave little in return. The Omahas had already lost so
much. The buffalo were disappearing, many lives had been lost to enemy raids and
disease, and thanks to the fur trade, Omaha values had changed and their culture was in
disarray. All they had left was the land, and it too was now threatened. Little by little, treaty
by treaty, the Omahas would see their land base erode until in 1854, they would make a
final move to their reservation. But in 1819, Big Elk, still trusting the white man, saw no
future threat. At a fall tribal council, he had assured Agent O'Fallon that he and his nation
loved the whites, and in response to American troop movements along the Missouri River,
the chief had told his agent: "Some think, my father, that you have brought these warriors
here to take our land from us, but I do not believe it. For though I am but a poor, simple
Indian, yet I know that this land will not suit your farmers. . . ."126 How very wrong he
was.

NOTES

1Francis La Flesche, The Middle Five: Indian Schoolboys of the Omaha Tribe
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), xx.
2John M. O'Shea and John Ludwickson, Archaeology and Ethnohisloi v of the
Omaha Indians: The Big Village Site (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 1617. G. Hubert Smith, Omaha Indians: Ethnohistorical Report on the Omaha People (New
York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 11.
3James Owen Dorsey, "Migrations of Siouan Tribes," American Naturalist 20
(March 1886): 213.
^Dorsey, "Migrations," 215. Alice Fletcher and Francis La Flesche, The Omaha
Tribe. Twenty-seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 70-72. Early sources do not call these people
the "Omahas." Many early documents refer to them as the "Mahas," probably because
whites misunderstood native speakers, who softly sounded as "u" the first letter of Omaha,
while placing the accent on the second syllable. They are also called the "Makas" and the
"Mahars" in some sources. For the purpose of this paper, the modem "Omahas" will be
used, except when quoting sources that use another form of the name.
^Fletcher, "Tribal Life Among the Omahas," Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine
51 (January 1896): 456.
^Dorsey, "Migrations," 221-22.
^Jam es Owen Dorsey, Omaha Sociology. Third Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1884), 212.

^Dorsey, Omaha Sociology. 212. Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 7374.
^O'Shea and Ludwickson, Big ViUage. 17. Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha
Tribe. 85.
l^O'Shea and Ludwickson, Big Village. 20-21. Fletcher and La Flesche, The
Omaha Tribe. 85-86. Tanis C. Thome, "Black Bird, 'King of the Mahars': Autocrat, Big
Man, Chief," Ethnohistorv 40 (Summer 1993): 418.
H "Truteau’s Description of the Upper Missouri," in A.P.. Nasatir, ed., Before
Lewis and Clark: Documents Illustrating the History of the Missouri. 1785-1804. vol. 2
(St. Louis: St. Louis Historical Documents Foundation, 1952), 378. "Table of Distances

37

Along the Missouri in Ascending from the Mouth up the White River, Taken by James
MacKay, 1797," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark. 489.
12"William Clark's Journal, September 18, 1804," in Gary E. Moulton, ed., The
Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, vol. 3 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1987), 399. Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 86-87.
l^O 'Shea and Ludwickson, Big Village. 37. Dorsey, Omaha Sociology. 213.
Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 87-88.
l^Dorsey, Omaha Sociology, 213-14. J. L. Bean to Thomas H. Harvey, December
31, 1845, Letters Received. Council Bluffs Agency. 1844-1846. National Archives,
Records Group 75, Microcopy [M] 234, Reel 216.
15Fletcher and La Flesche, Omaha Tribe. 81. According to Mildred M. Wedel, in
"The Ioway, Oto, and Omaha Indians in 1700," Journal of the Iowa Archaeological Society
28 (1981): 9, French explorer, trader, and prospector Pierre-Charles Le Sueur attracted
bands of Sioux "as well as the Mahas .. ." to his fort near the Big Sioux River in 1700.
The Omahas probably hoped to receive trade items.
l^Smith. Omaha Indians. 13-14. Henry Putney Beers. French and Spanish Records
of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 15.
l^Nasatir. Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 98.
l^Fletcher and La Flesche. The Omaha Tribe. 78.
1^Francisco Cruzat, "Report of the Indian Tribes Who Received Presents at St.
Louis, Dated November 15, 1777," in Louis Houck, The Spanish Regime in Missouri,
vol. 1 (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 144.
20ceorge F. Will and George E. Hyde, Com Among the Indians of the Upper
Missouri (St. Louis: William Harvey Miner Co., Inc., 1917), 200, 204-05, 209. Thomas
F. Schilz and Jodye L. D. Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes: The Rise and Fall
of the Indian Fur Trade Along the Missouri and Des Moines Rivers, 1700-1820," Annals
of Iowa 49 (Summer/Fall 19871: 6-7.
21 Addison E. Sheldon, Land Systems and Land Policies in Nebraska, in
Publications of the Nebraska State Historical Society, vol. 22 (Lincoln: Nebraska State
Historical Society, 1936), 2. Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 88.
22Thomas Jefferson Famham, Famham's Travels in the Great Western Prairies, in
Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels. 1748-1846. vol. 28 (Cleveland:
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906), 146. Smith, Omaha Indians. 77-78.
23sheldon, Land Systems and Land Policies. 5. Fletcher and La Flesche, The
Omaha Tribe. 89-90.

38

^ F letc h er and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 135-35, 196.
25Will and Hyde, Com Among the Indians. 58. O'Shea and Ludwickson, Big
Village. 7.
26Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 271, 275, 693, 701-02.
27Fletcher and La Flesche. The Omaha Tribe. 217.
28Robin S. Ridington, "A Sacred Object as Text: Reclaiming the Sacred Pole of the
Omaha Tribe," American Indian Quarterly 17 (Winter 1993): 84.
29Ridington, "A Sacred Object as Text," 83. Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha
Tribe. 225,229.
30Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 201. In this case, "old" pertains to
wisdom, not necessarily age.
31 Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 208-09. Margaret Mead, The
Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 61.
It is generally agreed that in Mead's anthropological study, the mythical "Antlers" are the
Omahas.
32Alice C. Fletcher, "Personal Studies of Indian Life: Politics and 'Pipe-Dancing,"'
Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine 45 (November 1892-April 1893): 443.
33 r . h . Barnes, Two Crows Denies It: A History of Controversy in Omaha
Sociology (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 33. Fletcher and La Flesche,
The Omaha Tribe. 208. Dorsey, Omaha Sociology. 362.
34-Dorsey, Omaha Sociology. 358-59. Fletcher, "Politics and 'Pipe-Dancing,'" 441.
Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 206.
3^Mead, Changing Culture. 61. Thome, "Black Bird", 412, 418.
36Fletcher, "Politics and 'Pipe-Dancing,'" 443.
37Reo Fortune, Omaha Secret Societies (New York: Columbia University Press,
1932), 158.
38Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 204.
39Fortune. Omaha Secret Societies. 1,156.
40John M. O'Shea and John Ludwickson, "Omaha Chieftainship in the Nineteenth
Century," Ethnohistorv 39 (Summer 1992): 316-52. In their discussion of the few
exceptions to the treaty-signing order, O'Shea and Ludwickson, 327, explain that

39

occasionally, chiefs who disagreed with treaty provisions refused to sign. Also, distance
and danger sometimes became factors; for example, in 1830, Big Elk made the long,
hazardous journey to sign the Prairie du Chien Treaty, but chiefs such as Little Cook and
Hard Walker may have refused to cross hostile Sauk and Fox territory.
4lB am es, Two Crows Denies It. 29. Houck, Spanish Regime, vol. 1, 144.
^ O 'S h e a and Ludwickson, Big Village. 33.
43john Bradbury, Travels in the Interior of America in the Years 1809. 1810. and
1811. in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Earlv Western Travels, vol. 5 (Cleveland: Arthur H.
Clark Company, 1904), 89-90.
^W ashington Irving, Astoria, or Anecdotes of an Enterprise Bevond the Rocky
Mountains, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard, 1836), 170-71.
^ O 'S h e a and Ludwickson, Big Village. 23.
46Smith, Omaha Indians. 40-41, 51-52.
47"Journal of Truteau on the Missouri River, 1794-1795," in Nasatir, Before Lewis
and Clark, vol. 1, 285. John C. Ewers, "Symbols of Chiefly Authority in Spanish
Louisiana," in John Francis McDermott, ed., The Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 17621804 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 275, states that Black Bird was the only
Indian in Spanish Louisiana ever to be given a gold Spanish medal. Of course, in true
Black Bird style, he demanded it.
4^Francis Paul Prucha, Indian Peace Medals in American History (Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), 16-17.
4^George E. Hyde, The Pawnee Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1951), 131-32. "Truteau's Journal," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 260.
50"Truteau's Journal," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 302. "Carondelet
to Alcudia, Jan. 8, 1796," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 2, 389.
51 "Truteau's Journal," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 263.
52'Truteau’s Journal," 280-81, 290.
53"Petition of Clamorgan, January 15, 1800," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark,
vol. 2, 608.
54schilz and Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 12. Thome, "Black
Bird", 422-23. "Truteau's Journal," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 264.

40

55"Clamorgan to Salcedo, April 18, 1801," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol.
2, 633-34.
^Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 82. Henry Fontenelle, "History of
Omaha Indians," in Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska State Historical Society, vol.
1 (Lincoln: State Journal Co., 1885), 78.
^ T h o rn e , "Black Bird," 427.
^^Edwin James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky
Mountains, performed in the Years 1819. 1820 . .. under the Command of Maj. S. H.
Long, in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, vol. 14 (Cleveland: Arthur
H. Clark Co., 1905), 318. Irving. Astoria. 171-72. Fletcher and La Flesche. The
Omaha Tribe. 82. Bradbury, Travels in the Interior of America, p. 85n. "Truteau's
Journal," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 283. Tanis C. Thorne, in "Black
Bird," 428, states that the use of poisons to strengthen chiefs' powers was neither original
nor unique to Black Bird. In the early nineteenth century, Big Elk owned a poison pouch
that had been in his family's possession for over one hundred years, and the tribal council
also threatened poisoning of uncooperative tribesmen.
^^Henry Marie Brackenridge, Journal of a Voyage Up the River Missouri.
Performed in Eighteen Hundred and Eleven (Baltimore: Coale and Maxweld, 1815), 8788.

60james, Account of an Expedition. 318. "Truteau's Journal," in Nasatir, Before
Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 287-88. Irving, Astoria. 171.
61 B radbury. Travels in the Interior of America. 85n.
62"Truteau's Journal," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1, 293. Clamorgan
to Carondelet, April 10, 1796, in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 2, 418.
63"Mackay's Journal, Oct. 14, 1795-Jan. 18, 1796," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and
Clark, vol. 1, 359, 363.
64irying. Astoria. 175. James. Account of an Expedition. 317. Black Bird would
not have been buried on horseback. In Omaha funeral customs, live horses were never
interred with their owners, but were sometimes killed at the gravesite.
65James P. Ronda, Lewis and Clark Among the Indians (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1984), 14.
66james. Account of an Expedition. 281,320.
6 / FI etcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 84.
6$Hyde, The Pawnee Indians. 133-34. O'Shea and Ludwickson, Big Village. 30.

41

69o'Shea and Ludwickson, Big Village. 30. Richard White, "The Winning of the
West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,"
Journal of American History 65 (September 1978): 325.
^ S c h ilz and Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 18, 21.
7 1 "D elassus to Casa Calvo, St. Louis, April 13, 1801," in Nasatir, Before Lewis and

Clark, vol. 2, 631.
72Bradbury, Travels in the Interior of America. 90. Irving, Astoria. 174-75.
Famham, Farnham's Travels. 146. "Clark's Journal, August 11, 1804 and August 14,
1804," in Moulton, Lewis and Clark, vol. 2, 467, 478-79.
73lrving, Astoria. 170.
^ O 'S h e a and Ludwickson, The Big Village. 31. Barnes, Two Crows Denies It. 9.
^ F le tc h e r and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 86-87. Famham, Farnham's Travels.
146. "Clark's Journal, August 14, 1804," in Moulton, Lewis and Clark, vol. 2, 478-79.
Irving, Astoria. 174-75.
7^George E. Hyde, Red Cloud's Folk. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1957), 9-10, 14.
77Hyde, Red Cloud's Folk. 14-15.
7^Beauhamais and Hacquart to the French minister, Oct. 25, 1729, in Reuben Gold
Thwaites, ed., Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, vol. 17 (Madison:
Wisconsin State Historical Society, 1906), 77-78.
79HvdR. Red Cloud'.-; Folk. 15.

SOwhite, "Winning of the West," 328-29.
“ 1"Clark's Journal, September 26, 1804," in Moulton, Lewis and Clark, vol. 3,
119. "The Original Journal of Private Joseph Whitehouse," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed.,
Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition. 1804-1806. vol. 7 (New York: Amo
Press, 1969), 64.
^ W h ite , "Winning of the West," 326.
83Smith, Omaha Indians. 79, 129.
^ S c h ilz and Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 24.

42

85Sally A. Johnson, "The Sixth's Elysian Fields: Fort Atkinson on the Council
Bluffs," Nebraska History 40 (March 1959): 24.
86h . Atkinson and Benj. O'Fallon to Sec. of War James Barbour, November 8,
1825, in American State Papers. Indian Affairs, vol. 2, 606.
87Smith. Omaha Indians. 129. 181. O'Shea and Ludwickson. Big Village. 39.
88 U.S. Congress. Senate. William Clark to John L. Bean, April 25, 1830, in
Correspondence on the Subject of the Emigration of Indians Between the 30th November.
1831. and 27th December. 1833. 23rd Cong., 1st sess., 1835, S. Doc. 512, vol. 2, 66-67
[Serial 245]. William Clark to the O'Maha Tribe, April 24, 1830, in Ibid.. 67. William
Clark to Sec. of W ar John H. Eaton, November 1, 1830, in Ibid.. 182-83.
89Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 85.
^Opletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 212.
91 Trudeau to Carondelet, May 30, 1795, in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark, vol. 1,
326.
92Fletcher and La Flesche. The Omaha Tribe. 82,631.
93 John C. Ewers, "The Influence of the Fur Trade Upon the Indians of the Northern
Plains," in Malvina Bolus, ed., People and Pelts: Selected Papers of the Second North
American Fur Trade Conference (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Peguis Publishers, 1972), 17.
94Ewers, "Influence of the Fur Trade," 2-3.
95schilz and Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 5-6.
96Brian Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), 43. Smith, Omaha Indians. 59-60.
97 Alice C. Fletcher, "Hunting Customs of the Omahas," Century Illustrated Monthly
Magazine 50 (May -October 1895): 693.
98xhe Big Elk, Chief of the Omahaws Nation of Indians, Cantonment Leavenworth,
June 24, 1828, accompanying Dougherty to Clark, June 23 [sic] , 1828, in Letters
Received by the Office of Indian Affairs. 1824-81: Upper Missouri Agency. 1824-1835.
National Archives, Record Group 75, Microcopy 234, Reel 883.
99Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 271, 614.
lOOschilz and Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 7-8. In Keepers of the
Game: Indian-Animal Relations and the Fur Trade (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), 19, 39, 61-62, 65, Calvin Martin argues that the religious significance of the

t

43

hunt had been waning before the coming of the fur trade. Prior to white contact, there
appear to have been limits placed on the number of animals a hunter could kill, since he
was required by tradition and spirituality to treat the remains of his prey with respect.
Failure to do so would result in retaliation by animal spirits—poor hunting or tribal illness,
for example. But European diseases and Christian interference with native beliefs changed
the Indian world view. Later, lured by European trade goods, armed with European
weapons, and encouraged by European traders, Indians began to hunt indiscriminately, and
because they had begun to lose respect for both animals and the land, slaughter of wildlife
became acceptable. Christianity supported the fur trade by "elevating man above Nature"
and secularizing the hunt. The cycle continued: participation in the trade increased Indian
callousness toward nature as it whetted the desire for more durable goods. Although
writing specifically about the Indians of sub-Arctic Canada, Martin's observations could
easily apply to the Omahas as well.
101 Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 615. Schilz and Schilz, "Beads,
Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 8.
102Ewers, "Influence of the Fur Trade," 11. Francis La Flesche, "Omaha Bow and
Arrow Makers," in Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution. 1926 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), 487-88.
IQ^Fletcher and La Flesche. The Omaha Tribe. 618.
104Johnson, "The Sixth's Elysian Fields," 25.
105£wers, "Influence of the Fur Trade," 17.
106schilz and Schilz, "Beads, Bangles, and Buffalo Robes," 6. Ewers, "Influence of
the Fur Trade," 20-21.
107£werSj "Influence of the Fur Trade," 20-21.
108EwerSj "influence of the Fur Trade," 1-2.
109smith, Omaha Indians. 60-61.
H^Ewers, "Influence of the Fur Trade," 17.
H I Sheldon, Land Systems and Land Policies. 5.
1 l^Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe. 269.
H^D'Arcy McNickle, "Indian and European: Indian-White Relations from Discovery
to 1887," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 311
(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1957), 6-7.

44

H^Sheldon, Land Systems and Land Policies. 14-15. Charles C. Royce, comp.,
Indian Land Cessions in the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 52728. Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheaton. United States Reports. 543
(1923). See Royce's Indian Land Cessions. 528-33, for a thorough discussion of this
precedent-setting Supreme Court decision.
H^Rovce. Indian Land Cessions. 16-17.
H ^ R o v c e . Indian Land Cessions. 536. In his study of the western Sioux, Richard
White argues convincingly that the Plains Indians did not range "accidentally" over the
land. Although individuals may not have possessed private property, tribes recognized and
enforced territoriality, Despite their fluidity, tribal boundaries did exist, and inter-tribal
wars were frequently fought over rights to game and other natural resources. The politically
astute Sioux declared that they held their lands in the same way Americans did—by "right
of conquest." "Winning of the West," 341.

H^Sm ith. Omaha Indians. 73-74.
1^ C h arles J. Kappler, comp, and ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 115.
119Kappl er, Indian Laws and Treaties. 115.
120iCappl er, Indian Laws and Treaties. 115. Fletcher and La Flesche, The Omaha
Tribe. 622. Smith, Omaha Indians. 75.
121 American State Papers. Indian Affairs, vol. 2, 226.
122Q'Shea and Ludwickson. Big Village. 38. Smith. Omaha Indians. 80-81.
123]£appler, Indian Laws and Treaties, 260-62.
124-Kappler. Indian Laws and Treaties. 261-62.
125Kappler. Indian Laws and Treaties. 261.
126jameSj Account of an Expedition. 258, 260.

CHAPTER TWO
MAKING WAY FOR WHITES: TREATIES AND TROUBLES, 1830-1853

I am like a large prairie wolf, running about over these barren prairies, in search of
something to eat, with his head up, anxiously listening to hear some of his fellows howl,
that he may dart off towards them, hoping to find a friend who has a bone to divide. 1
Omaha Chief Big Elk, 1835

Big Elk's predicted "flood" soon began to engulf his people, as the government
moved eastern Indians onto traditional Omaha hunting grounds and whites discovered that
the "Great American Desert" could be farmed profitably. Between 1830 and 1853, the
Omahas signed two official treaties and several agreements that were never ratified,
received cash for land for the first time, and joined the ranks of annuity Indians. The tribe
also witnessed the further destruction of the great buffalo herds as white hunting parties
slaughtered the precious animals by the thousands. The Sioux conducted relentless raids,
time and again forcing the Omahas from their homes. Alcohol, supplied by unscrupulous
whites, continued to be a serious problem, and traders pounced on Omaha annuities and
attempted to manipulate treaties to their benefit. The Omahas were no match for the new
spirit of M anifest Destiny. Like the Otoes, Missourias and Pawnees, they had the
misfortune to be "border tribes" blocking western migration, and as such, they became
victims of political infighting over territories and lucrative railway routes to the Pacific.
Despite the humanitarian efforts of a few agents and other Indian Department officials, the
Omahas continued to suffer, and in late 1853 were poised to sign an historic treaty that
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would drastically reduce their land base and confine them to a reservation much too close to
the Sioux.
On July 15, 1830, at Prairie du Chien in Michigan Territory, the Omahas made their
first permanent cession of land to the United States government, when, along with the
Sauks and Foxes, Sioux bands, and the Iowa, Otoe and M issouria tribes, they ceded
hunting grounds east of the Missouri River, in present-day Iowa. 2 The government's
primary motive for arranging a treaty at this particular time was to prevent bloodshed
among the Indians. Misunderstandings over boundaries and land cessions in the 1825 Fort
Atkinson Treaty had caused a great deal of dissension among the Iowa and Nebraska
tribes. The Sauks and Foxes asserted that the treaty's terms awarded them lands east of the
Missouri River which were already claimed by the Omahas and Otoes. On the other hand,
the Omahas and other destitute bands accused the Sauks and Foxes of selling their hunting
grounds and using their annuities to finance a war to take control of the disputed lands.
Because there was little game left in their own territory, access to these lands remained
crucial to Omaha survival. The Sauks, weary of waiting to be told where their tribal
boundaries lay, stepped up the pressure, and a major Indian war seemed imminent. 3
On February 1, 1830, Omaha agent John Dougherty informed the Secretary of War
that the Yanktons, Omahas, Otoes and Iowas desired a treaty to guarantee peace with the
Sauks and Foxes. The tribes proposed that the government buy the disputed land and
reserve it as a common hunting ground. Accordingly, President Andrew Jackson ordered a
conference at Prairie du Chien, and as an incentive to the Indians, made $3,000 in goods
available if and when they reached an agreement. 4
The job of securing delegations from all involved tribes fell to Indian
Superintendent W illiam Clark and Colonel W illoughby Morgan, commander at Fort
Crawford. Even after raising the value of gifts to $5,000, it took over two months to
assemble the tribal representatives. Clark threatened Sauk and Fox chief Keokuk with
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bodily harm if he refused to attend the council, and the Omahas' fear of the fierce Iowa
tribes forced Agent Dougherty to consider sending his charges to Michigan Territory by a
more circuitous routed On July 10, after their safe arrival, the tribal representatives signed
an informal treaty of peace, and five days later, the delegates, including Omahas Big Elk,
White Horse and White Cow, put their names to a formal document ceding their western
Iowa lands (Appendix IV).6 This treaty marked the Omahas' first payment for lands, and
began their troubled history as annuity recipients.
The Prairie du Chien Treaty's opening lines clearly state its two purposes— to
remove the bases for friction among the tribes, and, in light of the disappearing buffalo
herds, to encourage ways of subsistence other than the hunt.7 By the provisions of Article
One, the Omahas relinquished all rights to land east of the Missouri River (Maps 4 and 5),
a government admission that they previously held title to the land by virtue of it being their
long-used hunting grounds. The first article included an ambiguous and later troublesome
passage stating that the ceded lands were to be assigned and allotted to the tribes "now
living thereon, or to such other Tribes as the President may locate thereon, for hunting and
other purposes.”8
In return for their lands, the Omahas were to receive $2,500 "annually for ten
successive years . . . either in money, merchandise, or domestic animals, at their option."
In addition, the government pledged the services of a blacksmith for ten years and $500
worth of agricultural implements. Articles Five and Eight offered further incentives; for ten
years, the Omahas would receive a $3,000 annuity for their children's education, and at
Prairie du Chien, they shared in $5,132 worth of merchandise.^ At the Indians' request,
the treaty also established a reservation between the Grand and Little Nemaha rivers in
present-day southeastern Nebraska for Omaha, Iowa, Otoe, Yankton and Santee Sioux
mixed-bloods. Since these "Half-Breed Tract" lands had originally belonged to the Otoes,
the other tribes agreed to pay them $3,000 over ten years, from their collective annuities.^
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It is obvious that the Omahas were confused by the strange wording of the treaty's first
article, since they continued to hunt on the ceded lands. 11 In 1837, without prior notice,
the government moved the Prairie Band of Pottawatamies plus small bands of Chippewas
and Ottawas onto a reservation in what is now southwestern Iowa. Almost 3,000 "eastern"
Indians were now located almost directly across the Missouri River from the Bellevue
Agency, cutting the Omahas off from their western Iowa hunting grounds, which they
understood were still theirs to use. 12
Both John Dougherty and Pottawatami Agent Edwin James recognized the
unfairness of the government's actions, and Dougherty presented the Omahas' case in
Washington that fall. When Indian Commissioner Carey A. Harris requested information
on the Iowa lands, Dougherty responded with an angry letter protesting the government's
move and citing problems with the 1830 treaty. Dougherty understood that the sole reasons
for the treaty were to promote peace and more clearly define the blurred tribal boundaries
that had been a frequent source of dissention. The agent argued that neither he nor the
Indians believed they were surrendering all rights and title to those lands for "the paltry
consideration of Five Thousand dollars annually for Ten Years!!" Dougherty, who had
been the Omahas' interpreter as well as their agent at Prairie du Chien, stated that the
Pottawatamies were merely jo in t owners of the western Iowa lands, and both the treaty
commissioners and the Omahas believed that hunting rights would remain forever. The
irate agent's argument hinged on a single word in Article One. As stated, the treaty made it
possible for the president to locate certain tribes on the ceded lands to the exclusion of the
Omahas. Dougherty pointed out that the inadvertent substitution of the word "or" for "and"
completely changed both the meaning and intent of the treaty, and that the president was
never meant to have the powers falsely granted him by Article One. Warning that the
Omahas would be in a desperate condition without either access to the hunting grounds or

50
liberal compensation, Dougherty urged Harris to send provisions enough to tide them over
until they could learn agriculture. 13
Early in 1838, in response to Dougherty's plea for help, Commissioner Harris sent
the agent a draft copy of a treaty by which the Omahas would relinquish any remaining
interest in the Iowa lands in return for a cash payment of $15,000. The Omahas signed the
treaty on April 22, but the Senate refused to ratify it, leaving the unfortunate tribe with no
Iowa hunting grounds and little money to buy much-needed food. 14
The lands ceded by the Indians in 1830 included a parcel west of the original
Missouri state boundary running north from the juncture of the Kansas and Missouri
rivers, and the ink was barely dry on the Prairie du Chien Treaty when it came under fire
from citizens of western Missouri who objected to Indian hunting grounds blocking their
access to the Missouri River and preventing white settlement in the area. Missourians'
desire for this land was understandable; the area in question, known as the "Little Platte
Region," is that part of present northwest Missouri "watered by the Little Platte and
Nodaway rivers, one of the world's richest bodies of brown loess s o il. . . and according
to Indian legend, the 'beginning of the road to Paradise."’ Originally omitted from Missouri
due to a desire for neat boundary lines and the lack of initial white demand for these lands,
the Little Platte region was now coveted by settlers along the Missouri border. 15 Landhungry Missourians claimed that the state line had been incorrectly marked, and they gave
several reasons why the Little Platte region should be incorporated into the State of
Missouri: 1) it would create the natural boundary of the Missouri River as a more likely
way to separate the races; 2) Indians held no land title; 3) the country was unsuitable for
Indians in that the area was too small for any tribe, and no doubt more important to
Missourians, Indians in the Little Platte region would be "troublesome neighbors"; 4) the
land would bring a good price; and 5) it would help protect settlements from Indian attacks.
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A memorial to Congress, signed by over 150 concerned citizens, asked, "Shall so beautiful
and fertile a country remain a wilderness?" 16
The Missouri state legislature quickly joined private citizens in pleading the state's
case for annexation of this desirable area. Lawmakers warned of future "calamities" due to
the "restless hordes of native savages," and pictured the area as one that would be valuable
to a "cultured population." Taking a sarcastic tone, the legislature reminded Congress that
the government must have been aware of the "wretched condition" of the border tribes,
since Indian agents constantly called it to the public's attention, and if the tribes really were
that destitute, it did not bode well for white Missourians. Claiming that starving Indians
would steal to eat, the memorialists continued, "If the Indian tribes alone were to suffer. . .
we should leave them in their misery to the wisdom and humanity of Congress. But we,
too, are involved in the evils of their lot." 17
In 1835 and 1836, M issouri Senator L. F. Linn conducted an extensive
correspondence with Indian commissioners and agents to drum up support for his state's
annexation campaign. His correspondents all seemed to agree, especially on two points: 1)
the land was an inappropriate spot for Indians; and 2) Missouri needed access to the river.
In a May 1835 letter to Secretary of War Lewis Cass, Linn stated his feelings on the matter:
The hum ane policy pursued by the G overnm ent . . . has
accumulated horde upon horde upon our borders, ready and willing
at a favorable moment to rush upon our frontier settlements; the
inconvenience of their presence is sufficiently great without
throwing them between us and our great navigable waters. 18
Linn and his fellow legislators knew the Indians who signed the 1830 treaty were
willing to sell their lands, and in their eagerness to acquire treaties, the Missouri
congressmen offered to conduct the negotiations themselves, at no charge. When
confronted with the terms of the 1834 Indian Intercourse A c t ,^ they assured Secretary
Cass that they understood the government's promise not to disturb the Indians, and were in
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favor of the policy— except in the case of Missouri's border. Their concern seemed to be
that unless the state owned the land, they would have no guarantee that the Little Platte
region would not be permanently turned over to In d ian s.^
Missouri had its way. In its report to the Senate on March 16,1836, the Committee
on Indian Affairs agreed that Indian title to the Little Platte lands should be extinguished as
soon as possible, but did not think it necessary to appoint a treaty commission. Instead,
they believed it would be cheaper and more efficient to have Indian agents who were
already in the field conduct the negotiations.21 But Congress was impatient; in June 1836,
months before the treaty negotiations took place, it approved a bill to extend Missouri's
border. 22
On October 15, 1836, at Bellevue, Upper Missouri, Indian agent John Dougherty,
sub-agent Joshua Pilcher, and tribal leaders of the Omahas, Otoes, Missourias, Yankton
and Santee Sioux consummated the treaty often referred to as the "Platte Purchase"
(Appendix V). According to Article One, the Indians agreed to relinquish all claims
between the State of Missouri and the Missouri River (Map 5), thus creating "a natural
boundary between the whites and Indians. . .

In addition, as compensation for

abandoning their fall hunts to attend the treaty negotiations, each tribe shared in $4,520
worth of "presents." Article Three of the brief treaty immediately affected the Omahas.
Since they were forced to relocate near Bellevue because of the Sioux threat, the
government promised to break and fence 100 acres of farmland near the new Omaha village
"as soon as it can be done after the ratification of this convention."23
The Platte Purchase was a bargain for the government. The Indians received no
cash, and no future annuities were promised. In return for this "beautiful . . . valuable"
tract, the tribes received nothing but the trade goods distributed at the treaty signing. In his
diary, Reverend Moses Merrill, missionary to the Otoes, thanked the Lord for making
agents Pilcher and Dougherty so generous.24 Obviously, Merrill knew nothing about

The Platte Purchase
Map 5
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potential land values. Traders, often lurking at the fringes of Indian policy, meddled with
the treaty; among original provisions excluded from the ratified document was one to repay
Omaha debts to traders Joseph Robidoux, Sr. and Lucien

F o n t e n e lle .2 5

And late in 1845,

the government still had not plowed and fenced the 100 acres near Bellevue that had been
promised to the Omahas nine years

e a r lie r .
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Not since the smallpox epidemic at the turn of the century had the Omahas been as
dispirited and destitute as they became in the years following the Bellevue Treaty. During
the late 1830s and throughout the next decade, the Omaha people were raided by Sioux,
victimized by traders, and ignored by the government. White emigrants cut a destructive
swath through Omaha lands, and for two years, Latter-Day Saints illegally squatted in
Indian country, defying the government and destroying Omaha resources. After 1840, left
without annuities and often too frightened of the Sioux to venture onto the prairie in search
of game, the little band barely managed to survive. Their numbers dwindled in the 1840s:
in 1838, there were approximately 1,400 Omahas, and five years later, Agent Daniel
Miller's census counted 1,301. By 1847, this once "considerable tribe" numbered just over
1,000, m any of them

c h ild r e n .

27 Concerned Indian agents, superintendents,

commissioners and even Mormon sympathizers begged the governm ent to help the
struggling tribe, but the "Great Father" either did not hear, or chose not to listen.
It was evident as early as 1830 that the Omahas were in trouble. Liquor kept them
in poverty, the Sioux threat made a permanent home impossible, and any half-hearted
government attempts to turn them into farmers failed miserably. The supply of game had
run so low that the Omahas "starve[d] almost half the year— and [were] very badly
clad."28 in 1831, Agent John Dougherty, who perhaps did not appreciate their dedication
to the hunt, saw the Omahas' future as one of limited choices: they must either "cultivate
the Soil or perish by hunger."29 Despite these problems, Omaha leaders appeared willing
to cooperate with the government. In 1833, just a few weeks before he presided over an

informal treaty of peace among the border tribes, Special Com missioner Henry L.
Ellsworth forwarded a plea for help from the Omaha tribe. While expressing their desire to
till the soil and educate their children, they reminded the president that they were starving
and needed assistance. Describing their band as once "numerous and happy," Big Elk and
the other leaders begged, "Will not our great father help us . . . that we may once more
have enough to eat, and our women and children not starve and die when the cold weather
comes?"30
When the Prairie du Chien treaty annuities expired in 1841, the Omahas were once
more forced to depend on hunting profits, but they were "so reduced in number, and so
poor in horses, that their hunting trips [were] attended with but little su c ce ss."^ With
small hunting profits and no annuity extension, the Omahas were soon destitute.32 During
the winter of 1843-44, they needed food so badly that they crossed the river and stole com,
cattle, and pigs from the Pottawatamies. Big Elk promised to make restitution, but
Pottawatami Agent Richard Elliott had little sympathy for the starving Omahas, calling them
"too lazy to work and too cowardly to hunt."33
In 1845, Agent J. L. Bean described the Omahas as a people with "no resting
place," situated as they were between the Sioux and the Pawnees. That summer the Sioux
had burned the Omaha village at Blackbird Hills, forcing the tribe to flee down river to the
Bellevue Agency. After their arrival, they lived on "roots, the wild pea, with now and then
a stray raccoon or muskrat." Almost completely unarmed, they were terrified to leave the
agency to look for larger game. The Pottawatamies shared their provisions, but finally had
to tell the Omahas not to come back, because their own supplies were running low. Bean
was convinced that had it not been for the hoes and axes that their blacksmith made to help
them dig roots, many Omahas would have died. He feared for the Indians— "how they are
going to get through the Spring months the Lord only knows."34 in response to Bean's
urgent request for help, Superintendent Thomas Harvey asked Indian Commissioner

William Medill to authorize the purchase of $600-$800 worth of com to see the band
through its

c r is is .
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The com arrived, but the Omahas remained "a poor dispirited

p e o p le ." 3 6

By 1846,

the band had shrunk to "a pitiable handful of scarcely more than a hundred families," and at
least one observer believed they would shortly

d is a p p e a r .3 7

Mormon advocate Thomas

Kane accused the government of not sending the Omahas "a single sheep or a single soldier
i
to stand in the way of their death by murderers or starvation."38 jn 1849, Father PierreJean De Smet, Jesuit missionary and keen observer of American Indians, painted a grim
portrait of the Omahas. According to De Smet, the tribe was in "a state of nearly absolute
destitution," hunting birds, digging roots, and always wary of more powerful enemiesf
who often killed the old, the women, and the

c h ild r e n .

3 9 But perhaps Presbyterian

missionary Edward McKinney best summed up the 1840s when he reported that the
Omahas’ "entire destitution .. . [left] them almost always both naked and hungry. "40
Many of the Omahas' problems in the 1830s and 1840s were either the direct or
indirect results of white contact, and in most cases, "whites" meant traders. W hether
bartering for furs or annuity money, traders adversely affected Indian economy, society
and government. John Dougherty was especially vocal regarding traders' influence, which
he believed counteracted government efforts to improve the Indians' condition. The
conscientious agent became frustrated because he saw himself and the traders constantly
pitted against each other: "While the agent is advising the Indians to give up the chase and
settle themselves . . . the traders are urging them on in search of skins."41 In 1838, he
became so angry that he recommended a change in the intercourse law to allow a
government officer to clear an Indian village of white men, including licensed

tra d e r s.

42

In the 1840s, traders who formerly had gone to the Indians to barter for furs now
traded goods for annuity money. Indians derived little benefit from annuities since many
owed traders money, and their creditors hovered about the posts ready to snap up the cash
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when it arrived. Commissioner T. Hartley Crawford knew exactly what transpired, and he
argued that "the recipients of money are rarely more than conduit pipes to convey it into the
pockets of their traders."43 Also, annuity payments made to chiefs and head men created a
powerful temptation for them to misuse tribal funds by purchasing items on credit. As a
result, individual debts became tribal ones, and in some cases, the government had to make
annuity payments directly to traders.44 Even former traders took a lively interest in Omaha
annuities; for example, before the payments ended in 1841, Joshua Pilcher, ex-trader and
now Superintendent of Indian Affairs, suggested that the government buy some Omaha
land, the profits from which would help the tribe. From past experience, Pilcher knew that
a continuation of annuities from land sales would be a boon to traders. Pilcher's successor,
David D. Mitchell, himself a former trader, repeated the land purchase recommendation the
following year.45
Many traders had friends in high places, and did not hesitate to use their political
influence to remove "over-zealous" agents from their posts. In 1847, Commissioner Medill
received a tip that the "most active representatives of the Indian Traders" threatened to pull
political strings to prevent crusading St. Louis Superintendent Thomas Harvey from
prosecuting fur companies for "fraud and liquor smuggling." The biggest problems were
the large trading companies such as Pierre Choteau, Jr., and Company and W. G. and G.
W. Ewing, who took advantage of Indians to acquire their annuities. These companies
were nearly impossible to prosecute, since they bribed agents, traded through "front-men,"
and had United States congressmen in their pockets.46 The American Fur Company had
powerful representation in Congress in the person of Missouri Senator Thomas Hart
Benton, who helped install former traders Joshua Pilcher and D. D. Mitchell as Missouri
River Indian Service employees.47
Indian agents did sometimes attempt to police traders. In 1850, Omaha Sub-agent
John E. Barrow, on hearing that the Indian Department planned to grant additional trading
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licenses, asked Commissioner Luke Lea to refer applicants to him, since he knew the types
of people who were waiting across the river to come into Indian country. Calling western
Iowa a den of "thieves, counterfeiters, robbers, and liquor dealers to Indians," he assured
the commissioner that "no place in America [was] inhabited by a more unmitigated set of
villains than in the country immediate[ly] opposite called Council Bluffs. "48 But screening
applicants did not work in practice. Nearly anyone could obtain a license, and those who
could not, traded illegally. With no enforcement arm, the Indian department could do little
to prevent such

a b u s e s .4 9

Of all the white man's vices carried into Indian country by traders, alcohol abuse
was by far the most pervasive and destructive. Unscrupulous traders may have cheated the
Omahas of their annuity payments, but liquor robbed them of their dignity and destroyed
the vitality of their traditional culture. The easy availability of illegal whiskey curtailed
hunts, turned formerly honest Omahas into thieves, and forced the people deeper into
poverty. Competing traders plied hunters and chiefs with liquor, circumventing the law by
claiming to give whiskey away. Soon no transaction between Indians and traders took
place without alcohol playing a role, and many tribesmen became so addicted to whiskey
that anyone attempting to trade without it came away empty-handed.^^ By the early 1830s,
alcohol abuse had become so widespread that "not an Indian could be found among a
thousand who would not (after a first drink) sell his horse, his gun, or his last blanket, for
another. . . ."51
Despite the 1834 intercourse laws, whites continued to contact Indians, and in the
1830s and 1840s, the Indian office received numerous complaints about the importation of
liquor onto Indian lands along the Missouri River. In 1841, Superintendent Mitchell
reported that 300 barrels of whiskey had been smuggled in, and that well over 100 Indians
had died in drunken brawls. Besides the loss of life, alcohol abuse led to civil wars
resulting in tribal breakups, and caused hunters to stay home, leaving their families to
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sta r v e .

52 in an 1831 letter to John Dougherty, Upper Missouri Sub-agent J. L. Bean

lamented that "liquor flows as freely as the Missouri. . . . If it was possible to imagine half
the human misery I have witnessed . . . you would use utmost influence in having it
stopped. "53
But the liquor continued to flow, and the government had little success in stemming
the tide, as both large and small trading companies smuggled alcohol into Indian country.
When the government put a stop to their upriver liquor shipments, the American Fur
Company, fearing a loss of business, smuggled in a still and made its own whiskey, some
of which found its way into the Omaha camp. In late 1831, Joshua Pilcher reported having
seen Big Elk leave an American Fur Company post with an eight-gallon

k e g .5 4

Of the

small traders, the most difficult to control were the liquor-sellers who persuaded Indians to
cross state lines to trade where they were not subject to the intercourse laws. Agent John
Miller argued that whiskey purchased from these Iowa and Missouri dealers impeded the
tribe's prosperity and turned them into horse thieves. When the Indians traded their own
ponies for liquor, they then stole at least an equal number from

w h it e s .5 5

In just one year,

the Omahas traded thirty horses for liquor, and were cheated in the deal, a pony bringing
only two to four gallons of watered whiskey. During winter, Miller's charges crossed the
frozen Missouri River to barter with Pottawatami mixed-bloods who got their trading
whiskey from whites living near the Missouri line. W hen lectured about the evils of
drinking, the Omahas replied simply, "The white man makes it and sells it to

u s.
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M edal-giving continued well into the nineteenth century, perpetuating trader
influence and eroding the power of traditional chiefs. Throughout his long career, the
usually pro-white Big Elk complained of trader interference with his leadership. When
Major Thomas Biddle visited the Omaha camp in 1819, the chief told him that it was
difficult to govern his people when traders gave medals and "[made] chiefs of every man
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who [could] obtain a party to trap beaver." Biddle regretted that traders' meddling and
alcohol had cost the government the services of a "valuable and sensible Indian" possessing
"some traits that do honor to human nature. . . ."57
Big Elk continued his campaign against trader influence. Twenty-five years after his
conversation with Biddle, in the winter of 1844, the aging chief complained to his agent
that

trader A. L. Papin had given medals to several of his young men, who now

considered themselves his superiors. Big Elk confided that one of these young competitors
had even threatened his life, and predicted that "before the grass was an inch long" he
would be a dead man unless the medal-giving stopped. Although he also had a medal, the
chief swore that when he received his, he was told to be kind to everyone. Feeling like "an
old scabby Buffalo Bull who had got separated from his band on the Prairies," the old man
covered his head with his robe and lay down, thinking "his Great Father had thrown him
away." When confronted by Miller, Papin told the agent that thousands of medals had been
given to Indians, and that in a young man's mind, a fifty-cent pewter medal was as
valuable as a horse.58
Big Elk probably had reason to fear for his life. On December 6, 1847, American
Hat, an Omaha chief friendly to whites, was murdered by three young tribesmen. Earlier
on the night he was killed, the chief told Agent John Miller about death threats he had
received because he cooperated with the government. Realizing that they were a strong
civilizing influence on the tribe, Miller urged the government to protect the older c h i e f s . 59
The Omahas had their first brush with Manifest Destiny in the 1840s as emigrants
began to surge west in search of Oregon, California, and Great Basin lands. While
traveling through Indian country, future settlers showed little respect for the land or for
natural resources, as they "fouled the water, used up the wood, ruined pastures, and drove
off game animals."60 White hunters accompanying emigrant trains "wantonly killed the
buffalo," sometimes keeping only the tongues. While admitting that Indians also killed
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large numbers of buffalo, Superintendent Harvey warned that "all experience proves that
game rapidly disappears before the fire-arms of the white. . . . He kills for the sake of
killing."61 The destruction of game became an economic and demographic disaster for the
Omahas whose lands included a section of the heavily-traveled Oregon and Mormon trails.
Now the Omahas' increasingly far-ranging hunts often took them into Sioux territory
where their lives were constantly at risk. 62
Reporting that emigrant traffic had "excited the anxiety of several of the western
tribes" who regarded whites passing through their lands as a violation of their treaties,
Harvey feared that settlers and their livestock would become targets of hungry Indians who
blamed whites for their troubles.63 With this in mind, Indian department officials offered
their own solutions to the problem. Thomas Harvey suggested locating the hunting tribes
on acreage south of the Missouri River which could be purchased from the Omahas, at a
low price.64 d . D. Mitchell, Harvey's successor, offered an alternative to farming by
supplying the Indians with cattle and sheep and turning them into herdsmen— "the Tartars
of America."65 But by 1853, Indian Commissioner George W. Manypenny thought it in
the best interests of both races that the border tribes be "placed out of the paths of
emigrants. . . ."66
The Otoes, Pawnees, and Omahas "suffer[ed] and [felt] the effects of this vast
emigration more than all the other tribes together; . . ." and in his 1850 report, Council
Bluffs Sub-agent John E. Barrow warned Superintendent Mitchell that unless westbound
emigrants stopped trampling the Omahas' fields, villages, and hunting grounds, there were
Omahas who would commit acts of atrocity.67 Barrow had correctly sensed the Omahas'
mood, for in the spring of 1851, tribal leaders visited F. J. Wheeling of Council Bluffs, a
friend of the Indians, to complain about emigrant problems. The Omahas intimated to
Wheeling that along with the other border tribes, they intended to stop the cross-country
travel that was "starving them and their children." Wheeling urged the Omahas not to add to
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their problems by going to war, and suggested instead that they visit the president. Early in
1852, he and J. E. Johnson, also of Council Bluffs, escorted an Omaha delegation to the
nation's capital. Years later, the two good Samaritans still had not been reimbursed for their
expenses.68
Most of the westbound emigrants simply passed through Omaha lands, but one
group stayed. In mid-summer, 1846, several thousand Latter-Day Saints (Mormons),
fleeing persecution in Nauvoo, Illinois and bound for Salt Lake City, descended on
western Iowa. W hen a military emissary from President James K. Polk contacted the
group, requesting 500 volunteers for the Mexican War, Mormon leader Brigham Young
made a private agreement with the army to provide a battalion in exchange for the right to
winter on Indian lands. Neither Young nor his army contact had the authority to make such
a deal, but later, in council with Big Elk and his band, Young gave the Omahas the
impression that the Mormons had government permission to stay.69 Knowing they were
illegally on Indian lands,70 the Mormon leaders appealed to Superintendent Harvey to let
them stay until all the Saints had safely gone west. Harvey refused, stating that they had no
government permission to remain. The Mormons presented a problem for the Indian Office:
to remove them could cause a bloody conflict; to allow them to stay would harm the
Omahas.71
Although they had obtained permission to remain for a time in Iowa, most of the
Mormons crossed the river to Winter Quarters, on land claimed jointly by the Omahas and
Otoes (Map 6). Both tribes wanted to negotiate with the emigrants, who were well-armed
and could hopefully protect them from the Sioux, but it was the Omahas who signed a
patently illegal treaty with Brigham Young’s people in August 1846.72 Early on the
morning of August 28, the Mormon High Council met with an Omaha delegation,
including the aging Big Elk, his son Standing Elk, interpreter Logan Fontenelle, and
seventy other chiefs and warriors. It was clear from the outset that each party knew exactly
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what it wanted of the other. Besides asking permission to remain for two years and to use
timber and grass, the Mormons hoped the Omahas would welcome them. For their part, the
Omahas wanted protection from the Sioux, and were prepared to demand much in return
for their cooperation.^^
As the council progressed, Young explained that his people needed a place to spend
the winter until the Mormon Battalion returned, and in exchange for Omaha hospitality, he
offered the services of gunsmiths and announced plans to set up a trading post which also
would be illegally placed on Indian

la n d .7 4

After advising Young not to negotiate with the

Otoes, Big Elk declared himself agreeable if his "Grandfather the President" approved. The
chief offered warriors to help guard Mormon cattle, and asked the emigrants to please not
kill all the game. To outmaneuver the Otoes, the wily old chief suggested that the Mormons
settle on Omaha lands so he and his people could use their improvements after they

le ft.7 5

Big Elk agreed to sign "a writing," and on September 3, at the Omaha camp, the two
parties signed an agreement allowing the Mormons to

s t a y .7 6

The Omahas and Mormons had a treaty, but they had no peace. Unsuccessful in
recent hunts and unskilled as farmers, the desperate Omahas "either stole or starved."77
The Mormons' cattle were handy, and rustling became an Omaha way of life, making a
mockery of Big Elk's pledge of Indian cowhands. To protect their cattle, the Mormons
camped in square formations and used dogs as early warning systems, but the thefts
continued, and Young sent a delegation to the Omaha village to discuss the tense situation.
When confronted, the chiefs freely admitted they knew about the rustling, and agreed to
stop the depredations in return for $200 worth of com. However, the Omahas did not see
themselves as stealing from the Mormons. The Indians viewed their relationship with the
Saints as a reciprocal one, with food as payment for use of the land, and they further
justified killing the Mormons' cattle by arguing that the Saints frightened the game and
destroyed their precious timber s u p p l y . 78
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It was inevitable that the approximately 4,000 Mormons at W inter Quarters would
deplete the area's natural resources. They may have destroyed only small amounts of
timber, but trees were so scarce that the extra lumbering proved disastrous for the Indians.
In addition, the Mormons' expert marksmen killed much of the small game that the Omahas
now depended

u p o n .^ 9

By 1847, the Mormons had become "troublesome neighbors to the

Indians," who were left with the choice of freezing to death or invading enemy territory to
obtain wood. 80 Thomas Kane, the Mormons' gentile "lobbyist," presented their case in
Washington, using as his argument the August 1846 "treaty," and pointing out that the
Mormons protected the Omahas. In Kane's opinion, that protection was a fair exchange for
timber and game. The Mormon apologist portrayed the Saints as the temporary "saviors" of
the "pauper Omahas," even sharing their meager food supplies with the starving Indians.81
But Kane failed to mention the mutual distrust and the Mormons' broken promises. Big Elk
remembered it all: "You can take our wood and it won't grow up tomorrow. . . . must not
kill your Cattle but our game all scared away— You were here to protect us, but down
comes the Sioux and murderers [sic] us. . . . You can't raise up our timber and can't raise
up our dead

m e n .

"82

While the Mormons had Thomas Kane, the Omahas had Agent John Miller. A true
friend of the Indians, Miller never failed to defend their interests, and in the two years of
the "Mormon occupation," he and Brigham Young grew to hate each other. Miller was
convinced that despite their insistence that they were moving on, the Mormons planned
W inter Quarters as a continuous half-way house.83 it appears from his reply to a letter
from Brigham Young that the Mormons had asked Miller to move the Omahas south to join
the Otoes. After refusing, the agent advised his adversary: "I will respectfully suggest. ..
to you and your people, that the best services you can render the Omahas . . . will be . . .
to leave."84 jn May 1848, the Mormons did leave, but not before Young cursed John
Miller, saying "his bones should rot and his soul be damned. "85
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The Omaha-Mormon controversy did not end when the Saints moved on to Utah.
In May 1851, prospector, Nebraska booster, and self-proclaim ed general Thomas
Jefferson Sutherland wrote a letter to Indian Commissioner Luke Lea in which he accused
Orson Hyde, editor of the Mormon newspaper, The Frontier Guardian, of encouraging
Mormons and other emigrants to mistreat Indians. In an editorial, Hyde cautioned travelers
not to "feed them [or] suffer them to come about their camps. . . . " and also urged
Kanesville residents to whip any Omahas who crossed the Missouri River. These were
strange and hypocritical words coming from a prominent member of a sect that only five
years before had "crossed the river" and contributed mightily to the Omahas' destitution. 86
The 1840s were especially deadly years along the Missouri River. Omahas starved,
froze to death, and were killed by the Sioux. Indian agents' reports were filled with
accounts of Sioux depredations as the Dakota bands continued their merciless assault.
Because they were never truly safe, the Omahas failed to become farmers as the
government wished. The 100 acres near Bellevue remained unbroken in 1843, but the
Omahas1agent believed it would be senseless to encourage the tribe to farm as long as the
Sioux were on the attack. 87 The chiefs requested troops who never came, and not even the
firepower of the Mormons could protect the band when the Sioux attacks intensified in
1847.88
The testimony of traders, agents, and the Sioux themselves all point to a war of
extermination against the Omahas. In 1844, a trader at Fort Vermilion informed the Council
Bluffs sub-agent that he never heard the Sioux discuss attacking any tribe except the
Omahas, and at a parlay with the Mormons after his people had killed thirty of the
emigrants' cattle, Chief Eagle of the Sioux stated flatly that his tribe intended to kill
Omahas, not whites. Like the Mormons, the Sioux placed the government in an awkward
position; on the one hand, it was fairly obvious that they intended to wipe out the Omahas,
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but on the other, an army campaign against them could lead to plains warfare and further
danger to white emigrants. 89
For years, agents and superintendents campaigned for military garrisons to protect
the Omahas, who had no guns or ammunition to protect themselves. Superintendent
Mitchell believed forts were justified, and in 1844, Superintendent Harvey called for "an
adequate military force." In response to Harvey's and Agent John Miller's requests for
protection of the border tribes, in June 1848 the army established Fort Kearny, south of the
Platte River. The Indians argued that a fort should not be located below the Platte, because
the river was hard to ford, and crossing it would embarrass the soldiers. This location also
seemed ridiculous to John Miller who wanted to see a fort above the Platte where the Sioux
and the weaker tribes lived. He questioned Fort Kearney's purpose: "Protection for what?
Not for the Indians." In April 1847, Harvey suggested establishing a garrison north of the
Missouri River in Sioux country, and the following year, Miller proposed forts at Grand
Island, Pawnee Village, and at the Mormon camp on the Missouri River, which would be
available when the Latter-Day Saints continued on to U

t a h .9 0

Perhaps the most ferocious Sioux attack of the 1840s occurred while the Omahas
were being "protected" by the Mormons. On December 12, 1846, a large Yankton war
party completely destroyed an Omaha village, killing seventy-three women and children
while their husbands and fathers were hunting.91 According to a Mormon account, most of
the victims had been shot while asleep, after which the attackers cut off their noses in a
gesture of contempt.92 Agent John Miller sent Logan Fontenelle to investigate; on the way,
the interpreter met the sixteen terrified survivors, nine of whom were badly hurt. Miller
was distraught. He asked Superintendent Harvey, "Major, what will these poor Omahas
do— will the government do nothing for them? If they go South, the Ioways are on them—
if they go up the river, the Sioux are killing them off. "93 The government did nothing, and
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the Omahas continued to be victimized by their enemies both at home and on hunts, until
the mid-1860s.94
W hile the Omahas struggled to survive, American Indian policy changed.
Concentrating large numbers of Indians west of Missouri between the Red and Platte rivers
interfered with white emigration, blocked a central railroad route, and did nothing to
improve the Indians' condition. To clear a path for westward expansion, the Indian
department formulated a policy to group Indians north and south of a corridor through
which people and rails could pass.95 The activities of Indian comm issioners and
superintendents in the 1840s actually preceded congressional agitation for an organized
Nebraska Territory. Although the plan may have been considered for some time, the first
published statement of the new policy to divide Indians into two colonies appeared in
Com m issioner T. Hartley Crawford's 1841 annual report. In presenting his plan,
Crawford foresaw "a dense white population .. . interposed between the two settlements,"
and declared the scheme "an important point of national policy" that would benefit
everyone.96 Although the colony concept was still not concrete, treaties during the 1840s
roughly followed north-south boundaries.97
In the fall of 1848, realizing that they would not survive as they were,
Superintendent Harvey presented his design to settle Indians with no farmland on a tract
south of the Missouri River, to be purchased from the Omahas and Poncas.98 However,
Harvey's idea was never explored since almost simultaneously, bowing to pressure from
territorial organizers, Commissioner William Medill unveiled a plan to clear a large western
corridor. In order for the border tribes to survive, Medill urged moving smaller groups,
including the Omahas, away from the main migration routes. Considering it "a measure of
great humanity," the commissioner originally planned to relocate the Omahas among the
Osages and Kansas to the south. The Omahas were "much attached to the whites," and
considering their mild manner, Medill hoped to teach them white ways as an example to

69
other tribes. The commissioner was confident that the destitute Omahas would sell their
land cheaply and would cost little to "civilize."99
Medill's report naturally emphasized his plan's advantages to the Indians, arguing
that separation from whites and confinement on small reservations would ensure their
survival. But his plan was not strictly humanitarian, for the economy also had to be
considered; grouping tribes would require fewer agents, meaning lower salary budgets. In
addition, removing Indians played into the hands of expansionists such as Thomas Hart
Benton of Missouri and Illinois1Stephen A. Douglas, who promoted a central rail route to
the Pacific, and who knew that Congress would not back a railway through Indian
territory. 100
In 1849, the new Indian comm issioner, Orlando Brown, repeated M edill's
suggestion that the Omahas be moved south, and his successor, Luke Lea, advocated the
two-colony policy in language almost identical to Medill's. In 1851, Lea linked Indian
policy to the Nebraska question:
The necessity for an appropriation to carry these measures speedily
into effect is the more apparent . . . in view of the . . .
dem onstrations of the public feeling in favor of the early
organization of a territorial government over the territory in which
these Indians reside. 101
In the late 1840s, pioneers crowded the Indian country's eastern border anxiously
awaiting the natives' removal so they could take possession of their lands. But not
everyone stayed east the M issouri River. Nebraska "boomer" T. J. Sutherland, who
attempted to mount an exploring party to search for Nebraska gold in 1852, sang the
praises of the Indian territory, calling it "the most splendid country in America, and insisted
that "the Indians had no right to keep such fine lands." 102 A year later, a group of Council
Bluffs businessmen, including Dr. Enos Lowe and future congressman Bem hart Henn,
formed a town company to encourage settlement in the proposed Nebraska Territory. As
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early as June 1853, each of the company's partners had crossed the river to investigate sites
for a future

to w n .

103 Reports sent back by these first whites to infiltrate Indian country

encouraged others to follow. Sadly, the government's "solemn guarantee" that this country
would be Indian land "forever" meant n o t h i n g . 104
Soon lawmakers joined the clamor for white occupation of Indian lands, and no
congressional voice was louder or clearer than that of Stephen A. Douglas. As a member
of the House of Representatives in 1844, Douglas acted on the recommendation of
Secretary of W ar William W ilkins and introduced a bill to organize the Territory of
N e b r a sk a .

105 In 1848, now-Senator Douglas, declaring that an Indian barrier "[had]

become . . . ludicrous. . . .", presented a second Nebraska bill. In his proposal, the
territory would stretch from forty to forty-three degrees north latitude and from the
Missouri River to the Rocky Mountains. Though Douglas' bill was tabled, interest in
Nebraska

g rew .

106 Missouri Representative Willard Hall introduced bills in both 1851 and

1852, suggesting that the lands west of the Missouri River be called the "Territory of the
Platte." 107
The Nebraska question came to the fore in 1852-1853 when W. A. Richardson of
Illinois, chairman of the House Committee on Territories, presented his Nebraska bill. In
the ensuing debate, Volney E. Howard of Texas attacked Richardson's proposal, claiming
that it was unfair to the Indians. Howard, not known for his pro-Indian views, may have
had an ulterior motive, since Texans would have a better chance to capture a southern rail
route if Indian country remained unorganized. 108 in reply to this and other criticisms,
Richardson sprang to his bill's defense: "Five thousand settlers would do more to protect
the lines of travel to Oregon, California, and New Mexico . . . than all the troops in your
regular Army." An exasperated Congressman Hall added, "Everybody is talking about a
Railroad to the Pacific Ocean. In the name of God, how is the railroad to be made if you
will never let people live on the land through which the road

p a sses? " 1 0 9
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Expansionist lawmakers had help in their effort to organize the Indian country. In
December 1849, the Missouri State Legislature asked Congress to make the Nebraska issue
a reality, and in the summer of 1852, citizens of Parkville, Missouri composed a memorial
to Congress in which they asked for "the immediate organization o f the Territory of
Nebraska," and demanded that Indians residing there be moved to assigned parcels of land
so that their country could be quickly settled by whites. The Parkville petition was
forwarded to Missouri Senator David Atchison who presented-it to Congress without
comm ent According to Stephen Douglas, the petition from the Missouri town was just one
of "piles" of memorials from westerners; "scarcely a day passes in which we do not receive
more of them. . . ."HO i n western Iowa, Senators Augustus C. Dodge and George W.
Jones held meetings on the Nebraska issue, and in October 1853, a Council Bluffs group
supporting a provisional government for "Nebraska" met at Bellevue and elected Hadley D.
Johnson as their delegate to Congress. A month earlier, Rev. Thomas Johnson of the
Shawnee mission had been chosen to represent the southern part of "Nebraska" country—
the Kansas area. The two Johnsons sat in the House for a short time, but were later
removed. H I
Because the country west of Missouri and Iowa had been permanently reserved for
Indians and guaranteed to them in treaties, some congressmen objected to opening
Nebraska to settlement. To placate these dissenters, the Richardson Bill was amended to
provide that no whites could settle on Indian land as long as the Indians held title to it.
Despite the amendment, the bill failed to pass in the Senate, but the 1853 Indian
Appropriations Act included a rider authorizing $50,000 to negotiate with the Indians west
of Missouri for their lands and for their consent to a territorial government. H 2 President
Franklin Pierce wasted no time complying with the provisions of the Indian Appropriation
Act. During the winter of 1853-54, newly-appointed Indian Commissioner George W.
Manypenny made a fact-finding visit to Indian country to explore it, to gather information
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to be used in treaty negotiations, and to prepare the way for extinguishment of Indian land
titles.
None of the border tribes welcomed Manypenny. Alarmed and angry over illegal
white incursions onto their lands, they had made plans to convene a great council in which
the tribes would band together to drive out the white intruders. They had good reason to be
angry, for several months before the commissioner’s arrival, without permission from
Congress or the Indians, Thomas Hart Benton had issued a printed statement claiming that
much of Indian country was now open to whites. The former Missouri Senator even had an
"official map of Nebraska" printed, allegedly at the request of Manypenny, who claimed he
was unaware of its existence before he discovered a copy in the possession of "exploring
parties." The commissioner promptly issued a press release denying any involvement in the
map's publication and stating that no land in the proposed Nebraska Territory could be
settled.
But even after disassociating him self from Benton's scheme, M anypenny had
difficulty calming the anxious Indians, most of whom initially resisted selling their lands.
By the time the commissioner returned east, many of the tribes had reluctantly agreed to
sell, but only on the condition that they remain on reservations on their former lands. Since
this was not what the Indian office had in mind, and would, in Manypenny's opinion,
retard Indian advancement, the government deferred actual treaty negotiations, hoping the
Indians would see the benefits of relocating. Before departing, the commissioner made
arrangements for Indian delegations to visit Washington the following spring to sell their
lands.
Manypenny's trip west was an eye-opener. He was disturbed to find that the border
tribes' general condition had been misrepresented in agents' and superintendents' reports.
The Indians were not as prosperous and "civilized" as he had been led to believe. Instead,
he found most of them "indolent and intemperate, degraded and debased," leaving him
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convinced that despite the best efforts of missionaries and the government, the plan to
relocate Indians in a country of their own had been a failure. He believed that allowing
small bands to wander large tracts at will had led to Indian degradation, and he had little
confidence in their ability to reform without "a change of residence."
Although Indian country had been steadily eroding since its establishment in the
1830s, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 effectively ended the "permanent
Indian frontier." 117 Father De Smet observed that "the aborigines [were] forced to sell and
cede their lands, with the ashes of their ancestors . . . to make room for strangers. . . ."H 8
During 1853 and 1854, the Indian office engineered a series of treaties by which the border
tribes ceded approximately 13,000,000 acres of land, and by 1854, what remained of the
Missouri River tribes had either been relocated or assigned to "small portions of their
former lan d s."!19 In March 1854, the Omahas surrendered their Nebraska territory and
found themselves bound for a reservation they were too frightened to accept. Once again,
they became a wandering nation in search of a safe, permanent home. And their suffering at
the hands of the government had just begun.
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CHAPTER THREE

POLITICS AND BROKEN PROMISES: THE EARLY RESERVATION YEARS,
1854-1881

"We have much trouble in this land, but we have no one to help us." 1
Two Crows— Omaha, circa 1879

When he returned to Washington, D.C. in the fall of 1853, Commissioner George
Manypenny quickly put the treaty-making process in motion. On October 19, he instructed
Agent Thomas Gatewood to accompany an Omaha delegation to the nation's capital to
negotiate a land cession.2 With their leaders' fateful trip to W ashington, the Omahas
entered a new era in which they were buffeted from all sides by the government, hostile
white settlers, missionaries and opportunists who were hoping to make a quick dollar at the
Indians' expense. The early reservation years also saw tribal dissention, patterns of forced
and voluntary acculturation, the demise of the annual buffalo hunt, and a new concept of
chieftainship. Despite broken promises and neglect, the Omahas remained loyal to the
government and attempted to become the agriculturalists that the Indian department wished
them to be. It was in part this loyalty and cooperative spirit that captured the fancy of white
reformers and prompted the government to allot Omaha lands in 1882. Omaha history from
1854 to 1881 has been viewed through the eyes and words of white men and acculturated
or politically-active Indians, many of whom vied for power and profit. Unfortunately, the
average Omahas were allowed little voice in these events precisely because they did not
wish to walk the "white man's road."
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Agent Gatewood finally received Manypenny's orders two months after they were
issued, and when he informed the Omahas that the government wanted them to send
representatives to Washington, the people refused to allow a delegation to negotiate a treaty
at any place without the presence of all the men of the tribe. In other words, the treaty was
an undertaking too important to trust to a few men, even if they were chiefs. Knowing that
the government was anxious for a treaty, Gatewood negotiated on his own.3 On January
27, 1854, at the Council Bluffs Agency, the Omahas and their agent signed an agreement
known simply as the "Gatewood Treaty" (Appendixes VI and VII ).4
Although this treaty was never ratified, the document and the events surrounding it
reveal the Omahas' state of mind immediately before their official treaty was consummated.
By negotiating a treaty without proper authority, Gatewood displayed poor judgment, but
he may have been trying to make the best of a difficult situation. His charges were willing
to negotiate, but not to delegate—an ambiguous position that revealed much about changes
in tribal politics. At an earlier time, one or more chiefs would have had complete control.
But at least sixty Omahas attended the January 1854 council, where six men were
appointed to travel to Washington with Gatewood to finalize the treaty.5
The first of the treaty's five articles described in detail the boundaries of the lands to
be ceded by the Omahas. Article Two stated that as soon as the government provided a
means for fulfilling the treaty’s stipulations, the Omahas would settle on lands beyond
Ayoway Creek, north of present-day Ponca, Nebraska. In addition, they relinquished all
former treaty claims except the remainder of $25,000 which had been provided for
agricultural purposes in 1851. It was agreed that the president would distribute these funds
at his discretion.^
The heart of the treaty was Article Three, which promised the Omahas $40,000 per
year for thirty years, and provided arms, ammunition, a blacksmith and a shop. Perhaps
underestimating the Omahas' historic fear of their mortal enemies, Gatewood also pledged
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protection from the Sioux and promised a future peace treaty to halt all hostilities. In return,
the Omahas vowed not to make war and to submit all disputes to government arbitration. In
a clause that seemed unfair to the tribe, the Indians agreed that if an individual stole from
whites or other Indians, restitution would be made from tribal annuities. Finally, the
Omahas agreed to pay debts to traders out of their first year's annuity: $6,300 to Peter
Sarpy, and $500 each to Logan Fontenelle and Lewis Saunsoci. Article Four provided that
all payments to the Omahas would be in cash, and the treaty concluded by giving six
men— Logan Fontenelle, Joseph La Flesche, Village Maker, Standing Hawk, Little Chief,
and Yellow Smoke— authority to represent the tribe and to "slightly modify, alter, or
amend" the current treaty [author's emphasis].7
On February 20, 1854, Superintendent Alfred Cumming notified Commissioner
Manypenny by telegram and by letter that Agent Gatewood and the Omaha delegation were
en route to W ashington armed with the signed draft of a treaty, and he warned the
commissioner that the tribal representatives' power to negotiate could be restricted by the
word "slightly" in Article Five.8 Upon his arrival, Gatewood explained to his superior that
he had been unable to convince the Omahas to allow a delegation to act freely on their
behalf, and he thought it proper to make a treaty and give the delegation amending power.
Manypenny disagreed. The irate commissioner was convinced that had Gatewood acted
properly, the Omahas would have allowed their representatives to negotiate for them in
Washington. He disapproved of the premature treaty, especially its provisions for long
term cash annuities and the payments to Sarpy, Saunsoci, and Fontenelle:
The treaties, if they can be so called, are made in violation of law
and are in my judgm ent such as m ight not be approved or
sanctioned. Their provisions are in direct conflict with the reforms
desired, and would have no other effect than to degrade the Indians
and enrich the traders.9
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It was important to Manypenny that these early treaties with Indians west of Iowa
and Missouri be done correctly, so as not to compromise the ones to follow. He wanted the
"influences adverse to the moral as well as the temporal interests of these people [met] at
the threshold," and he would rather see no treaty than an im proper one. Like
Superintendent Cumming, Manypenny worried that the wording of the treaty's fifth article
would allow neither the government nor the Indians enough latitude to negotiate the type of
agreement he wanted. 10 But the commissioner fretted needlessly; in spite of the Omaha
delegation's limited powers, the government hammered out a treaty quite different and less
advantageous to the Omahas than Gatewood's document.
Agent Gatewood told Commissioner Manypenny that his treaty was the result of
Omaha intransigence, but events in January 1854 made the agent's motives suspect. An
article in the St. Mary's, Iowa, Gazette on January 25, 1854 stated that on the previous
day, Agent Gatewood had visited the Iowa side of the Missouri River, returning to the
Omaha village the same day. On January 25, two days before the treaty signing, Peter
Sarpy informed the paper's editor that a treaty with the Omahas "[was] consummated."H
Perhaps not coincidentally, Article Three of the Gatewood Treaty included the provision to
pay Sarpy money owed him by the tribe. His handling of the treaty situation was definitely
unwise, and his actions may have been dishonorable, but to local white settlers, Gatewood
was a hero. The St. Louis Republican declared:
Maj. Gatewood has . . . overcome all obstacles, and accomplished
in two weeks . . . what his chief failed to do . . . in a whole season.
H alf of all the Indian country is now ceded, and were the
negotiations intrusted to the gallant Gatewood it would not be many
"moons" until the WHOLE OF IT were thrown open to the AngloSaxon plough! A thousand guns for Nebraska and the go-ahead
James M. Gatewood! 12
But Gatewood's career as Omaha agent would be short-lived. He had already angered both
Cumming and Manypenny by reporting late to his post, then compounded his error by
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being absent without leave shortly after he arrived in Nebraska 13 The abortive treaty was
simply the last in his series of miscues. Congress never approved his appointment to the
Omahas, and he was relieved as agent in the summer of 1854.
With Gatewood's impromptu document discredited, the Omaha leaders agreed to a
complicated treaty (Appendix VIII) that would have enormous impact on their people's
present and their future. Composed of fifteen articles, this agreem ent reflected the
government's new approach to Native American policy. There were some similarities to the
Gatewood Treaty, but for the most part, it was an entirely different document. In 1842,
Agent Daniel Miller stated that the Omahas claimed "the country bounded by the Missouri
river on the east, by Shell creek on the west, by the river Platte on the south, and on the
north by the Poncas country." Although the "Poncas country" constituted a rather indefinite
northern border, these boundaries were closely followed in the actual land cession (Map
7 ) . 14
Article One provided that if the lands north of Ayoway Creek, designated as the
Omahas' future home, proved unsatisfactory, the Indians could select another site either
"within or outside of the ceded country. . . . " To make this determination, a delegation
from the tribe was to accompany their agent on an exploratory trip to the assigned region. If
the site to the north suited the tribe, it was automatically their home; if not, the president
was authorized to provide a new reservation of not more than 300,000 acres. As soon as
possible, and not later than April 1855, the Omahas were to vacate their homes near
Bellevue and move to their reservation of choice. 15
As they would have in the Gatewood Treaty, the Omahas relinquished all claims
under earlier treaties, but would receive the balance due from the 1851 appropriation.
Article Four addressed one of Manypenny's major problems with the provisional treaty.
Instead of $40,000 per year for thirty years, or a toted of $1,200,000 in cash, the Omahas
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would now receive $84,000 in decreasing annuities spread over forty years, with the
president deciding whether payments would be in cash or in clothing, provisions and other
items for their "improvement." Annuities were subject to deduction, however; use of liquor
could result in lost payments, and annuity funds would pay for any depredations committed
by Omahas. In a proviso no doubt disappointing to traders, no individual debts would be
paid from annuity funds, but the government did agree to pay the Omahas' $1,000 debt to
Lewis Saunsoci for

" s e r v ic e s ." ^

In Articles Seven and Eight, the government made promises that it would later
break. Regardless of where the Omahas decided to settle, the United States promised
protection from the Sioux and other hostile tribes as long as the president considered it
necessary. And to nudge them toward "civilization," the tribe would be provided with a
saw mill, a grist mill, a blacksmith shop, and the services of a miller, a blacksmith and a
farmer for ten years. Looking to future western growth, Article Fourteen provided rightsof-way for roads and railroads through the Omaha Reservation, 17
No provision of the 1854 treaty was as important to the Omahas' future as Article
Six, which provided land in severalty to the Indians. In the future, the president could have
the Omaha Reservation surveyed and divided into lots to be assigned to individuals or
families who would make the land their permanent homes. The following allotment
schedule would apply: 1) single Indians over twenty-one would receive eighty acres; 2) a
family of two rated 160 acres; 3) families of three to five, 320 acres; 4) families of six to
ten, 640 acres; and 5) families of more than ten would receive 640 acres plus 160 acres for
each five additional members. Rules of inheritance would be determined by the president,
who could also issue patents with the stipulation that the land could not be leased for a term
longer than two years. In an attempt to curtail hunting, the article stated that if a person
granted a patent should refuse to farm it or should "rove from place to place," the patent
could be canceled and annuity shares withheld. In the event that a patent holder failed to
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return, the land could be reassigned or sold as excess. Any lands remaining after all the
Omahas had been assigned permanent homes would be sold for their benefit, under rules
"to be determined later." Finally, these lands could not be sold, taxed, or forfeited until
Nebraska had a constitution and its legislature removed the above-mentioned land title
restrictions, with congressional approval. 18
As had been the case in previous Omaha treaties, Commissioner Manypenny's
1854 negotiations were hampered by outside parties "seeking to mold the treat[y] to suit
their views and interests," which usually meant giving Indians as much cash as possible. 19
Shortly before negotiations began, the Iowa congressional delegation asked Manypenny to
include in the forthcoming treaty provisions to pay for depredations allegedly committed by
Omahas against Iowa

c itiz e n s .

20 As usual, traders were suspect. In January 1854,

Presbyterian missionary William Hamilton expressed concern that they would play a large
role in the treaty, since they controlled many agents and head men. He warned that unless
Manypenny was very careful, traders instead of Indians would negotiate the treaty.^ 1
Father Pierre-Jean De Smet considered the entire treaty process unfair. In his opinion, the
sure destitution of the Omahas and other border tribes was "found in the disparity of the
parties who make the treaty. On one side stands a shrewd and perhaps, unscrupulous
Government officer; on the other, a few ignorant chiefs, accompanied by their half-breed
interpreters, whose integrity is far from being proverbial."22 Manypenny ignored the Iowa
legislators, and except for the payment to Saunsoci, outsiders had little impact on the treaty,
which was signed on March 16, 1854 and quickly ratified by the Senate on April 17.23
Shortly after the treaty was ratified, questions arose regarding Logan Fontenelle's
role in the negotiations. After being told that Fontenelle was not a chief, Commissioner
Manypenny wrote to George Hepner, the new Omaha agent, asking him to investigate the
m a tte r .

24 w h e n questioned, the Omahas told Hepner that all the delegates sent to

Washington in March 1854 were "chiefs on a par," and that a man could become a chief by
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inheritance, by transfer, by charitable acts, by bravery, or by an ancient method hardly
used at that time— smoking a pipe and interpreting the curl and ascent of the smoke.
Hepner surmised that since he met none of the other criteria, Fontenelle was recognized as
a chief due to his frequent feasts for the head men and "some other influence which the
department well understands. "25 Hepner assumed Manypenny knew that Fontenelle had
been a favorite of Thomas Gatewood, and that the former agent had passed him off as a
chief in Washington. 26 Oddly, the makeup of the Omaha treaty delegation and the names
appearing on the treaty disagree. According to his contemporaries, Two Grizzly Bears was
a member of the delegation which went to "sell land," yet his signature is absent. One
account says that when Commissioner Manypenny questioned Logan Fontenelle's presence
in W ashington, Two Grizzly Bears identified him as his interpreter.27 Judging by the
names on the treaty, Fontenelle may have signed for Two Grizzly Bears as well, thus
leaving his name on an important document he was perhaps not qualified to sign.28
Logan Fontenelle's true status within the Omaha tribe has never been resolved.
M ost whites who knew him considered him a chief, but many of Fontenelle's
contemporaries insisted he was never a leader according to Omaha traditions. To many
Omahas he remained merely a "half-breed" interpreter. In an 1854 narrative, Two Crows
discussed the impending departure of the treaty delegation, which would be accompanied
by interpreters Saunsoci and Fontenelle, and the Indian narrator of an account of the battle
in which Fontenelle was killed referred to him as "the white interpreter who was with
u s.

"29 Yet Henry Fontenelle insisted that his brother was named the principal chief at a

tribal council held during Commissioner Manypenny's visit in 1853, and it is possible that
because of his facility with English, Fontenelle was made a chief "for the express purpose
of helping the Indians to make the treaty with the United

S ta te s.

"30 Because his father was

a French trader and he was never adopted into the tribe, Logan Fontenelle probably did not
qualify for chieftainship, yet despite his questionable credentials, when he died in 1855,
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both Agent George Hepner and Joseph La Flesche referred to him as a principal chief.31
Properly signed or not, the 1854 treaty became effective, and Commissioner
Manypenny instructed Agent Hepner to take a party of Omahas north to inspect their
reservation so they could be moved early in the spring of 1855.32 Of the Omahas, only
Logan Fontenelle agreed to accompany Hepner so far north. Along with Thomas Griffy, a
white man whose status is unclear, Fontenelle and the agent made their way north to
Ayoway Creek. On their return, Hepner filed a report totally rejecting the proposed
reservation. It was, he said, too cold, too hilly for farming, and much too close to the
Sioux and the Poncas. The agent did not believe the Omahas could survive there: "Should
they be compelled to locate on this reservation, I doubt whether one would be left to tell
their fate in twelve months." The area the Omahas wanted, and needed to survive, ran from
the middle of the main channel of the Missouri River east of the lower end of Black Bird
Hills, then eighteen miles up the river's main channel. This approximately 300,000 acres
was eighty miles north of Bellevue, possessed trees, arable land, and probably ample water
for mills. Hepner urged the government to provide protection and to move the Omahas
there as soon as possible. Based on Hepner's unfavorable view of the Ayoway Creek
region, St. Louis Indian office clerk John Haverty recommended that the Black Bird Hills
site be substituted.33
This was the official correspondence on the Ayoway Creek rejection. But in a
deposition before Nebraska Territorial Secretary Thomas Cuming on behalf of Dr. B.Y.
Shelley, whose land became part of the Omaha Reservation, Thomas Griffy told a different
story. In Griffy's version, Fontenelle and Hepner admitted they were simply "going
through the motions," and had no intention of even looking at the land to the north.
Fontenelle claimed to be familiar with the area, and as "the principal chief and business
agent of the Omahas," he refused to accept it, and insisted instead on Black Bird Hills. In
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reply, Hepner intimated that the Indians could only get that desirable land if he agreed, and
he would agree, for the right price.34 jf accurate, Griffy's testimony showed Hepner to be
an opportunist out to line his own pockets. The agent's offer to accept a bribe gave
credence to Joseph La Flesche's accusation that he was involved in a partnership with Peter
Sarpy and Logan Fontenelle, and perhaps explained why Iowa Senator A. C. Dodge
wanted to know if Sarpy accompanied Hepner on his inspection

to u r .

35

As early as January 1854, prior to the treaty negotiations and long before the
Omahas made their wishes known, two Iowa congressmen forw arded to Secretary
McClelland a letter from Council Bluffs businessman Hadley Johnson strongly objecting to
locating the Omahas at Black Bird Hills. To Johnson's protest, the legislators added their
own, not for political reasons, they said, but for the sake of peace, prosperity and the
welfare of the Indians. They argued that a reservation at Black Bird Hills would place the
Omahas close to sources of liquor and too close to white citizens already seething over
numerous alleged Omaha depredations.3 6 As if to underscore the Iowa delegation's
objections, petitions and claims from Harrison County, Iowa, arrived in Commissioner
Manypenny's office, along with the request for a treaty provision to pay for depredations
by Indians.37
Word that the Omahas had definitely chosen to settle at Black Bird Hills generated a
flood of letters to the Indian office from Iowa lawmakers and their constituents, and from
speculators who had designs on the area's fertile lands. Writing to his congressman on
behalf of "many citizens" of Woodbury and Monona counties, Addison Cochran, himself a
large landowner, pointed out that some families had already settled at Black Bird to take
advantage of the good soil and abundant timber and water, and they wanted "other
neighbors than Indians who [had] been in the habit of killing or driving off their stock."
Cochran asked the congressman to please use his influence to locate the Omahas
elsewhere.38 A letter from Enos Lowe of Council Bluffs saw an Omaha reservation
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interfering with "the great Railway Route North of the Platte," and pointed out that an
election district had already been marked off at Black Bird

H ills .

39 Iowa's congressmen

agreed wholeheartedly with Lowe, and urged Manypenny not to approve the Omaha's
move, since it would mean "eventual injury both to the Whites and the Indians."40 Hadley
Johnson expressed surprise that the Omahas were going to Black Bird Hills, since Senator
Dodge had told him that would not happen. Johnson considered the locating of Omahas
there to be "bad policy" because he was sure they were plotting another, more lucrative
treaty and they would be moved again in the near future.41
In view of all the protest letters, Secretary McClelland began to have second
thoughts regarding the Omahas' reservation choice. Perhaps to buy time, he instructed
Manypenny to have Agent Hepner conduct a second exploration of the ceded lands to find a
less controversial home for the tribe.42 W hen he received McClelland's orders, Hepner
fired off a blistering letter explaining why a reinvestigation was unnecessary and also
disclosing underhanded dealings by white settlers and speculators. He refused to look for
another reservation site because 1 ) it was mid-winter; 2 ) the selection was to be made only
with the Omahas' consent; 3) he knew they would not accept any other location; 4) the
Omahas had once lived at Black Bird Hills, but had been driven away by the Sioux; and 5)
he had trouble getting the Omahas to go north of Fort Calhoun, only a short distance above
the Bellevue A

g e n c y

.43

The angry agent then shredded white objections, point by point. Discussing the
mythical white village underway at Black Bird Hills, Hepner reported that when he was
there in November 1854, no one lived there and no settlement preparations had been made.
The only structure was a $2.00 "claim house" built by a Council Bluffs company in which
Hadley Johnson was a partner. Under the circumstances, Hepner said the president need
not worry about "driving off white settlers to accommodate the speculating Indians,"
because "none [were] there to chase." He admitted that an election district called Tecama
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(now the Tekamah area) had been established, with polling places at Tecama and Black
Bird Hills, but that it was a front to make it appear that people lived there. Apparently,
families from Council Bluffs and other communities each sent a representative north to be
counted. At election time, Hepner claimed that a group started for Tecama, "got within
twenty miles of the place, halted in the prairie, held the election and returned." As a result,
"some fifty [voters] were [listed] in the district, when in fact not a family lived in it."
Hepner could not understand why a reservation at Black Bird Hills would pose a problem
for a railroad, since the reservation only extended eighteen miles along the Missouri River,
and whites would only settle near the river, where there was timber. As to drunken Indians
committing depredations, the agent said the Omahas drank less than any equal number of
whites.44
Hepner knew the government wanted to locate the Omahas as far north as possible,
but he reminded his superiors that because of fear of the Sioux, no one but Logan
Fontenelle had offered to investigate the Ayoway Creek site with him. In Hepner's
opinion, forcing or even persuading the Omahas to locate north of Ayoway Creek would be
an "act of inhumanity" since he even anticipated problems moving the Indians to Black Bird
Hills without protection.45
Realizing that the Omahas had the right to choose their reservation, but not wanting
to deprive white settlers of the rich Black Bird Hills land, M anypenny proposed a
compromise, suggesting that the Omahas should make their home on the Big Blue River,
near the Otoe Reservation. Secretary McClelland agreed, but only if the Omahas consented
to the move. If they refused to go south, he wanted them located at Black Bird

H ills .

4b in

compliance with telegraphed instructions, Agent Hepner presented Manypenny's plan to
the Omahas, who flatly rejected the offer, arguing correctly that their treaty gave them
permission to go where they chose. They vowed to plant their com near Bellevue and not
to leave the vicinity of the agency until they had received their annuities in cash. Calling his
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determined charges "saucy and contrary," Hepner suggested a "show of force" to make
them leave immediately. 47 But the government had a treaty to honor, and on May 11,
1855, McClelland gave Manypenny permission to move the Indians to Black Bird Hills and
to place the area off limits to whites.48 Later that month, the Omahas arrived at their new
home. In early June, Hepner reported that the trek north from Bellevue had gone well,
except that the Indians, as predicted, balked at going north of Fort Calhoun. Only the
persuasion of leaders such as Joseph La Flesche and Lewis Saunsoci, and the promise of
money when they arrived at Black Bird Hills, convinced them to move on.49
Letters of protest continued even after the Omahas arrived at their reservation. In
June 1855, a vindictive B.Y. Shelley, who later would successfully petition Congress for
reimbursement of money spent in developing his Black Bird Hills land, accused Hepner of
duplicity and charged that a few "half-breed" speculators were involved in this "fraud." He
said settlers wanted their land back, and did not want to be driven from their homes "at the
point of the scalping knife."50 But in a petition to the president, residents of Nebraska
Territory and Iowa stated perhaps the true reason that the Omahas were unwelcome at
Black Bird Hills. They did not want Indians to have "the most highly favored section of the
territory. "51
Just eleven days after George Hepner described the uneventful trip to Black Bird
Hills, a party of Yankton or Santee Sioux murdered an Omaha just six miles from the
tribe's camp. Unnerved but determined, the Omahas left on their summer hunt, but Hepner
was sure they would have problems on the

p la in s .

52 Once again the agent was right. He

left the Omahas to escort the Otoes and Missourias to their reservation on the Big Blue
River, and returned to discover that Logan Fontenelle and five others had been killed and
scalped by Sioux in a battle on Beaver Creek, in present-day Boone County,

N eb ra sk a .
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Accounts of Fontenelle's death vary slightly, but most agree that he was hunting with a
small party eight to ten miles from the main Omaha camp when he was surprised by a
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Sioux war party. Others hunting nearby, including Joseph La Flesche, returned safely to
camp, and because Fontenelle "had a fast horse," they assumed he had escaped as well.
But on their way home, the Omaha hunters discovered Fontenelle's bullet-riddled and
arrow-pierced body. On a trip that took ten days, the frightened and grief-stricken Omahas
carried his body to Bellevue for burial.54
Logan Fontenelle's murder was a psychological blow to the troubled Omahas. After
they buried their leader, they refused to return to Black Bird Hills, and instead camped
along the Platte River, about fifteen miles west of Bellevue. Saying they could do nothing
while "so exposed to their enemies the Sioux," the Omahas asked to "borrow a piece of
ground from their great father" until they received protection at Black Bird

H ills .

55 Agent

Hepner suggested that the tribe join the Otoes on the Blue River, but they refused to live
among other tribes. Commissioner Manypenny agreed to let the Omahas spend the winter
near Bellevue with the understanding that they would return to their reservation in the
spring. But the people had no com planted and were afraid to hunt.56
The Omahas remained huddled on the Platte, badly frightened, with little food and
no real leader. To add to their misery, white settlers near Bellevue threatened to drive them
away, but the Omahas stood their ground, preferring to be killed by whites rather than by
the

S io u x .

57 Both J. B. Robertson, the agency farmer, and Agent Hepner pleaded with the

Omahas to return to Black Bird Hills. Robertson pointed out that the recent disaster would
not have happened had they been settled and farming. Some of the head men agreed, and
the farmer thought they might return if given protection. In mid- October, Hepner spent
three days in council with the Omahas, but reported little progress. The Indians admitted
they feared not only the Poncas and the Sioux, but also Sergeant Bluff, Iowa, traders who
had threatened to call the Sioux down on their c a m

p s.
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Black Bird Hills was very special to the Omahas, but in their fear they would have
relinquished the lands of their choice. Speaking in a September 1855 tribal council,
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Standing Hawk and Joseph La Flesche asked to exchange their reservation for one on the
Platte River, where their lives and homes would be safe. Pouring out the pain and
frustration the entire tribe must have felt, Standing Hawk decried the loss of their land, the
delay in annuity payments, their forced removal, and the death of Logan Fontenelle due to
lack of protection.59
Peter Sarpy delivered the Omaha leaders' speeches to George Manypenny in
Washington and returned with a proposal from the commissioner that the Omahas unite
with the Pawnees. According to Sarpy, the Omahas approved the plan and even offered to
sell the Pawnees part of their land. To ensure that the Omahas would stay on their
reservation when they returned from their fall hunt, Sarpy sent supplies to Black Bird Hills
and planned to arrange peace treaties between the Omahas and Poncas and among the Sioux
bands. In late November, the trader informed Manypenny that he believed the Omahas had
been convinced to leave their temporary camp on the Platte.60 Sarpy's arguments must
have been persuasive, because the Omahas did return to Black Bird Hills in May 1856.
However, the Pawnees did not join them, the proposed peace treaties never materialized,
and the Omahas were once again unprotected and on their own.
As it did in so many treaties, the government failed to keep its promises to the
Omahas. Annuity payments came late; mills were delayed and often inoperative; the
government expected the Indians to farm without capital or machinery, and the Omahas
remained victims of Sioux attacks through the mid-1860s. They lived in constant fear,
staying as far south and east on the reservation as they could. W hen their newly-arrived
Presbyterian minister, William Hamilton, mentioned in 1856 that he might locate the
mission school near the reserve's northern border, the Omahas warned, "Do not go there.
The Sioux will kill the children. "61 In 1859 alone, Sioux raiding parties stole fifty-nine
horses, and summer hunts remained risky. The 1859 hunt on the plains of central Nebraska
ended in tragedy; a party of seventy Omahas, mostly the old and the ill who could not keep
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up, were attacked by either Cheyennes, Arapahoes or Sioux. Seventeen Omahas died, but
not before they took four enemy

s c a lp s .
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In September 1860, an outlaw Santee Sioux band or a party of Brule Sioux under
Little Thunder attacked the Omahas within sight of the mission and threatened to torch the
agency buildings. Following this outrage, many Omahas deserted their villages, and some
even left the reservation, which of course brought complaints from nearby settlers. Agent
George Graff worried about the Omahas' livelihood as well as their safety, fearing they
would starve if they did not return to plant com. 63 At a council earlier in the year, Joseph
La Flesche had reminded the government of its treaty obligation to protect his people, but
months later they continued to wait for the protection promised them six years earlier.64
Omahas and whites on the reservation were quickly losing patience with the government
and with the Sioux. The Indians threatened to retaliate, and after eleven Winnebagoes
temporarily residing on the Omaha Reservation were murdered, Agent Robert Furnas built
an unauthorized two-story log blockhouse as an armory and a place of refuge, arming it
with a six-pound cannon he found on the prairie. The agency also established a cavalry unit
composed of whites, mixed-bloods, and English-speaking Omahas, who hoped to receive
arms and ammunition from Fort Leavenworth,

K a n sa s.

65

In 1865, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs R. B. Van Valkenburgh asked
Agent Furnas to send him a report on Sioux depredations so that he could determine how to
reimburse the Omahas for their losses. With the aid of testimony from Omaha chiefs and
head men, two former agents, and mission employees, Furnas compiled a detailed list of
thirteen Sioux attacks dating from June 1854 to May 1865. In the raids, $1,000 worth of
personal property had been stolen, the Omahas had lost 152 horses, and twenty-two of
their people had been slain. Furnas calculated the value of horses at $60 each, and since
"there ought to attach some pecuniary consideration for loss of life," he considered the
twenty-two Omaha lives worth a total of $2,000. Reminding the department that the
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Omahas were "a loyal and peaceable tribe," he asked that their claim be seriously
considered.66 But in 1875, the tribe had not yet been compensated for their losses at the
hands of the Sioux.67
In December 1854, Lewis Saunsoci asked Agent George Hepner when he would be
paid the $1,000 provided him in the March treaty.6 8 This is but one of many instances of
late payments, underpayments and.arbitrary-deductions from monies-owed the OmahjsT^
For example, the Omaha agency had no funds for the first nine months of 1861, and Agenf^
O.H. Irish had to use his own money plus credit to keep the mill and farm operating.69
A nnuities often cam e late and on no particular schedule, requiring agents and
superintendents to remind the government that the Omahas were in need.70
In some cases, it appears that the government deliberately cheated the tribe. In
1862, Joseph La Flesche wanted to know why most of the Omaha annuity was paid in
paper money when the more rebellious tribes received theirs in silver and gold. He
considered the practice unfair since it made a $7,000 difference in the Omahas' yearly
income and the government expected its payments in coin. In 1866, the chiefs and head
men questioned the payment of part of their annuity in goods when they previously had.
been paid cash; with the many deductions that reduced their payment, they needed the
money now.71 When the Omaha annuity fell short in 1864, Agent Furnas investigated and
found that without the tribe's knowledge, funds had been deducted for trampling a field,
stealing a horse, and for "expenses" to a former agent's widow.72 The Omahas waited
more than fifty years to be paid for the additional 483,365 acres of land they had ceded to
the government when they chose their smaller reservation at Black Bird Hills. It was not
until they filed suit with the United States Court of Claims in 1910 that they received
$94,739.34, or 19.6 cents per acre for the extra land.73
In 1855, Commissioner Manypenny reported that the Omahas would have a saw
mill "next season." Seasons came and went; in October 1856 and again in the fall of 1857,
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Agent J. B. Robertson urged the department to erect the promised mill, since many Omahas
wanted to build homes and live like whites.74 When encouraged not to go on the hunt, one
chief asked, "What can we do if we stay here, we have nothing to do with. . . ."75 The
Omahas finally received their saw mill in the summer of 1858, but after running for three or
four months, its boiler exploded, putting the mill out of commission for a year and a
half.76 On the treaty's tenth anniversary, the chiefs wanted to know if the mill's ten-year
life dated from the treaty's signing, its ratification, or from when the equipment was
actually installed and working. Asked to investigate, Agent Furnas contacted former Omaha
farmer Joseph Betz, who corroborated the Omahas' testimony that the mill had successfully
operated only five and one-half of the promised ten years. Consequently, Furnas
recommended repairing the mill and continuing its operation for at least one more year so
that all the Omahas could build homes. The mill continued to run, but eventually had to be
rebuilt. 7 7
The saw mill was an integral part of the Omahas' efforts to become more like white
men, since it enabled them to build frame houses to replace their earth lodges. Once on the
reservation, the people clustered in three villages four to five miles apart: farthest south was
Ton-won-ga-hae's village; Ish-ka-da-be's earth lodge settlement was in the center; and
perhaps in keeping with the spirit of Big Elk's "farewell address," Joseph La Flesche and
the progressive Omahas of his "young men's party" formed a village patterned after white
communities. Built near the proposed Presbyterian mission, La Flesche's cluster of neat
frame homes and gardens became known derisively by more traditional Omahas as the
"make-believe white man's village." By 1861, La Flesche's little town boasted nineteen
homes— more than in the neighboring white village of Decatur, Nebraska. But after 1865,
residents gradually abandoned the white man's village as they moved onto allotments.
Despite its desertion, the village never became a ghost town, since a shortage of building
materials required the homes' owners to tear them down and reassemble them on their new
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farms. In 1888, all that remained of La Flesche's village was a list of its occupants and a
tiny sketch "drawn from memory by one of the Indians who lived there" (Fig. 1)78
Joseph La Flesche, also called E-sta-ma-za or "Iron Eye", (Fig. 2) dominated
Omaha history during the early reservation years. The son of French trader Joseph La
Flesche, Sr. and an Indian woman,79 La Flesche lived among the Omahas and earned the
respect of their leaders. Adopted by the revered Big Elk, La Flesche joined the Omaha tribal
council sometime between 1845 and 1850 and became a principal chief upon Big Elk's
death in 1853. A trader, tribal leader, campaigner for acculturation and a Christian, LaFlesche has been described as a "man of sagacity, integrity and intelligence" as well as a
self-serving, "shrewd . . . Indian

P o litic ia n .

"80 Like his mentor, he admired whites and

believed his people could survive only by adopting their ways. Much to the annoyance of
the more conservative Omahas, La Flesche supported a white style of education and
befriended the missionaries assigned to the Omaha reservation, yet he never completely
abandoned Omaha traditions. For years he participated in the hunt, and he had several
wives.
After witnessing a murder during a drunken brawl, La Flesche had promised
himself that if he ever achieved a position of authority, he would prohibit drinking among
his people. When he became a chief, {te^used $ 1,000 in tribal funds to establish a police
force to stop drunkenness. Punishment was severe; regardless of station, anyone caught
*

drinking could be flogged.81 Of course, La Flesche's authority did not go unopposed.
JT~Members of the "chiefs' party" who wished to retain the tribal hunt and other ancient ways

/

resisted his attempts at acculturation, and at one point threatened his

lif e .8 2

But Agent O.H.

Irish considered the Omahas lucky to have such a chief, and the Presbyterians sang his
praises, saying that he was "doing everything in his power to civilize and elevate his
people. . . . " Charles Sturges, superintendent of the mission school, called La Flesche "an
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The Make-Believe White Man's Village
Fig. 1

Alice C. Fletcher, Historical Sketch of the Omaha Tribe of Indians in Nebraska
(Washington, D. C. : Judd and Detweiler, 1885), Plate 6.
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Joseph La Flesche
Fig. 2

Alice C. Fletcher and Francis La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe.
Twenty-Seventh Annual Report o f the Bureau o f American Ethnology
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1911), Fig. 49.
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industrious man, [and] a friend of the mission" but qualified his praise, cautioning that
"money [was] his idol."83
It was La Flesche's pursuit of power and of the Omaha trading dollar that led to his
conflict with the equally ambitious Agent Robert W. Furnas in 1865. On the reservation,
La Flesche and Henry Fontenelle served in the lucrative and coveted positions of traders for
the Omahas, who strenuously resisted having a white trader among them. Shortly before he
left the agency in 1864, Agent Irish appointed the two mixed-bloods official traders, but
their credentials were delayed so the new agent, Robert W. Furnas, could share in the
trading decision. Furnas, who would be such a factor in La Flesche's career, owed his
position as Omaha agent to Samuel G. Daily, Nebraska Territory's congressional delegate,
and Daily had his own ideas about who should secure the Omaha trade. Cautioning Furnas
not to give the business to "those half-Breeds at the Reserve," Daily told the agent to
appoint the best possible man as trader, making sure to [give] him only as small a portion
of the proceeds as [he could]." Furnas chose Robert Teare of Brownville, Nebraska for-the
job^A lthough the official "trader," Teare was merely an employee; Furnas, Daily and
Indian Commissioner William P. Dole invested in the trade and split the profits.84 Teare
now had the trading license, but Fontenelle and La Flesche continued to sell goods to both
the Omahas and the recently-arrived W innebagoes. When Teare protested, Commissioner
Dole, concerned about profits, told Furnas to stop their activity, even with troops if
necessary. 85
As a former Civil W ar military commander, Furnas expected to be obeyed. Along
with the trading issue, La Flesche may have annoyed the agent by not subordinating
himself to his authority. W hatever the reasons, Fumas-never-missed-an-opportunity to
accuse the chiof~oi—obstructionism ,-self-aggrandizem ent- and-hypQcrisy. In a bitter
indictment, Furnas charged La Flesche with "producing discord among the tribe," leaving
the reservation without permission, encouraging tribal police to inflict unfair punishment,
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lending money at usurious rates, and refusing to allow his people to deal with licensed
traders. Furnas claimed that it was the "accidental" chiefs wealth, not his personal
popularity, that kept him in power. Citing his lavish feasts, Furnas quoted La Flesche as
saying he "[could] fill the Omahas' bellies and then do as he pleas[ed] with them." If true,
the agent's most serious charges showed La Flesche to be an enemy of his own people.
According to Furnas, the chief advertised his support of tribal advancement, but behind the
scenes did everything he could to hold the Omahas back. W hat most incensed Furnas was
La Flesche's opposition to an 1865 treaty amendment providing universal Indian education.
Accusing the chief of wanting only his own children to have a white education, Furnas
charged that La Flesche, that "dreadful incubus upon the tribe," would not "if he could help
it, allow the masses to be educated or benefited, for then they would be equal with him ."86
Furnas argued that as long as La Flesche pulled the tribal strings the Omahas would
not progress. Therefore, the agent recommended that he be permanently deposed as chief
and, if necessary, banished from the reservation. Superintendent E. B. Taylor agreed with
Furnas' assessment, but Commissioner Dennis Cooley was reluctant to take such harsh
measures against an influential Omaha who had been of such use to the government in the
past. Since La Flesche's actions seemed to be heavily influenced by mission school
superintendent R. J. Burtt, Cooley asked the Presbyterian Church to recall Burtt in the
hope that his removal would change the chiefs behavior. According to Furnas, La Flesche
boasted that the missionary would shield him from any charges of misconduct. Burtt was
dismissed, and with his alleged protector gone, La Flesche hastily fled the reservation with^
his entire family on the night of April 17, 1866.87 A few months later, Furnas reluctantly N
admitted that he may have judged La Flesche too harshly and agreed to allow him back on
the reservation, but only if he were willing to be "subordinate to the agent ."8 8 La Flesche )
did return home, but he never again held a seat on the tribal council, and apparently was \
recognized as a leader only among his band of followers in the young men's party. 89

/
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Was Joseph La Flesche a self-serving "politician" as Furnas charged, or did he
really want to see his people advance? Did he worship money? In the long run, did he help
or hinder his people? The questions are legion. Most of the evidence shows a man who
correctly gauged the future and wanted his people, and especially his own family, to be
prepared for the white world. His campaign to stop alcoholism was truly admirable, though
his methods were not. In tryingjo^force his people_along the white man's road, perhaps he
pushed too hard. In assessing his career, it appears odd that the only real criticism of this
remarkable man, besides that of rival chiefs, came from an Indian agent with a hidden
agenda. But Joseph La Flesche may have done his people a disservice simply by being
who he was— an acculturated, high-profile Christian Indian whose im age possibly
convinced reformers and the government that all Omahas could become land-owning
farmers. Perhaps it is best to let Joseph La Flesche speak for himself. Suffering from
complications from an improperly amputated leg, he confronted his own mortality by
stating that all he lived for was "to see his people on the road of improvement, their money
matters all made straight, and the Mission fu ll... ."90
In his correspondence and his actions, Robert Furnas appeared grasping,
domineering and vindictive, and perhaps he was. But for the most part, he did a good job
under trying conditions. Reformers and the government dictated Indian policy, but it was
the agents who dealt with everyday affairs, and the temptation to cheat was strong. In most
cases far from Washington, agents often became despots and occasionally became thieves.
Most agents were overworked; all were underpaid, and it took a man of rare character to
settle himself, and often his family, in the western wilderness for $1,500 a year. "For the
weak and dishonest, it was a wide-open opportunity for quick wealth; for the honest man,
it was an impossible job."91
Omaha agents were no different from others in these respects. Although the 1860s
are considered the most corrupt period in nineteenth-century Indian administration, three
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Omaha agents in succession left their posts under questionable circumstances a decade
earlier. George Hepner, already suspect for his alleged role in the reservation selection,
soon came under fire for neglecting the Omahas and being in league with a group of Indian
leaders. According to missionary Hamilton and citizens of Council Bluffs, Hepner lived in
St. Mary's, Iowa, and only saw the Indians under his care when absolutely necessary. In
1856, responding to numerous complaints, Nebraska Territorial Secretary Thomas B.
Cuming filed a formal protest with Commissioner Manypenny.92 But charges that Hepner
shorted the Omahas on provisions proved his undoing. When a shipment of flour bound
for the Indians arrived in Omaha and was determined to be underweight and of poor
quality, The Nebraskian. Omaha's territorial newspaper, attacked the agent in print. Noting
that Hepner was conspicuously absent when the flour arrived, an editorialist asked, "Was
*

he a party to the attempt to defraud the poor Indians, furnishing them inferior flour at the
prices of a better article?"93 jn February 1856, Secretary of W ar Robert McClelland
ordered Hepner to explain his actions or risk removal from office. Hepner defended
himself to the satisfaction of investigator Daniel Vanderslice, who claimed that the agent
had been the target of a "smear campaign" by merchants who wished to discredit him and
replace him with someone more "pliable." Despite Vanderslice's recommendation that he be
returned to duty, Hepner was suspended and never returned to the Omaha agency.94
J. B. Robertson, a former Omaha farmer who replaced Hepner as agent in 1856,
appears to have been an extortionist and a thief. Robertson was universally disliked by
Presbyterians at the agency who accused him of neglecting the Omahas and undermining
their mission.95 W illiam Hamilton was convinced that Robertson played a role in an
alleged plot to move the Omahas to Ponca lands to open their reservation to speculators. In
Hamilton's view, tricking the Omahas out of their lands would be as simple as "mak[ing] a
chief or two and brib[ing] one interpreter. 9 6 Robertson may also have misappropriated
Omaha funds. Shortly after taking office, he deposited $2,000 with the W estern Fire &
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Marine Insurance Company in Omaha at three per cent interest per month. In September
1857, Robertson approached the company's auditor, saying he needed the cash back, since
it was "government money, and if not paid would lead to his ruin and disgrace." When the
company balked, Robertson threatened to have his son, who edited The Nebraskian. attack
the firm in the press.97
The construction of an agency building gave the dishonest agent another occasion to
skim government funds by charging $600 for a $450 construction job. But a fourth charge
finally attracted the government's attention. In 1866, the Omahas claimed that Robertson
kept part of the $25,000 provided them in the appropriation act of August 1851, and an
investigation of the agent's books showed discrepancies. The Indians were right, and the
government agreed to a $13,000 settlement for the stolen funds. In 1882, payment was still
pending.98
Agent William F. Wilson lost his position as Omaha agent on the strength of a
quite-possibly forged letter. On June 11, 1859, the Omaha chiefs and head men allegedly
signed a petition to have Agent Wilson removed from office because he was "too old and
infirm," had refused to pay their annuity at their village, and had exposed them to whiskey
sellers. In addition, the Indians claimed that he replaced a competent engineer with an
untrained one and refused to pay Indian employees. The Omaha chiefs later denied any
knowledge of the letter, written by Henry Fontenelle, and categorically denied every charge
Fontenelle brought against W ilson. In a signed statement, Lewis Saunsoci accused
Fontenelle of forging his signature, and the testimony of two white men from Decatur,
Nebraska who spoke to Fontenelle in Omaha the afternoon of the supposed council
supported his charges.99
W hy would Henry Fontenelle forge such a letter? At this point the plot takes an
interesting twist. The chiefs, Omaha Hiram Chase, and agency farmer David Jones all
testified that in mid-June, Nebraska Governor S. W. Black, Territorial Marshall William A.
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West, and "one Mr. Patrick" 100 visited the Omaha village. Governor Black passed himself
off as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs while West claimed to be the new Omaha agent.
The three men gave the Omahas money and asked leading questions whose "answers"
appeared in the "petition." All the evidence indicates an attempt to discredit Wilson, who
believed W est wanted his job and had dictated the "petition." 101 Disregarding the three
men's mysterious visit, letters of support from missionaries and local citizens, and his own
believable defense in which he claimed to be the victim of a vendetta by a "corrupt" tribal
faction, Wilson was summarily dismissed on October 17,
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W hile some agents and many outsiders hoped to profit from the Omahas,
missionaries hoped to change them. In 1846, the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church established a mission and a boarding school at Bellevue for the Otoes
and Omahas. When the Omahas moved to their reservation in 1855, the Presbyterians and
their ethnocentricity went along. Charles Sturges, an early mission school superintendent,
told the Omahas in council that the missionaries had come "to tell them how to live and how
to die," and gave the impression that their tribe would disappear if they did not educate their
children and accept the white man’s God. 103
The churchmen criticized or ridiculed what they did not understand. Sturges
complained that several "chiefs and men" wanted to observe the Sabbath, but had no
concept of time. One Indian recognized the Sabbath because that was the day the
missionary came to see them, and another counted on his fingers to represent the seventh
as Sunday. R. J. Burtt of the Omaha mission thought the Omaha language "a very poor
one," with a "scarcity of . . . words" to communicate religious ideas. W hile admitting that
pride probably prevented the Omahas from being emotional, Sturges accused the Indians of
underreacting to his gospel message. 104 Presbyterians also believed the Omahas immoral,
which seems strangely hypocritical in light of moral lapses by the churchmen. Reverend
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Burtt reputedly had an extramarital affair, which caused Joseph La Flesche to remark that
he had "as good a right to another wife as Mr. Burt

[ s ic ] ,"

105 and in 1854, William

Hamilton borrowed $1,800 from La Flesche with the understanding that he would earn ten
per cent interest and would have his money back in six months. Three years later, La
Flesche, who could not read English, learned that the note read six per cent interest, not
ten. Only the intervention of Charles Sturges prevented La Flesche from suing Hamilton
for his money. 106
The Presbyterians, along with Omaha agents, advocated a program of forced
acculturation by discouraging common ownership of property, by attempting to depose
chiefs, and by curtailing hunts, even though these often were the Omaha's only source of
meat. Instead, they encouraged private land ownership, acquisitiveness, and detribalization
of the

O m a h a s.

107 g ut they directed most of their energies toward changing the Omaha

children, believing that white ways learned at an early age would become permanent. In
1858, Charles Sturges asked the government to force Omaha chiefs to send all children
aged eight to fourteen to the mission school to "fill up [the] school and keep it so." Seven
years later, Agent Robert Furnas recommended that the treaty of that year include a
provision requiring parents of children aged five to twenty to educate them or lose their
annuities. 108
The acculturation process began by missionaries giving their students English
names to replace their difficult-to-pronounce and "heathenish" Indian ones. Traditional
Indian dress was taboo, as noted by Joseph La Flesche's son, Francis, who related an,
incident from his days at the mission school. Wanting to look his best, an Omaha boy\
arrived at school for the first time dressed in his "embroidered moccasins, his leggings ana
[his] little buffalo robe" and he was immediately sent to the storeroom, where La Flesche
and a fellow student fitted him with white clothing. His fine Indian costume was bundled
up and returned to his parents. Since the government and the church considered the English
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language basic to civilization, children were forbidden to speak in Omaha, a rule—rigidly
enforced with- a hickoryxod." But despite the rules and the rod, R. J. Burtt insisted, "There
still exists a too general-disposition to converse in^their-native^language." 109 The
Presbyterians meant well, and they hoped their presence would "humanize government
policy" and help the Omahas survive. Board of Foreign Missions secretary Walter Lowrie
believed agriculture would solve all the Omahas' problems. All they had to do, according to
Lowrie, was "to give up their hunting, and settle each on his own farm, and live like white
men." 1

It would not be that easy.
In 1869, President Ulysses S. Grant's "Quaker Policy" brought Hicksite Friends to

the Omaha Reservation as agents. Like the Presbyterians, these Quakers misunderstood
and under-appreciated Omaha culture and the huge problems confronting the tribe. Also,
like the Presbyterians, they hoped to turn the Omahas into "civilized," Christian farmers.
The Friends treated the Indians as "spiritual equals" but "cultural inferiors" who must learn
white ways or perish. Important to their aims were allotment of lands and the creation of
individual farms, both of which contributed to the destruction of traditional Indian
government and social structure. 111
At first, Presbyterian missionary William Hamilton, Quaker Agent Edward Painter,
and his superintendent, Samuel M. Janney, had a good relationship, and a Quaker report in
1869 praised Hamilton's efforts, vowing that Friends would work "shoulder to shoulder"
with him to improve the Omahas. 112 But Hamilton soon fell out of favor with the Quakers
and most of the Omahas when he interfered in tribal politics by defending Joseph La
Flesche in his power struggle with conservative chiefs. Probably because of the
relationship among Hamilton, La Flesche and the mission boarding school, the chiefs in
1868 asked to have the school terminated and replaced with two or more day schools.
Acting in concert with the request of tribal leaders and Superintendent Janney,
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Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ely S. Parker canceled the Presbyterians' school contract
effective September 30, 1869.1
Although the Omaha chiefs requested the boarding school closing in 1868, before
the Quakers arrived, Hamilton blamed the Friends for the school's temporary demise. The
feud between the religious groups continued for years, finally degenerating into a war of
words on the pages of Alfred B. Meacham's national Indian advocacy newspaper Council
Fire. In September 1879, Meacham published a letter from eleven Omahas, probably sent
at the urging of Hamilton, asking the government not to replace Quaker agent Jacob Vore
with Barclay White, the current Winnebago agent Apparently the Indians misspoke: what
they meant to say was that they wanted no more Quaker agents because the Friends had
closed the boarding school. Vore then attacked Hamilton, calling him anti-Quaker and
accusing him of using "ignorant" Indians to convey his own message. He denied any
Quaker involvement in the boarding school's closing and referred Hamilton to his own
1869 report, in which he thanked Janney and Edward Painter, both Quakers, for their
support and kind words. In March 1880, J. Owen Dorsey announced that Hamilton was
not sectarian and that all the Omahas had complained about Quaker agents. 114
The Friends' stewardship among the Omahas was unsuccessful, but outside
influences contributed significantly to their failure. For five years of their regime, Nebraska
farmlands were attacked by grasshoppers, and the Omahas' final buffalo hunt in 18761877 was so unsuccessful that the starving Indians resorted to begging food at Fort Hays,
Kansas, where General John Pope issued them $340 worth of rations. But mostly, Quaker
expectations were simply too h ig h .H ^ g y 1 8 7 6 , Nebraska's congressmen wanted only
Nebraska citizens to serve as agents within the state, and as a result, the Senate rejected
many Quaker candidates. One by one the Hicksite Friends lost their posts, until none
remained in 1885.116
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Of course, not all Omaha acculturation during the early reservation years was forced
by whites. Tribal leaders roughly divided along "traditional" and "progressive" lines, with
Joseph La Flesche and his followers representing the latter category. Letters translated by
anthropologist J. Owen Dorsey or those published by Meacham in Council Fire reveal the
Omaha progressives' desire to "improve." While admitting they were a tribal minority, the
j/'

letter writers all wanted to be farmers and follow white

w a y s.

117 Qn the other hand, so-

called Omaha "reactionaries" refused to leave their earth lodges and wanted no money spent

r

on agriculture, physical improvements or medical care. The parents of some children who
wanted to attend school were afraid to send them for fear of being whipped. William
Hamilton believed these Omaha parents had been threatened by traditional chiefs under
orders from former agent W. P. Callon and Superintendent H. B. Denman to keep the
children away from the mission school. Tired of the Indians being pulled in several
directions by interfering whites, Hamilton admitted it would be "a blessing to the nation if
the white man were removed from the reservation."
v *

/

Of the tribal conservatives, Little Chief appeared to be the most troublesome,
---------------- --—
—
controlhngjhe more-traditional Indians, obstructing justice, and threatening to drive whites
off the reservation. The progressives hated him because he removed Indian children from
the mission school, and both Agents Irish and Furnas recommended that he be stripped of
his title, since he im peded Omaha "progress." 119 Other tribes resented Omaha
progressives as well; in a joint council, the Otoes cautioned Omaha chiefs not to try to
become white men because they would fare badly. Joseph La Flesche disagreed:
Look back on the lives of your fathers and grandfathers; then look at
yourselves, and see how far you have gone ahead, and seeing this,
do not stop and turn back to them, but go forward. Look ahead and
you will see nothing but the white man. lh e future is full of the
white man and we shall be as nothing before them .1

As the Omahas "progressed," their government was modified to suit whites.
Because tribal meetings were unproductive and "cumbersome," the agents organized a
council of as many as nine "paper chiefs" whose tenure rested on good behavior and who
could be "easily called together by the agent." Although chiefs were no longer independent,
Quaker agents advocated abolishing the office altogether, since chiefs "insisted on special
privileges and impeded tribal progress and 'republicanism.'" The Omaha people must have
agreed; in August 1877, they petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to allow them
to "remove [their] chiefs and try some other way." They wanted to elect their leaders as
white men did, but the embattled chiefs claimed "the great Father made [them] chiefs" and
the people could not remove them from office. They were deposed, however, and in March
1880, by a show of hands, the Omahas elected seven leaders with equal authority. The era
of the principal chiefs had ended. 121
Amid the turmoil of the 1860s, the Omahas found themselves inundated by
hundreds of destitute Winnebagoes fleeing the arid, desolate Crow Creek reservation in
Dakota Territory. A canoe load at a time, half-starved W innebagoes struggled onto the
Omaha Reservation, and by May 1864, nearly 1200 of these strangers had moved onto
Omaha lands. In a council with newly-arrived Agent Robert Furnas, the Omahas agreed
that the Winnebagoes could stay, but only if they obeyed stringent rules and if they paid
their hosts out of their tribal annuities. Many of the very young and very old Winnebagoes
froze to death during the following winter; they had arrived with nothing and had been
issued no clothing since they came to the Omahas. Furnas could not understand Winnebago
agent Saint A. D. Balcombe's lack of concern for the Indians in his care. He made no
attempt to contact Furnas, who later learned that he had spent the winter in Sioux City,
"forty miles from the nearest W innebago," probably living off the Indians' clothing
allowance, which had mysteriously disappeared. 122
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On February 6, 1865, over the objections of those who did not want to see their
still-unallotted reservation reduced, the Omaha chiefs and head men authorized Joseph La
Flesche, Standing Hawk, Little Chief, Noise and No Knife to negotiate with the United
States to sell part of their lands for the Winnebagoes1use. The first article of the March 6,
1865 treaty (Appendix IX) stated the boundaries of the northern portion of the reservation
to be conveyed to the Winnebagoes (Map 8) and provided that no Omaha improvements
would be included. By the provisions of Article Two, the Omahas would be paid $50,000,
to be used by their agent to improve what remained of their reservation. Article Three
provided the tribe with a blacksmith, shop, farmer and mills for ten years longer and
allowed the Omahas $7,000 for damages sustained during the W innebagoes1stay on their
reservation. 123
Article Four, which would almost immediately be questioned, abolished common
land tenure on the remaining Omaha Reservation and provided for "regular and compact"
allotments of 160 acres to each family head and forty acres to each male over eighteen. The
agency would occupy one quarter section, and all allotments would include some timber.
Certificates would be issued for the tax-exempt allotments, which could not be sold or
leased, except to the government or to other Omahas. Finally, under Article Five, the
Omahas could buy their land back if the Winnebagoes proved to be poor neighbors. 124
The Omaha tribal representatives had no idea what was included in the 1865 treaty.
When Superintendent H.B. Denman explained the treaty's provisions, they were surprised,
and said they were unaware that allotment was even mentioned. They objected strenuously
to the changes in allotment terms in the new treaty, since land would now be parceled out
without regard to family size. It was, they argued, unfair for a childless couple to have as
much land as a family of ten. In February 1868, the Omaha chiefs asked to have their lands
allotted according to the more generous terms of the 1854 treaty. Denman urged the Indian
Department to change the mode of allotment, even if it took an act of Congress. In
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November, the Omahas once more voiced their objections, this time asking for a new
treaty. But at his first council with the chiefs, in June 1869, Samuel Janney convinced them
to accept the 1865 terms. The Quaker superintendent must have been quite persuasive,
since the chiefs also offered to pay the surveyor from their "Winnebago fund. "125
Early in 1866, Omaha leaders petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
survey and allot their lands promptly so that those who had chosen their acreage could
begin working their farms in the spring. Exactly one year later, the United States Land
Commissioner informed Commissioner Lewis Bogy that the Omaha survey had been
delayed due to harsh winter weather, but promised that it would be completed as soon as
possible. The surveyor finally finished his field work on June 27, 1867 and transmitted the
survey to the land office in parts to speed up its verification .126 Two months after the
survey's completion, Agent W. P. Callon urged the government to get on with the work of
allotting Omaha lands, since it would be a time-consuming process. 122
The task of allotting Omaha lands fell to Agent Edward Painter. Following clearly
defined rules, he had assigned 160 acre parcels to 130 of the 278 heads of families by
August 1869. A year later, 209 farms of 160 acres had owners and forty-six single Omahas
had received their land. In July 1871, Painter finally sent his superior the complete roll of
Omaha allottees, which included a few allotments to non-resident Indians, should they
agree to return to the reservation. The Omahas whose land had been allotted received their
certificates in March 1871 with the promise that the land was secure for them and their
heirs. 128
Painter had barely finished his work when problems arose regarding the allotments.
Some were minor: because of the similarity of names and an inadvertent erasure, Little
Buffalo received Sleeping Buffalo's claim; several Indians wished to exchange their lands
for ones closer to the villages and the school; still others wanted to be near relatives and
friends; and at least one Omaha built a house on the wrong allotment. But, more seriously,
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some land could not be farmed, and several allotments were being washed away by the
Missouri River. Overall, the Omahas were unhappy with their inadequate 1871 allotments,
and worried about their futures, since they could no longer hunt and the Nebraska
legislature had threatened to remove them from the state. Some Indians, especially Joseph
La Flesche's faction, wanted written deeds to their lands so they could not be driven to
Oklahoma. 129
After allotting the Omahas' lands, Edward Painter's hands were tied. He had no
funds to help the Indians improve their farms, and they each received only fourteen dollars
per year in annuities. Citing Article Six of the 1854 treaty, which allowed the Omahas to
sell surplus lands, Painter suggested selling 50,000 acres from the reservation's western
end to raise money for improvements. Both Painter and Janney worried that lack of capital
for farms would cause the Indians to "regress." Approving their agent's plan, the Omaha
chiefs asked that a delegation go to W ashington to negotiate the sale. 130 The Omahas'
proposition first came before Congress early in 1871, but because it was attached to a more
complex and controversial bill, the tribe's request was denied. 131 Stressing the inadequacy
of their $20,000 annuity, the Omahas in late October 1871 petitioned the new Congress for
permission to sell the land, this time with the support of Interior Secretary Columbus
Delano, Commissioner Francis A. W alker and the Quakers. In addition to approving the
transaction, Congress allowed the Omahas a $30,000 cash advance, to be repaid from land
sale profits. 132
An act of June 10, 1872 ordered the 50,000 acre western tract to be surveyed and
appraised, after which the lands would be advertised for sale at no less than an average of
$2.50 per acre. The resulting money would be deposited in the United States Treasury at
five per cent interest, payable semi-annually, with the stipulation that no more than twentyfive per cent of the land sale money could be used in any given

y ea r.

133 Unfortunately,

sales were slow since few investors agreed to pay the high per-acre price. Consequently,
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the Omahas saw little profit and were unable to "advance in civilization" in 1873. Instead,
they went on a hunt. 134
In 1873, the Indian office called Omaha chiefs to Washington to transfer still more
land to the Winnebagoes. Since the designated area (Map 8) included heavy timber and the
Winnebagos had been stealing their horses, the Omahas initially resisted the sale. But when
told by Agent T. T. Gillingham that chiefs who refused to negotiate would be deposed,
they reluctantly agreed, under certain conditions: 1) they wanted more than $2.50 per acre;
2) the pony thefts must stop; and 3) Omahas whose allotments were on the land to be sold
must be given titles or be allowed to choose other acreage. 135 j n July 1874, all nine
Omaha chiefs went to Washington where they deeded 12,347.55 additional acres of their
dwindling reservation to the Winnebagoes for $30,868.87, or almost exactly $2.50 per
acre. 136
By 1881, the governm ent still owed the Omahas $20,885 from the second
Winnebago land sale. In a rational yet emotional appeal for payment, the Indians reminded
Congress that much of the merchandise purchased from proceeds of the first sale was
substandard. Also, the govemment-issue harnesses did not fit their small Indian ponies,
and fifty of the one hundred cattle they received were kept by the agent and allowed to
starve to death. The memorialists asked for itemized lists of items purchased "so if we are
not allowed to suggest or to direct how our money shall be expended, we may at least have
the satisfaction of knowing what became of it when it is all gone. "137
The Poncas' forced removal from Nebraska in 1877 prompted the Omahas to look
at their own land titles. When lawyers told them they held worthless scraps of paper, they
felt betrayed by the government they had always trusted. Joseph La Flesche addressed his
fears to Alfred B. Meacham of the Council Fire: "We reserved for ourselves a very small
part of the la n d .. . . But the white people wish to take that from us and send us to another
land; that is very hard for us!"138
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The Omahas did not suffer the Poncas' fate of removal, but the early reservation
years left them in many ways poorer than they had been before their fateful trek to Black
Bird Hills in 1855. They no longer feared the Sioux, but they did fear the future. For
nearly twenty years they had been cheated, lied to, and forced to surrender many of their,
old ways. Promises had been made and broken and their tribal government had been
dismantled. No longer able to depend on the buffalo for food, they had been asked to farm
without money or machinery. Worst of all, they had been unwilling participants in the rapid
deterioration of their tribal land base. Yet to whites, the Omahas were "a steady and reliable
set of men . . . advancing in the direction of citizenship." 139 Considered models of
loyalty, self-reliance and acculturation, they were deemed ready for allotments in severalty.
But most were not ready, and even harder times lay ahead. In 1881, the Omahas would
meet a determined "lady from Boston" who would study their culture, reallot their lands,
and
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good

or

ill,

lead
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CHAPTER FOUR

A MODEL FOR DISASTER: THE OMAHA ALLOTMENT EXPERIMENT,
1882-1887

"I want title to my land, so that no one can take from my children the land on which I have
worked.
Wa-ha-sha-ga (James Springer)— Omaha, 1881
"All friends of our race who urge land in severalty upon us now wi l l . . . see their error and
repent of it when it is too late to remedy the wrong they have caused to be done to us."^
An Anonymous Omaha, 1887

The Omahas had good reason to fear the future. Through the pleas of a handful of
tribal "progressives" and the lobbying efforts of an unlikely mentor, they were awarded
lands in severalty during 1882. But allotment proved to be a continuation rather than the
end of their troubles. As a result of the allotment legislation, they became lost in a legal
"no-man's land," subject to state laws but not protected by them, and with passage of the
Dawes Act of 1887, they became citizens without understanding its ramifications. Lands
on the western end of the reservation were sold to white settlers, but little of the money
filtered down to the tribe. Attempts at self-government quickly degenerated into tribal
feuding, and controversy over a common pasture permanently split the prominent La
Flesche family. By 1886, the Omahas were culturally adrift and unable to manage their
own affairs, but they were still considered successfully assimilated by many reformers who
refused to admit failure. Policy makers ignored agents' reports that accurately portrayed
deteriorating conditions among the Omahas, and despite their numerous problems, the
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Omaha "experiment" became the blueprint for the 1887 Dawes Act, which allotted the lands
of many other tribes, often with equally disastrous results.
Omaha allotm ent resulted from changes in public attitudes toward Indian
assimilation. Generally contemptuous of Indians, westerners had historically opposed any
efforts at assimilation, and until about 1880, easterners, far from the frontier and with little
understanding of conditions there, saw Indians as romantic and exotic. But even staunch
Indian advocates found it difficult to defend Native Americans in the 1870s, when a series
of events, including the 1873 Modoc W ar in northern California and the 1876 Battle of
Little Big Horn turned public opinion against them. Ironically, George Custer's
monumental defeat created a climate more favorable to reform. Westerners criticized the
United States Army for its failure to subdue the Sioux, but most eastern reformers abhorred
G eneral W illiam T. Sherm an's and the late General C uster's policy of Indian
extermination.^ Eastern reformers increasingly saw the army as the villain in this western
tragedy and as an obstacle to Indian "civilization." After the Custer M assacre, many
reformers feared that the army would "destroy the Peace Policy and probably the Indians."
The army did place all the Sioux agencies under its control, and in a series of punitive
campaigns, "forcibly disarmed and dismounted" hostile and friendly Indians alike. With
their subjugation by the United States Army, northern plains tribes became people to be
pitied, and their condition piqued interest in assim ilation.^
As public anger over Little Big Horn subsided, the Ponca tragedy took center stage.
Standing Bear's return to his Nebraska homeland in 1879 and the subsequent trial in which
his right to sue in court was upheld made the Ponca chief an instant celebrity. But public
sentiment in Nebraska did not support the Poncas, and in October 1879, Thomas H.
Tibbies, a former abolitionist and one-time circuit rider who, as a reporter for the Omaha
Herald had been instrumental in Standing Bear's successful lawsuit, took the now famous
chief on a lecture tour of the Northeast. Accompanying Tibbies and Standing Bear were
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Joseph La Flesche's highly educated daughter, Susette, and her half-brother, Francis La
Flesche.^ The Ponca chiefs eastern trip "resembled a political campaign more than a state
visit," and was designed to sway public opinion to obtain support for policy changes.
Tibbies carefully selected his audiences, making sure they would be sympathetic. During
the tour, Susette La Flesche downplayed her French and English ancestry, even appearing
in buckskin and using her Indian name of "Bright Eyes" as she translated Standing Bear's
remarks and made her own plea for liberty and equality. 6
Standing Bear was well received in the East. In Boston, the cradle of the Indian
reform movement, influential citizens urged the Poncas' return to Nebraska, and at the
same time recognized that injustice toward Indians resulted from their lack of legal status.
With a zeal approaching that of the earlier abolitionists, eastern reformers urged that Native
Americans be provided citizenship, legal protection, and individual land patents.^
Tibbies' lecture tour netted more than sympathy for the Poncas and other Indians.
In Boston, Tibbies was approached by Alice C. Fletcher (Fig. 3), an ethnologist and
protegee of Frederic W ard Putnam, director of the Peabody Museum of American
Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard University. Fletcher wished to study Indians first
hand, and despite Tibbies' insistence that she was not up to the rigors of camping on the
prairie, she was determined to go. When Tibbies and Susette La Flesche returned to Boston
in 1881, Fletcher again pled her case. This time, they agreed to take her camping with the
Sioux, and on Septem ber 1, 1881, she arrived in N ebraska carrying personal
recommendations from the Secretary of War, the Interior Secretary, and members of the
scientific community. W hat Fletcher planned to do was unprecedented for a woman in the
1880s, and she knew there would be problems. She confided to a correspondent," I know
that what I am toward is difficult, fraught with hardship to mind and body. . . ."8
Tibbies and Susette La Flesche, who was now Mrs. Tibbies, escorted Fletcher
north to the Omaha Reservation, where she was warmly welcomed by Joseph La Flesche
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Alice C. Fletcher
Fig. 3

Joan Mark, A Stranger in Her Native Landi
Alirp. Fletcher and the American Indians
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988).
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and other tribal progressives who saw this "Boston lady" as someone who might be able
to help them secure their land. Inevitably, the conversation turned to land titles, which the
Indians saw as their only alternative to removal to Indian Territory, where they feared they
would perish as so many Poncas had.9 As promised, after this short visit with the La
Flesche family, Tibbies, Susette, Fletcher, and Wajapa, a La Flesche family friend, set off
for Sioux country. After briefly visiting the Poncas, the foursome continued on to the
Rosebud Sioux Agency, then to Fort Randall, where Fletcher interviewed and was
charmed by the captive Sitting Bull. After visiting the Yankton and Santee Sioux agencies
with the inspector general, Fletcher rejoined the others and returned to the Omaha
Reservation. 10
When asked why she had come to Nebraska, Fletcher told her Omaha hosts that she
hoped to learn their ways and to help them if she could. The Omahas indeed wanted her
help. Since 1854, tribal progressives had fretted over the security of their lands, and the
recent discovery that their certificates were worthless filled them with alarm. Joseph La
Flesche had sent Susette east with Standing Bear in 1879, and many Omahas had signed
petitions and letters addressed to the "white people in the east," asking for aid in securing
land titles. They had also sent letters to the reform newspaper, Council Fire, with the intent
that these be forwarded to the President, the

Secretary of the Interior, and the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 11 The desperate Omahas told Alice Fletcher: "You have
come at a time when we are in distress. . . . We want a 'strong paper.' We are told that we
can get one through an act of Congress. Can you help us?" 12
Having listened to the pleas of Joseph La Flesche and other leaders, the ethnologist
decided that the only solution to the Omahas' problems was land in severalty. Fletcher later
explained her decision to plead the Omahas' case before Congress. "While living with the
tribe . . . I grew to know the fervor with which the people loved their land, and to see that
over each fireside hung a shadow that would not lift— the fear of compulsory removal to

143
the Indian Territory. . . ."13 But like many other whites, Fletcher misunderstood the
Omahas' desires. In asking for a strong paper, most of the tribe wanted a secure title to
their tribal lands so that they could remain in their ancestral home. Instead, Fletcher
worked to destroy Omaha tribalism and to secure for individual Indians private property—
their alleged ticket into "civilized society." 14
After two meetings with Omaha head men, Fletcher addressed a petition to the
United States Senate asking that its signers be granted full title to their allotments. Fiftythree Omaha men signed the document, and Fletcher added personal statistics and remarks
of each petitioner. 15 Fletcher mailed the petition on December 31, 1881, along with a letter
explaining her own role. Insinuating that her short stay with them had made her an
authority on the Omahas, she asked Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hiram Price to "trust
her interpretation of the situation." While admitting that the Omahas had two tribal parties,
"one desirous of civilization [and] one that clings to the past," Fletcher assured the
commissioner that the progressives were "the true leaders among the people. "16
Fletcher remained with the Omahas all winter as they anxiously awaited news from
Washington. Finally, in February, word came that the petition had come before the Senate.
The eager Fletcher then wrote to Interior Secretary Samuel Kirkwood and Massachusetts
Senator Henry L. Dawes, chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, asking them to
support Omaha allotment legislation. 17 Too impatient to continue lobbying from Nebraska,
Fletcher decided to conduct her Omaha campaign in person. During a three-month stay in
W ashington in the spring of 1882, she relentlessly lobbied government officials, one of
whom called her "a dreadful bulldozer," but it was these officials' wives and daughters
who convinced them to hear Fletcher's plan. 18
In her appendix to The Omaha T ribe, Alice Fletcher called her W ashington
allotment lobbying "a long, and for a time a single-handed campaign." Yet, it was not that
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difficult In fact, her campaign was "short and almost foreordained to succeed." Her timing
was perfect; W ashington was ready for a new Indian policy and waiting for someone to
force a bill through Congress. Fletcher did just that. A bill to sell part of the Omaha
Reservation had already cleared one branch of Congress, and Fletcher wanted to ensure
allotments for tribal members. Urged on by Commissioner Price, she managed to amend
the bill so that the Omahas would receive allotments before any reservation lands could be
sold to whites. In pushing for allotment, Fletcher stressed not what the Indians would lose,
but what they would gain— 160 acre farms, citizenship, laws, schools, and the chance to
become part of white "civilization."^
The bill did not pass unchallenged. In April 1882, several senators entered into a
heated debate over the sale of Omaha lands. In his opening remarks, Nebraska Senator
Alvin Saunders defended the sale of 50,000 acres of the reservation. "This land has no
settlers upon i t . . . and is yielding nothing to the Indians, nothing to the government, and
nothing to the country. It happens to be one of those few cases where I believe everybody
is satisfied to have a bill of this kind passed. . . . " Senator Dawes agreed with Saunders
after his fear that the loss of 50,000 acres would leave the Omaha Reservation too small
was dismissed by the Indian commissioner, who assured the senator that there was plenty
of land, both for the present and the future. In addition, Omaha tribal representatives
allegedly had told Dawes that they "had more land than they could occupy" and wanted to
sell "a portion of their real estate." The strongest objection to Omaha allotment came from
Senator John Ingalls of Kansas who disagreed with the twenty-five-year trust period, and
who questioned the constitutionality of depriving Nebraska of its tax revenues from Indian
lands .2 0
The House Committee on Indian Affairs appeared quite proud of the Omaha Act.
Members told their colleagues they had drawn up a bill that met government needs and still
safeguarded Omaha interests. In the committee's opinion, "great good [would] result to the

145
Indians in the securing of title to their lands."21 But the interests of the Omahas were
already threatened. Ignoring Alice Fletcher's and Omaha Agent George W ilkinson's
recommendations that only those Indians who previously had worked their land should
receive titles, the Indian Affairs Committee applied the bill's provisions to every Omaha.22
As Alice Fletcher had hoped, the Omaha allotment became law on August 7, 1882,
as part of the act enabling the government to sell that portion of the Omaha Reservation
west of the Sioux City and Nebraska Railroad right-of-way. (Appendix X).23 in passing
this law, Congress made most Omahas private landowners, changed their legal status, and
created a breeding ground for tribal dissention, but most tragically, it set in motion a
process that would eventually leave many Omahas landless. Sections five through eight of
the act established the terms and conditions of Omaha allotment. Section Five provided for
an agent to allot reservation lands east of the railroad according to the following schedule:
heads of families would receive 160 acres of land; each single Omaha over age eighteen
would be assigned eighty acres; forty acres would be allotted to each orphan under age
eighteen; and other minors would also receive forty acres. Heads of families would choose
lands for their children, and orphans' allotments would be selected by the agent. Although
these allotments superseded those of the March 6 , 1865 treaty, Indians already holding
lands from that agreement could remain on them if they so desired.24
The problematic Section Six provided that allottees would receive land patents to be
held in trust for twenty-five years, during which time their lands could not be sold or
encumbered in any way. At the end of the trust period, Omahas would receive their
allotments, free and clear. According to the act's seventh section, the Omahas would be
subject to the civil and criminal laws of the State of Nebraska, which in theory could not
deny the Indians legal protection. By the provisions of Section Eight, lands remaining east
of the railroad after all allotments had been made would be patented to the tribe as a
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collective unit, and like individual allotments, held in trust for twenty-five years, after
which the Omahas were to receive these lands, minus acreage allotted to children bom
during the trust period. Finally, the act's last section allowed Indians to take their
allotments anywhere on the reservation, including west of the railro ad .^
In early May 1883, Alice Fletcher, accompanied by interpreter Francis La Flesche,
returned to the Omaha Reservation to allot the Indians' lands. Earlier that spring,
Commissioner Price had named her an Office of Indian Affairs special agent at a salary of
five dollars per day plus expenses. Although somewhat wary of the challenge, she viewed
her unusual assignment as a way to combine philanthropy and science at government
expense. Upon her arrival, Fletcher called the Omahas together to explain the allotment
process, then spent ten days fam iliarizing herself with survey procedures and land
registration. W here she found no legal procedures, she created her own. After
painstakingly collecting and accounting for all 316 of the 1871 allotment certificates,
Fletcher reassigned as many families as possible to their same lands. 26
Unfortunately, many of the allotments taken in 1871 were on M issouri River
bottom lands that flooded frequently. After a tour of the reservation, Fletcher concluded
that the Omahas' best land lay in the Logan River Valley, fifteen to twenty miles west of the
Missouri. In addition, these lands were near the railroad. Fletcher explained to potential
allottees that if they stayed on their original lands near the Missouri River, they would have
to travel "miserable trails" to Decatur, Nebraska, or more distant towns to sell their
produce. To encourage the Omahas to choose rich prairie lands, Fletcher borrowed a tent
and established her allotment headquarters on the banks of the Logan River.27 According
to George W ilkinson, who greatly admired the forceful allotting agent, Fletcher's plan
worked; he reported that a "large proportion" of the Omahas, including nearly all the
progressives, decided to move to the Logan Valley.28
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The first Omaha family to accept their allotments were the La Flesches. Taking
Fletcher's advice, they chose land west of the railroad right-of-way. There they would be
among whites when that area was opened to settlement, and would also be near the little
town of Unashtazinga ("little stopping place"), which would later become Bancroft.
Ultimately, in the two townships through which the railroad passed and in the two
townships immediately to the east, Fletcher made 326 allotments— sixty-nine to heads of
families, fifty-eight to single adults, and 199 to minors. She believed this "remarkable
exodus" showed promise for the future since the reservation's best land was now in the
hands of the most "progressive" Omahas. At a Board of Indian Commissioners meeting six
years later, Fletcher revealed her elitist allotment strategy. "I give the best land to the best
Indians I can find. I always help the progressive Indians first, on the principle 'to him that
hath shall be given. "'29
Alice Fletcher almost failed to finish her assignment. In July 1883, she was
drenched in a sudden thunderstorm and became extremely ill with what the agency doctor
diagnosed as inflammatory rheumatism. For five weeks she lay desperately ill at the
Presbyterian mission, and was then moved to the nearby agency at Winnebago. Realizing
that tribal conservatives were using her sudden illness as proof that allotment was wicked,
Fletcher began conducting business from her sickbed. With Francis La Flesche as her
clerk, she made out allotments, and as a self-proclaimed judge, settled tribal disputes. By
working in pain, Fletcher convinced many Omahas of her pow er. 30
Fletcher continued her work, walking with the aid of crutches, but in December,
allotments still had not been made to the most conservative Omahas. Twelve families,
calling themselves "the Council Fire," had joined forces to fight allotment and to continue
their traditional ways. Fletcher decided to compel these dissenters to take allotments.
Probably under orders from Agent Wilkinson, tribal police rounded up the resisters and
forced them to accept lands in the presence of Alice Fletcher and other witnesses.31
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Having assigned these final parcels, Fletcher submitted her report and allotment schedule
on June 25, 1884. The Indian office approved her schedule on July 11 and directed the
General Land Office to issue patents for 76,810 acres of the Omaha Reservation to 954
Indians. But despite Fletcher’s efforts to encourage Indians to take more westerly lands
near white settlers, of the allotted acres, only 877 were west of the railroad. All the
reservation land was now obligated; 50,000 acres would be sold to whites and the
remaining unallotted 55,450 acres east of the railroad would be held in trust for unborn
children (Map 9). Along with her allotments, Fletcher compiled a complete tribal registry
which she turned over to Agent Wilkinson. Hoping that the registry would answer future
heirship questions, she instructed the Indians to report every birth, death, and marriage.32
Satisfied with a job well done, Alice Fletcher left the Omaha Reservation in June
1884. But she left behind a divided tribe and covetous whites eager to occupy choice
Omaha lands. In 1881, only a tiny minority of the Omahas had signed the petition asking
for lands in severalty. Citing signatures on this and other petitions, Fletcher's biographer
estimated that only one-fourth of the tribe supported allotment. One-third vehemently
opposed it, and the rest, although not in favor, went along with the plan. At the 1884 Lake
Mohonk Conference, Fletcher admitted that only one-third of the Omahas favored land in
severalty.33 And Fletcher must have been aware of the potential problems with whites near
the reservation. In testimony before the Board of Indian Commissioners, she reported
constant white complaints that she was "giving the very best land to the Indians," and she
told of local white "committees" shadowing her as she made allotments.34
In a letter to his half-sister Rosalie La Flesche Farley, Francis La Flesche explained
that after allotment the Omahas "[were] entirely under the law civil and criminal just exactly
the same as if they were white men." Unfortunately, La Flesche was only half right.
Despite being subject to Nebraska laws, the Omahas could not benefit from them because
they had no legal officers— no sheriff, no justice of the peace— and because they paid no
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taxes, they were discouraged from using state and local courts, and were denied basic
services. Neighboring whites resented the Omahas' tax-exempt status. So did the State of
Nebraska, which claimed it was losing money and that it should be able to tax these lands.
Senator Henry L. Dawes reminded Nebraska county officials that the land had been a
reservation and had never been taxed, so there was no revenue loss under allotment
status.3 5
Unhappy with their precarious legal position, the Omahas decided to establish an
independent government. Alice Fletcher did not think the Omahas would be ready for selfgovernment until the tribal organization and the agency system had been destroyed, but in
1884, Omaha councilman Sindahaha presented the position of at least part of the tribe. He
began by stating flatly, "In future, we wish no one here put over us by Government, but
we wish to govern ourselves." Then he requested that the government pay the Omahas all
money owed them, and that it allow the tribe to handle its own affairs. Caving in to
pressure, Alice Fletcher wrote a sixty-page plan of government that recognized the ten-man
Omaha Council, but she urged that most power be given to the three-man Indian Court of
Offenses, designed to end "heathen" customs. Fletcher envisioned a simple form of county
government, with a school superintendent, a superintendent of roads, and other officials.
She further recommended that the lands being withheld for the next generation be fenced
and used as a common p a stu re.^
During that same year, the Omaha leading men asked that all agency employees be
discharged, a move supported by Agent Wilkinson. Noting that the desire for independence
among some prominent Omahas had increased following allotment, and that the Omahas
had proved they could farm successfully, Commissioner Price agreed. On September 30,
1884, he instructed W ilkinson to release all Omaha Agency employees except those
associated with the school and the farmer, who would serve as a liaison. Wilkinson was
also told to turn over the mills, shops, agency buildings, school houses, and government
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livestock. The tribe was now on its own, and Price had high hopes for his Omaha
"experiment." He was sure it would succeed and that it would become a model for other
tribes to emulate. 37
But the Omahas could not manage on their own. In 1885, the agency farmer
resigned, severing the tribe's tenuous link to the government. W hen neither newlyappointed Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins nor Alice Fletcher seriously considered an Omaha
request that Fletcher become their "business manager," several Indian delegations visited
W ashington in April 1886 and gave Atkins mixed messages regarding Omaha needs.
Fletcher and Francis La Flesche met with each delegation and worked out another plan of
self- government that for the moment appeared to please everyone. Despite the seeming
W ashington settlement, old tribal divisions rapidly resurfaced back in Nebraska. The
Omaha Council of Ten split into factions. W hile half of the leaders (Two Crows,
Doubasmurri, Sindahaha, White Horse, and Chazininga) supported Fletcher's plan and the
common pasture, the other five (Prairie Chicken, Wahininga, Wasagaha, Little Cow, and
Kaiska) opposed the pasture, self-government and the La Flesches. The five conservative
councilors drafted a letter to Commissioner Atkins, accusing Fletcher of misrepresenting
Omaha affairs and of playing favorites among their people. But they reserved their
strongest criticisms for Joseph La Flesche, denigrating his mixed-blood ancestry and
calling him a chronic trouble maker. One-hundred-fifty men signed this letter, nearly three
times the number who had petitioned Congress for allotments five years earlier. 38
The Omaha Reservation was in chaos. According to a member of the Board of
Indian Commissioners who visited the Omahas in 1887, turning over the mills and the
blacksmith shop to the Indians had been a disaster. William H. W aldby reported that the
mill was falling down and the machinery had either broken or been carried off. Even doors
and windows had been confiscated by tribal members. All that remained of the blacksmith
shop was one anvil and the bellows, and the Omahas now had to hire their own
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blacksmith. In 1890, Agent Robert Ashley also questioned the wisdom of allowing the
Indians to run the mill and shops, and a year earlier, Agent Jesse Warner, arguing that the
Omahas still needed agency control, had described their situation as "trying to erect a new
superstructure without removing the debris of the past "39
Along with tribal divisions and non-functioning mills and shops, a rift occurred in
the influential La Flesche family. Former friends Alice Fletcher and Susette Tibbies
disagreed sharply on self-government, the common pasture, and leasing of allotted lands,
and their feud forced family members to choose sides. In addition, the family could not
agree on citizenship. Joseph La Flesche favored self-government and doubted the Omahas'
readiness to become citizens "in [their] present state." Five years earlier, Susette Tibbies
had forcefully expressed her contrary views on citizenship in an introduction to one of her
husband's books. "Allow an Indian to suggest that the solution to the vexed 'Indian
Question' is Citizenship. . . . If it were not for the lands which the Indian holds, he would
have been a citizen long before the Negro. . . . " In 1886, she saw citizenship as the proper
alternative to the agency system, and she considered self-government a "great evil."
Testifying before the Board of Indian Commissioners, she argued that citizenship could not
hurt her people because "they cannot be in any worse condition than they are now. "40
The major break between Alice Fletcher and Susette Tibbies occurred over the
question of leasing Indian lands. By 1884, the Omahas' unallotted lands had become fair
game for white squatters, and by paying the agent a fee, white men could graze cattle on the
reservation. Roaming at will, these cattle trampled Indians' fields and gardens. The
Omahas balked when Fletcher suggested they fence in their crops, so in her selfgovernment plan, she had recommended fencing the unallotted lands and creating a
common pasture. The plan worked; Indians' cattle could graze free and whites could graze
their stock for a price. In July 1884, Rosalie La Flesche's husband, Ed Farley, requested
permission to manage the common pasture. With Agent Wilkinson's blessing, he applied
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for a twenty-year lease on 18,000 acres of unallotted land at an annual rate of four cents per
acre. This leasing arrangement was apparently unique on Indian lands. Farley bypassed
Congress and dealt directly with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, while also entering
into a partnership with the Omaha Tribe, which would share the profits.^!
Susette and her husband, Thomas Tibbies, took positions that alienated many
Omahas, especially Susette's family. Crusading for immediate citizenship and against
Omaha self-government, Tibbies agitated for an investigation of the common pasture. The
husband and wife team interpreted the no-lease provision of the 1882 Omaha Allotment Act
as an infringement of Indian rights. Arguing that the Omahas should be allowed to lease
their lands to whomever they wished, they actively opposed Rosalie and Ed Farley's
management of the pasture lands. Although she probably knew that the Farleys kept
accurate books and paid the tribe several hundred dollars per year, Susette claimed that Ed
Farley cheated her people, and that they knew nothing about the common pasture's
operation or what their share should be.42
In 1883, many Omahas had taken allotments some distance from the Missouri River
in areas where the land had never been farmed. To break and clear virgin sod, especially
without proper equipment and animals, was hard work, and many Omahas wanted to lease
their land to whites rather than farm it themselves. But by terms of the 1882 act, leasing of
allotments was illegal. With their usual zeal, the Tibbies worked for the Omahas' right to
lease their individual farms. At rallies in nearby Bancroft and Pender, they raised enough
cash from interested whites to plead their case in Washington. Tibbies even tricked his
father-in-law into initially supporting his scheme to promote leasing. After appealing to
eastern reformers for Omaha leasing rights, Joseph La Flesche realized he had been
deliberately confused. Alice Fletcher fully supported the leasing of the common pasture— it
had, after all, been her idea—but she was adamantly opposed to leasing Indian allotments.
Assuming that only the best lands would be leased, Fletcher worried that with whites
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occupying the m ost productive farmland, the Omahas would become discouraged and
would not "progress.” When La Flesche saw that Tibbies was attempting to overturn the
twenty-five-year trust period and, in the process, was personally attacking Alice Fletcher,
he withdrew his support for Tibbies' campaign. He told his friend Two Crows, "I feel we
have made a wrong move." It all came down to trust; increasingly, La Flesche distrusted
Tibbies, and he felt Alice Fletcher had never lied to him.43
To counteract Tibbies' efforts to destroy the common pasture, Francis La Flesche
instructed his father and other progressives to send a petition to Boston reformers saying
they did not want to lease the unallotted lands to outsiders because that would bring whites
onto the reservation. Also, he wanted the tribal leaders to state that they wanted no input
from Tibbies on the matter. In a warning that proved prophetic, Francis assured his father
that whites would not pay a fair price and would be difficult to dislodge from Indian lands.
He also wisely cautioned the Omahas not to involve themselves in any litigation, since
whites controlled state and county officials and the Omahas would surely lose in court.44
Francis La Flesche detested Thomas Tibbies, whom he accused of spreading
rumors about the propriety of his relationship with Alice Fletcher. Remarks made in a letter
to his sister Rosalie in December 1886 reveal the depth of his animosity. La Flesche never
forgave the married Tibbies for his alleged affair with Susette La Flesche while they toured
the east on behalf of the Poncas. In Francis' words, "Mr. T left his wife to die in Omaha
while he made love to S."45 Joseph La Flesche died in 1888, and for the last few years of
his life he was tom between loyalty to his daughter and son-in-law and to Alice Fletcher.
The Fletcher-Tibbles controversy continued, and the rift in the La Flesche family never
healed. Ultimately, the Tibbies won; the Omahas became citizens with the passage of the
1887 Dawes Act, and the Council of Ten continued to govern the tribe.
At twelve o'clock noon on April 30, 1884, 50,157 acres of Omaha Reservation
land west of the Sioux City and Nebraska Railroad, with an appraised value of
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$512,670.24, was thrown open to white settlem en t.^ According to the terms of sale, an
individual purchasing Omaha land would be required to pay for it in three installments,
beginning one year after the purchase was registered, and would be charged five per cent
interest, payable annually. Proceeds from land sales would be held for the Omahas in the
United States Treasury, and the interest would be used to benefit the I n d i a n s . 4 7
That was the theory. In practice, Congress repeatedly granted purchasers more time
to pay for their acreage, always with the understanding that unless the annual interest was
paid, buyers would forfeit their lands. With the Omahas' consent, the Indian Appropriation
Act of March 3, 1885 extended the time of the first payment by one year, and in 1886
buyers, again with Indian perm ission, were granted an additional two years.48 in
September 1886, Francis La Flesche warned the Omahas that if they wanted to see any
proceeds from their western lands, they should refuse to perm it any further payment
deferrals.49 Nevertheless, in 1888, the tribe agreed to a further two-year e x te n s io n .T h a t
year, in response to a Senate resolution, acting Interior Secretary H. L. Muldrow asked the
Indian office to produce figures regarding the sale of the roughly 50,000 acres of Omaha
land. Acting Commissioner S. M. Stockslager reported that nearly all of the land—
49,630.62 acres appraised at an average of $10.00 per acre— had been sold, but as of
December 31, 1887, only $154,654.62 had been deposited in the Treasury. Also in late
1887, $4,108.06 in interest remained unpaid, and no attempts had been made to force
payment or to repossess the lands involved.^ 1 Despite the commissioner's adverse report,
another extension was approved in 1890.52 A final delay in 1894 allowed purchasers to
defer their first payments until 1897, thirteen years after the land became available to
whites, and only the intervention of Commissioner Daniel M. Browning prevented
Congress from approving the 1894 extension without the Omahas' knowledge.53
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Because of these delays and delinquencies, the Omahas gained little from the sale of
their western lands. In February 1886, Agent Charles Potter forw arded to Indian
Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins a petition from 230 destitute Omaha heads of families,
asking that the last nine $10,000 annuity payments from the 1854 treaty be paid in a lump
sum so that they could afford essential improvements to their farms, The commissioner
recommended that Congress pay the Omahas in two $45,000 installments, but Francis La
Flesche, once more assuming his role as "tribal conscience," cautioned his people that if
they squandered the first payment, the second would be withheld.54
Congress rejected the Omahas 1 request, and in December, 158 tribal members
petitioned the government for the remaining $70,000. In their petition, the Indians agreed
to accept half the proceeds in farm equipment, but demanded the rest in cash.55 Congress
agreed to pay the rem aining annuities in two $35,000 increm ents, but Nebraska
congressmen and Senator Dawes suggested that an agent be appointed to make the
payments in return for a five per cent commission. Believing that to be a huge salary for a
few days' work, four Omaha tribal leaders, probably coached by Francis La Flesche, asked
their congressman to try to get them all their money.56
While the Omahas struggled to survive after allotment, reformers, congressmen and
government officials wrestled with the idea of granting Indians land in severalty on a much
larger scale. Many backers of a general allotment act ignored reality or manipulated
available data to support their positions. For example, in 1880, Acting Commissioner of
Indian Affairs E. M. Marble claimed that "the demand for titles to land in severalty by the
reservation Indians is almost universal. "57 Also in 1880, the House Committee on Indian
Affairs reported favorably on Indian allotments. Communal life, they said, fostered
"idleness, inefficiency, and dependency," especially among Indians. Citing the
"encouraging" examples of several tribes, including the Omahas, who had been at least
partially allotted, the majority of the Committee agreed that these Indians' progress "clearly
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demonstrate[d] .. . the advantages to be derived by the Indians from holding their lands in
severalty." The Committee majority concluded its report by agreeing with Marble that the
Indians of Nebraska and several other states were "exceedingly anxious" to have their lands
allotted.58
Interior Secretary L. Q. C. Lamar insisted that tribal relations should remain intact
during a slow transition to "civilization." M errill E. Gates of the Board of Indian
Commissioners disagreed. In a widely-read pamphlet, he wrote that the greatest obstacle to
assimilation was the tribe, and asserted that "the best way to kill an Indian was to make him
a white man. "59 Also to counter Lamar's views, Board of Indian Commissioners Secretary
Eliphalet W hittlesey sent all Indian agents a questionnaire regarding allotments in
November 1885. He then carefully selected the most favorable responses for inclusion in
his 1886 annual report to support his claim that "not less than 75,000 [Indians] are asking
for individual allotments . . . and nearly all of these are, in the opinion of their agents, far
enough advanced to receive and care for separate homesteads."60 But Lyman Abbott, the
activist editor of Christian Union, offered the most extreme solution. Convinced that
reservations were a disaster, he said:
I w ould, therefore, abandon this experim ent, abolish the
reservation, allow only time enough to work out the abolition,
scatter the Indians among the white people, make their lands
inalienable for a term of years, give them the rights of citizenship,
and trust for their protection to the general laws of the land. 61
Many concerned individuals and groups saw potential problems in severalty. Citing
past failures and most Indians' opposition to allotments, they argued eloquently against the
proposed General Allotment Act (Dawes bill). Anthropologist Thomas Henry Morgan
quoted former Interior Secretary Carl Schurz, who hoped that land in severalty would
never become a reality since Indians were incapable of successfully dealing with whites.
Schurz predicted "the result of individual land ownership, with power to sell, would . . .
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be, that in a very short time [the Indian] would divest himself of every foot of land and fall
into poverty. "62 After a chance meeting with aging former Indian Commissioner George
W. Manypenny, one reformer recalled the abject failure of early allotments. He reminded
the Board o f Indian Com m issioners that those tribes which were allotted under
Manypenny's 1850s treaties were now "reduced in number; reduced in morals; without
spirit," and advised the Board and the American people not to force severalty on any more
unprepared

I n d ia n s .6 3

Perhaps the Senate's most eloquent allotment opponent was Henry M. Teller of
Colorado. During the 1881 congressional debate over severalty, he reminded his colleagues
that in the previous thirty-six years, few tribes had chosen to be allotted, and those which
did quickly lost their land. Declaring severalty "fundamentally wrong," Teller predicted that
"when thirty or forty years shall have passed and these Indians shall have parted with their
title, they will curse the hand that was raised professedly in their defense to secure this kind
of legislation. . . ."64
Almost as though they had read different reports and experienced different history,
a m inority of the House Indian Affairs Committee disagreed completely with their
colleagues. The dissenting committeemen pointed out that in 1862, Congress had provided
that Indians who wished could take lands in severalty. If so many Indians favored
allotments, they wondered, why had so few taken them? They urged Congress to proceed
cautiously with severalty, and criticized the proposed law's application to "blanket Indians"
as well as "those who [wore] the clothing of civilized life." Ridiculing the seeming
hypocrisy of a land in severalty law, the minority on the Committee accused Congress of
treating Indians as men by giving them land and expecting them to live off its profits, and at
the same time keeping them children by not allowing them to do as they wished with their
own property. Finally, opponents on the Committee questioned the motives of Dawes bill
supporters:
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The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands and open them
up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the
Indians are but the pretext to get at his lands and occupy them. . . .
If this were done in the name of Greed, it would be bad enough; but
to do it in the name of humanity is infinitely worse.65
As late as the fall of 1882, after the Omaha Allotment Act had become law, even
Senator Henry Dawes, who would later sponsor the general severalty bill, opposed the
compulsory allotment of Indian lands. At that time, Dawes argued that Indians "cannot be
set up in severalty and left to stand alone any more than so many reeds. . . ." 6 6 But in the
following few years, Dawes swallowed his own convictions and let events and activists
such as Alice Fletcher dictate his actions.67
Due to her forceful personality and her experience in allotting Omaha lands, Alice
Fletcher wielded considerable influence during the severalty debate. In 1884, Senators
Richard Coke and Henry Dawes introduced a revised version of a severalty bill which
provided for a twenty-five-year trust period, tribal land patents for those Indians unwilling
to accept individual allotments, and required the consent of two-thirds of a tribe's adult
males before a reservation could be allotted. Fletcher agreed with the twenty-five-year
inalienability clause, but objected vehemently to the other two provisions. As a member of
a nine-person Lake M ohonk committee lobbying Congress for passage of the bill, she
insisted that tribalism was an impediment to progress: "Under no circumstances should
land be patented to a tribe. The principle is wrong." Citing the early resistance of most
Omahas, she also thought that trying to get two-thirds of a tribe's consent to allotment
would be a wasted effort. "The work must be done for them," she argued, "whether they
approve or not." At Fletcher's insistence, the committee and the Lake Mohonk Conference
voted to oppose any government recognition of tribalism .6 8 Jn making final adjustments to
his bill, Dawes heeded the voices from Lake Mohonk. The Dawes Act, as passed on
February 8 , 1887 (Appendix XI), contained the trust period, which Fletcher approved, but
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neither of the provisions she opposed- A controversial House amendment that became part
of the act's Section Six also granted the Omahas and other previously allotted Indians
United States citizenship.69
Although the Dawes Act marked the culmination of years of work by numerous
government officials, reformers, and private organizations, the stamp of Alice Fletcher was
firmly imprinted on the bill in its final form. In recognizing her contributions, Senator
Dawes said, "I stand in reference to that very much as Americus Vespucious [sic] stands to
C olum bus."70 Fletcher called the Dawes Act "the Magna Charta of the Indians of our
country." In an editorial in the Carlisle Indian School newspaper, M orning Star, she
enumerated the reasons for her high praise: 1) each Indian was guaranteed a homestead; 2)
each Indian became a citizen; and 3) each Indian was now free from "tribal tyranny." She
also mentioned, but did not belabor, the provision to open "surplus lands” to white
settlement. 71
But the so-called Indian Magna Charta had major weaknesses and created more
problems than it solved. The Dawes Act left the Indian with title to his land, but no power
to use it, and retained just enough tribal interest to hold him back. The new law did not
provide courts, education, or a public infrastructure, and tribal lands surrounding
allotments would soon cause strife among Indians and invite greedy whites onto
reservations.^^ Historian Wilcomb Washburn observed that had Henry Dawes displayed
more courage and greater understanding, his bill might have better protected Indians and
provided fewer advantages to greedy whites. Or, it may never have passed at all. As it was,
"the losses were all on the Indian s id e ... ."73
Because of Alice Fletcher's high profile and reports of their rapid progress after
allotment, the Omahas became the model for the more comprehensive Dawes Act.. But had
congressmen heeded the words of some Omaha agents and former agents, the editor of
Council Fire, or more importantly, the Omahas themselves, they may have been less
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anxious to allot additional tribes. A few reformers visiting the reservation, an eternally
optimistic agent, and Alice Fletcher herself, at first, spoke glowingly of the Omahas'
condition. In 1883, before allotment was even completed, Agent George Wilkinson saw a
bright future for the Omahas. He believed that living near white settlements would teach the
Indians the value of hard work. In 1884 and 1885, both Wilkinson and Alice Fletcher
reported that the tribe was doing well under allotment and its limited self-government. The
agent insisted that closing their tribal shops showed the Omahas' determination to move
forward, and he praised their progressiveness. In addition, W ilkinson assured the Indian
Commissioner that Fletcher's fine job of allotting and her sound advice would give the
Omahas "an impetus which [would] never be lost." Despite serious problems on the
reservation, Wilkinson predicted in 1885 that the Omahas would "soon become prosperous
and profitable citizens. . . ."74
A year earlier, the Board of Indian Commissioners admitted that many Indians were
unprepared for allotment and would not be ready in the foreseeable future, but they called
the Omaha experience "instructive and encouraging." The Board fully expected Omaha
allotment to work, and just one year later, they proclaimed the Omaha experiment a success
which proved "what [was] possible, and what, when protected by law, [would] always be
s u c c e s s f u l." 7 5

Samuel B. Capen echoed the views of the Board of Indian Commissioners.

In 1886, he told the Lake M ohonk Conference that the Omahas were on their way to
civilization, had their land and were farming it, were receiving nothing from the
government, and best of all, had done away with the agency system. He perceived this
Omaha progress as a positive omen for the success of the impending Dawes

A c t .7 6

But these few voices were countered by a chorus of warnings that all was not well
on the Omaha Reservation. As early as 1884, reports of Omaha difficulties surfaced, many
of them on the pages of Council Fire. Stating that the Omahas had been more prosperous
before allotment, a former agency employee told the editor that he hated to visit the Omaha
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Agency because everything had deteriorated. 77 Former agent Jacob Vore visited the
reservation in 1884, and in conversations with the Omahas, found that they were suffering.
Their agent ignored them; their farmer—a doctor by profession— had proved incompetent,
and the mission superintendent threatened parents in order to keep children in school. "We
are not getting along well," several Indians confessed, "we are rather going back."78
Even Alice Fletcher worried about the Omahas. At a Washington, D. C. conference
in 1886, she expressed optimism for their future, but when called upon to report on her pet
project in 1887, she felt differently. Having visited the Omahas earlier in the year, she
found they were "doing very badly. They seem utterly at a loss how to get along. They
don't seem able to work the land themselves. . . . White men are anxious to get leases, and
almost all the Indians would lease their lands if they could." Letters from leading Omahas
confirmed Alice Fletcher's report, but painted an even grimmer picture. Council Fire's
editor, Thomas Bland, worried that the Omahas would soon be homeless, and predicted a
similar fate for every tribe touched by the Dawes Act.79
Claiming "that satisfaction of mind which results from telling the truth," Agent
Charles H. Potter in 1886 filed a report which should have prompted legislators to delay
passage of the Dawes bill. Potter stated that far from being solved, the Omaha problem was
only in its first stages of solution and the Indians' condition had been misrepresented.
Angry because he was being held responsible for the sad state of affairs on the reservation,
the new agent set the record straight. Without identifying names, but no doubt referring to
former agent George Wilkinson, Potter charged that both the Indian department and the
public had been "deceived in reference to the true condition of the Omahas." According to
his report, the Omahas had also been deceived. When he explained their 1882 allotment to
them shortly after his arrival, the Indians claimed they had never agreed to state allegiance
before the end of the twenty-five-year trust period, and that the meaning of such allegiance
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had never been made clear. They refused to receive their land patents until Potter advised
the Indian department of their feelings.80
Potter related the spring 1886 events surrounding the Omahas 1 request for a lump
sum payment of their remaining $90,000 in annuities. According to the agent, after
neglecting their farms to hold feasts and councils, the tribe sent a delegation to Washington
to discuss self-government, as well as the annuity payment. While the delegation was gone
and for a time after it returned, the people refused to work. When Congress refused to
appropriate money for the single annuity payment and they could muster no support for
self-government, the Omahas became disheartened, and with the majority opposed to the
conditions imposed on them, there developed strong support for a return to agency
employees and shops. In 1886, Potter had great concern for the Omahas 1 future. Their
crops were failing; they had no government, no interpreter, no law enforcement; and he
thought the Indian office would have to step in and dictate a system of government for the
tribe. 81
Amazingly, despite having received Agent Potter's discouraging report, Indian
Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins lauded the Omahas 1 "success 11 and urged that "Indians
everywhere .. . adopt the same policy.1182 Atkins and Alice Fletcher apparently shared the
same blind optimism. Just a few weeks before the commissioner issued his favorable
report, Fletcher visited the Omaha Reservation and found the Indians unable to handle their
problems and quarreling among themselves as whites agitated for their land. As she was
inclined to do, she turned this controversy into a positive sign. In her unrealistic view, this
tribal "disintegration" denoted progress, and she believed other tribes would have similar
experiences as the government "props" fell away. 83 Earlier in 1886, she had written of the
Omahas: "The people will succeed if given time.1184 The problems encountered by the
Omahas after allotment in no way diminished Fletcher's enthusiasm for Indian land in
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severalty. In July 1887, when notified that she had been chosen to allot the Winnebagoes,
she told her diary, "A great triumph!"85
The Dawes Act's passage in February 1887 did not silence its critics. In the April
edition of Council Fire, editor Thomas A. Bland discussed the tragic results of the Omaha
allotment. In a statement highly critical of Alice Fletcher's methods and her use of the
Omaha experiment to encourage further land in severalty, he charged that the beneficiaries
of Fletcher's work were not the Omahas, but the "professional philanthropists, the landsharks, the politicians who desired to catch the land-shark votes, and the railroads." Bland
noted that at the Board of Indian Commissioners conference in January 1887, Fletcher
"virtually admitted the failure of her cherished scheme." Citing long passages from Agent
Potter's 1886 report, Bland asked, "Can any intelligent friend of humanity look on this
picture . . . and not sustain us in our opposition to the Dawes land-in-severalty bill?"86
Perhaps because of his outspokenness, Agent Charles Potter submitted only one
report from the Omaha and W innebago Agency before being dismissed. In 1887, his
successor, Jesse F. W arner, filed a report that was a m asterpiece of constraint and
compromise. Pointing to the large amount of publicity surrounding the Omaha experiment
and the conflicting opinions as to its success, Warner granted that both supporters and
detractors had good points. Admitting that the first few years after allotment promised little,
the agent could now see some progress, and he suggested that for the good of their people
the conservatives and complainers should "return to their weed-grown farms" and "set an
example . . . to others." Unfortunately, W arner lamented, it was too late to worry about
whether the Omahas had been moved along too quickly; they were now citizens, and tribal
government could not continue. In a thoroughly sensible statement, Warner suggested that
in the future, other tribes should be given more time to accustom themselves to their
changed status before being left on their o w

n .
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It was too late to help the Omahas. Because of misconceptions regarding readiness
for allotment, they had been forced into a situation few of them desired or understood.
Most Omahas in 1881 wanted only to remain in their Nebraska homeland; they had little
desire to become individual land owners and even less to see a large portion of their
reservation sold to white settlers. Generally unprepared for the consequences of allotment,
they became confused and blamed one another for their problems. But the fault was not
theirs; many mistakes had been made, most of them by Alice Fletcher. Often lost among the
kudos Fletcher received for her pioneering anthropological studies of the Omahas were the
dire consequences of her Nebraska "field trip."
In part due to the attitudes of people such as Alice Fletcher, Indians in the 1880s
came to be regarded as "children who needed to be encouraged to grow up." Fletcher did
not always feel this way; she went west to study a people who had a different but "effective
way of life." However, when she had to resort to force to complete the Omaha allotment,
she began to see the Indians as children who could not make their own decisions. Fletcher
came to perceive herself as a "mother" to the Omahas, calling them "her children— her
babies."88 At least one reformer noticed Fletcher's "curious feeling of ownership of the
Omahas." M artha Goddard, the wife of Boston newspaper editor and prominent Indian
advocate D. A. Goddard, observed that at Lake Mohonk conferences, Fletcher refused to
admit that others knew anything about the tribe, and ignored anyone else's comments
regarding her pet Indians. $9
In response to an 1886 letter of inquiry from Indian Rights Association secretary
Herbert W elsh, Mrs. Goddard hinted at substantial wrongdoing on the part of Alice
Fletcher. From the tone of her letter, it is apparent that Goddard was on quite friendly terms
with Thomas and Susette Tibbies, and so may not have been totally objective, but her
charges were too serious to ignore. Accusing Fletcher of being power hungry, Goddard
argued that she had been given too much authority by the Indian Bureau. W elsh's
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confidante also charged that a "ring" of Fletcher's friends used her to profit from Omaha
lands, but she doubted that Fletcher gained personally, since "she care[d] for power, not
for riches." Overall, Mrs. Goddard found Fletcher's dealings with the Omahas "very
questionable," and called for an investigation of her activities.^
Alice Fletcher did appear to enjoy the limelight and she took great pleasure in being
an "Omaha expert." Perhaps she was power hungry as Martha Goddard charged, but her
"crimes" were more likely errors in judgment. Admitting that Fletcher often behaved rashly
and made unwise decisions, anthropologist Nancy Oestreich Lurie observed that she may
have acted more cautiously had her first Omaha contacts been "ordinary" Omahas rather
than the acculturated, multi-lingual, mixed-blood La Flesche family. She did not seem to
realize that they were atypical Omahas. In her haste to relieve the Omahas' distress,
Fletcher gave herself too little time to fam iliarize herself with the Indians she was
determined to help. "It is possible that if Alice Fletcher had first studied the Omahas
thoroughly— as she later did— instead of plunging immediately into the matter of land, she
would have sought some other solution to the Indians' economic problems than the one she
brought with her into the field. "91
Alice Fletcher did not deliberately undermine the Omahas' future. Because her
dealings had been primarily with tribal progressives, she honestly believed that what she
desired for the Omahas was what they wanted as well. Although the results were
catastrophic, her intentions were good.

Acknowledging her many shortcomings but

defending her humanity, Nancy Lurie said of "the lady from Boston": "Alice Fletcher, for
all her misguided benevolence, must at least be respected for regarding the welfare of the
people she studied as her primary obligation and for never forgetting that they were fellow
human beings. . . ."92
Alice Fletcher was of course not solely responsible for the Omaha "experiment" and
its subsequent problems. In 1882, she had ridden the crest of the wave of assimilationist
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sentiment that had swept over Washington. Most reformers wanted to see the Omahas and
other tribes allotted, and few later cared to admit that it was a mistake. But the roots of the
Omaha disaster actually went much deeper, back to the 1854 treaty that began their trek
toward assimilation. No one regretted his role in the 1854 treaty more than former Indian
Commissioner George Manypenny. In 1885 , he confessed:
When I made those treaties I was confident that good results would
follow. Had I not so believed I would not have been a party to the
transactions. Events following the execution of those treaties proved
that I had committed a grave error. I had provided for the abrogation
of the reservations, the dissolution of the tribal relation,and for lands
in severalty and citizenship, thus making the road clear for the
rapacity of the white man . . . Had I known then as I now know . . .
I would be compelled to admit that I had committed a high c r i m e . 9 3
The door was open to white greed, as the years following the Dawes Act would
show. As citizens without recourse to law, and owners of valuable agricultural lands, the
Omahas in the 1890s would be victimized by unscrupulous whites hovering about the
reservation's fringes. Alcohol would once again become a major problem and court battles
would further divide tribal leaders. By 1900, due to an additional allotment provision and
liberal leasing laws, the Omahas would hold little tribal land and most of their individual
farms would be occupied by white men. Alice Fletcher was wrong; time would only make
matters worse.
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CHAPTER FIVE

A BELEAGUERED PEOPLE: LIQUOR, LEASING, AND LARCENY, 1887-1905

"I never knew a white man to get his foot on an Indian's land who ever took it off."l
Henry L. Dawes, 1891

In 1896, Alice Fletcher reluctantly recognized the many cultural problems that
allotment posed for Indians.2 But along with the loss of traditional religion, the forced
restructuring of the Indian family, and the realignment of gender roles, Omahas suffered
from exploitation by greedy whites in the sm all towns that sprang up along the
reservation's borders. Land "rings," merchants, bankers, and liquor sellers, particularly in
Pender and Homer, Nebraska, took advantage of the Indians' naivete, leasing their lands
for a fraction of their value, charging usurious interest, and selling them whiskey for what
little money that remained. Iifthe years following the 1887 Dawes Act, the Omaha and
Winnebago reservations became embroiled in controversy, especially over leasing of Indian
lands, as agents either opposed or abetted local real estate syndicates. Unfortunately for
tribal unity, a few Omahas, either for personal gain or under duress, cooperated with
whites in their attempts to separate Indians/rom their lands. Indian office investigators and
congressional delegations conducted inquiries and filed reports, but the Omaha "land grab"
continued. W ith no farms to work and with lease money in their pockets, idle Omahas
became the local bootleggers' best customers. Largely ineffective liquor laws were passed
and quickly overturned, and most local whites closed their eyes to the tragedy of Omaha
alcohol abuse, while remaining concerned only with the money that Indians pumped into
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their towns' economies. By the early 1900s, few Omahas controlled their allotments, many
drank heavily, and almost no one seemed to care.
Omaha citizenship became an immediate problem after the passage of the Dawes
f

N
— ----

Act. Doubting their readiness, Senator Henry Dawes and many reformers had objected to
the House amendment that made the Omahas and other previously allotted Indians
citizens.3 Dawes' concerns were well-founded, for 259 Omahas sent a letter through
Council Fire to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs protesting taxation and citizenship
before the expiration of their trust period. Again in December 1887, claiming that their
condition had been misrepresented, 158 Omahas signed a petition protesting their
premature citizenship and resulting taxation. Pa-Hang-Ga-M a-Ne said, "They have
reported at headquarters that we live well; but we do not. . .," and he continued, asking
Congress to "keep this thing citizenship away from us." Another Omaha reminded
Congress that Alice Fletcher had promised his people that they would not be citizens or pay
taxes for twenty-five years, and it was with this understanding that they had taken land
patents. They had trusted Alice Fletcher, but in less than five years, they now found
themselves citizens, and many were unprepared.^
Dr. Susan La Flesche, Susette Tibbies' younger sister, believed that in some ways,
citizenship had a positive effect on the Omahas. By being in closer proximity to whites, Dr.
La Flesche observed that the Indians had learned about law and business and had become
more independent.^ But according to Susette Tibbies, it was not until their personal
property was taxed that the Omahas realized that citizenship brought with it obligations and
liabilities. Mrs. Tibbies claimed that some whites who wanted Indians to remain non"citizens had told conservative Omahas horror stories regarding citizenship— that they would
lose everything they had to taxes, and that any crime was punishable by hanging. As a
result, "non-progressives" among the Omahas resented the young Indian assessors who
came to evaluate their personal property. Some hid their horses, others destroyed the tax
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forms, and a few threatened to kill the messengers. However, when the recalcitrant
Omahas learned that assessors would record their own estimates of present worth, they
agreed to report their personal property.^
With citizenship, the Omahas became voters, and seventy to eighty percent cast
ballots as soon as they were eligible. But beginning in 1892, many Omahas, in need of
cash and seeing no difference in political parties as far as their welfare was concerned, sold
their votes to the highest bidders, prompting Agent Robert Ashley to comment that "full
citizenship with the right of franchise . . . was a mistake. These people were not ready for
it, and the evil and demoralizing effect of bartering in votes will outweigh all possible
g o o d . S u s e t t e Tibbies claimed that whites treated the Omahas better after they could vote,
but it appears in some cases that whites used enfranchised Omahas for their own purposes.
For example, when saloons opened near the reservation, many Indians wanted them
closed. But when prohibitionjippeared on the local ballot, white liquor dealers tricked or
coerced most Omahas into voting against it. 8
Supporters of the severalty law did not anticipate Omaha voting irregularities, and
never foresaw the huge problems that would arise when the "ambitious little town of
Pender" pushed a bill through the state legislature making nearly the entire Omaha
Reservation one Nebraska county. Despite a reformer's suggestion that it would be more
sensible to divide Omaha lands among four or five bordering counties, the reservation plus
a small strip of white-occupied land on the reserve's southwest border, became Thurston
County on March 29, 1889.9 Reservation lands were tax-exempt, yet the new county was
required to build roads and schools and to provide courts. Since the county had no taxation
right over Indian real estate, the O m a h ^ ^ ^ s o n a l^ ro p e rty was taxed at an exorbitant
rate. 10 Anticipating their high tax bills, Omahas Silas W ood and Daniel Webster, along
with over 150 of their tribesmen, had asked their eastern white friends to help stop the
county's organization. 11 It had never occurred to Senator Dawes that virtually an entire
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county's land could become tax-exempt, and he urged the governm ent to either pay
Thurston County an amount equivalent to the Omaha taxes, or to use tribal funds for that
purpose. But even had this proposal been fair, Omaha annuity money was unavailable; the
tribe had already received half of its remaining $90,000 and had been promised the

r est.

12

Over the next twenty years, faced with large expenses and a tiny tax base, Thurston County
would conduct a relentless campaign to tax Omaha real estate.
From the time the Omahas chose their reservation, whites had resented their
ownership of some of Nebraska’s most fertile land. In the late 1880s and into the next
decade, white settlers and land "syndicates" managed to move onto the reservation by
leasing Omaha lands at ridiculously low rates. One scholar believed this systematic
^

-
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takeover of Indian lands was by design. Calling leasing an "inevitable corollary of the
allotm ent system ," W ard Shepard charged that leasing was m ore than a "mere
afterthought." 12 Indeed, as early as 1888, Indian Commissioner John H. Oberly, in an
attempt to cut Indian department costs, campaigned for legalization of grazing leases to
provide tribal income and to reduce Indian dependence on government appropriations. 14
Reformers of the Lake Mohonk Conference justified their support for leasing by arguing
that Indians could not progress if they were forbidden to manage their own allotments, and
by pointing out that leasing part of their lands would provide income to improve the rest. 15
In the opinion of historian D. S. Otis, allowing Indians to lease their lands was the
"most important decision as to Indian policy . . . after the passage of the Dawes Act," yet it
met little opposition and generated almost no debate in Congress. 16 The only real objection
to leasing came from Senator Dawes, who told the Lake Mohonk Conference in 1890 that a
law allowing leasing would "overthrow the whole allotment system," since " the Indian
would abandon his own work, his own land, and his own home. . . . " A year later, Dawes
reminded the Lake Mohonk conferees that he had always opposed leasing of allotments
because he knew if-an Indian gave up his allotment, he "would never get it back." These
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were strange words coming from a legislator who in March 1890 had introduced a leasing
bill in the Senate. 17 Dawes explained that he reluctantly changed his mind on leasing after
seeing Indians, frustrated with trying to break prairie sod, turn their lands over to whites
and return to their tepees. As an alternative, he suggested authorizing Indians to lease part
of their allotments to white farmers, and to use the rent money to have the rest of their lands
cultivated. 18
The perceived positive aspects of Omaha allotment had been used to promote the
passage of the Dawes Act in 1887. Just a few years later, premature and unregulated
leasing of Omaha allotments prompted the government to pass a law permitting the practice.
In 1890 and 1891, the Indian office conducted three separate investigations into the largely
illegal leasing on the Omaha and Winnebago reservations. In his reports dated May 29 and
June 2, 1890, Inspector W. W. Junkin observed that the Omahas were making little
progress toward "civilization," a state of affairs he blamed on the presence of whites on the
reservation. Whites rented grazing lands for from eight to twenty cents per acre, and with
few exceptions, the Indian landowners were idle most of the time. Junkin called for an end
to this exploitation, and he unsuccessfully requested troops to drive every white person off
the reservations.

A later report by Inspector A. M. Tinker stated that the more

"progressive" Omahas did not want any lands leased, but some Indians had already leased
both their lands and their homes and were living in tepees, "doing nothing." Tinker also
reported that whites often refused to make their lease payments and allowed their stock to
run free, breaking fences and destroying crops.70
In response to a January 1891 Senate resolution, Indian Com missioner T. J.
Morgan directed Agent Robert Ashley to investigate leasing of allotments on the two
reservations. On January 26, Ashley reported that without the department's knowledge,
some Omahas had been leasing their allotments to whites ever since they received lands in
severalty, and m ore' were leasing each year. Prior to 1890, most leases were for grazing
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and for one year at a time, but more recent leases had been written for longer terms.
According to the Thurston County clerk, 2,387 acres of Omaha land were leased in 1890,
and fifteen lessees actually lived on the reservation. Ashley agreed with Junkin that both the
Indians and their tenants knew that leasing of allotments was illegal, but the practice
continued. Omahas were quickly losing control of their lands, and their agent feared that
soon all the best reservation lands would be farmed or used for grazing by white
interlopers.^!
In his 1890 annual report, Agent Ashley had suggested a solution to the problem of
illegal leasing on the Omaha and Winnebago reservations. Stating that at least sixty percent
of allotted land belonged to women, old or ill men, or minor children, he urged that their
lands be allowed to be leased with the oversight and consent of either the Indian
Com missioner or the local agent.22 Inspector Junkin agreed that current laws were
inadequate, and if the government wanted to allow leasing, it should be carefully controlled
and fair rentals should be enforced. 23
Realizing that leasing would occur legally or otherwise, Congress on February 28,
1891 passed "an act to amend and further extend the benefits of the act approved February
8, 1887" (Dawes Act). The new law's section three stated that if an Indian, because of age
or disability, could not personally occupy or improve an allotment, he or she might lease
the land for a term not to exceed three years for farming or grazing, and ten years for
m ining.24 But able-bodied Indians also wanted to lease their lands, and as a result, in
August 1894, the leasing act was amended. The words "or inability" were added, and lands
could now be leased for five years for farming and grazing, and ten years for "business
purposes " or mining.25
It was easy for whites to convince Indians to lease, and the term "inability" covered
many conditions, including simple laziness. C. C. Painter of the Indian Rights Association
[IRA] predicted that this change in the leasing law would result in innumerable leases and
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would harm Indians more than annuities ever had. In his opinion, "There has never been a
time when the situation has been so full of danger to the Indian with reference to his land as
now ."26 xhe changes were so heavily criticized that in June 1897, "or inability" was
removed, farming and grazing leases reverted to three years, and a five-year limit was set
on business and mining contracts.27 Congress could not decide on a definitive policy. The
"legislative tinkering" continued, and in May 1900, "inability" once more became grounds
for leasing; lands could now be rented for five years for "farming only," business and
mining leases remained at five years, and grazing lands could be leased for a maximum of
three years.28
Leasing almost totally demoralized the Omahas in the late 1880s and 1890s.
Cattlemen encouraged strife within the tribe, and the promise of "grass money" was more
attractive to many Indians than working a farm. In a letter to his half-sister Rosalie Farley,
Francis La Flesche described the scenario should white men be allowed to lease Omaha
lands. He predicted that the Indians would do nothing to better themselves, and that at the
expiration of their trust period, his people ' ^ v o i f l d ' T m p r e p a r e d for their new
responsibilities. 29 Unfortunately, the always perceptive La Flesche was correct. By 1892,
ninety percent of the Omahas and Winnebagoes had leased either all or p a rto f their lands \ ^
and were getting by on rent money. Many Omahas had deserted their allotments, leaving
white lessees to farm them, and had either moved in with relatives or were living on their
children's allotments on the reservation's poorer lands. 30
In reply to an 1892 survey distributed by Commissioner Morgan, Agent Ashley
stated that illegal leases "[were] doing more to retard the progress of [the Omahas]. . . than
all other causes combined." Ashley had seen far too many Omahas begin to farm, then
lease every acre they owned for a little cash on which they hoped to survive without
working. Those allottees who held desirable lands near towns came under tremendous
pressure to lease. The agent explained how land companies, in conjunction with local
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townspeople, "feasted, cajoled, and incited" the Indians to try to gain control of their
valuable lands.31
By 1894, allotment advocates who had high hopes for the Omahas were bitterly
disappointed. Whites now lived on lands that reformers once had envisioned as flourishing
Indian farms, while manyjDLthe-OmahasxaDmpednal'ohg^the^Missouri and drank heavily.
The Omahas received higher rents for their lands than did the W innebagoes, which
according to C. C. Painter, simply gave them "greater facilities for debauchery." Some
Omahas themselves abused the system by claiming unallotted lands for nonexistent
children, or by making more than one claim for a single child. In Painter's judgment, many
Omahas had been "irreparably damaged" by leasing, and all had been slowed in their quest
for "civilization." Furthermore, he did not see the lessees vacating Omaha lands in the near
future. 32
White tenants did stay, and leasing proliferated on both the Omaha and Winnebago
reservations. Two hundred twenty-three leases were approved on the two reservations in
1894, and in 1896 and 1897, over 220 more Omahas rented their lands. Nineteen hundred
was a banner year for whites who wanted Omaha lands. When Commissioner Jones
submitted his annual report, 543 farming and grazing contracts had already been approved,
and 135 more were pending. Two-hundred-eighty-four more Omahas leased in 1901;
another 293 parcels fell into white hands in 1903, and between October 1903 and August
1905, Commissioners W illiam Jones and Francis Leupp reported an additional 466
contracts. Prices for Omaha lands ranged from twenty-five cents per acre per year for
grazing, to $2.50 per acre for choice farmland; this continued until 1903, when allottees
could command $3.00 per acre for their best lands. By 1904, the leasing of 55,560 acres of
Omaha land netted the tribe and individual Indians $43,763.63.33
In fiscal year 1898, Omaha agent W. A. Mercer began collecting rents for leased
lands, much to the dissatisfaction of whites who had for years taken advantage of the
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Omahas' unfamiliarity with business matters. Mercer estimated that Indian income would
more than double under the new system. Because many Omahas had in the past agreed to
accept whatever rentals white lessees offered, Mercer's successor, Charles P. Mathewson,
also predicted a large increase in Omaha income with rentals going through the agency.34
Although he collected land rentals, Agent Mercer thoroughly disapproved of leasing,
considering its income "a premium on laziness and a discouragement to industrious effort
and self-support among the Indians." The outspoken agent recommended that Indians be
forced to live on and farm their allotments, and he advocated banning all whites from the
reservation until the Omahas could support themselves.35
By 1900, leasing had gotten out of hand, and reform ers as well as Indian
department officials recognized that the system was corrupt and detrimental to Indians. The
once supportive Lake Mohonk Conference included in its 1900 platform an official stance
on the leasing issue. Since "the habit of leasing allotments convert[ed] the lessor from an
industrious worker to an idle and improvident landlord," the conferees urged that leasing be
strictly limited to those Indians who could not work their lands, and that guidelines be
rigorously enforced.36
The Indian Rights Association assigned blame, charging that greedy agents played a
large role in the proliferation of leases of Indian lands. A potential lessee would allegedly
approach an agent, offer a ridiculously low rental, then promise the agent a bonus if he
would recom m end the lease. Bonuses paid on thousands of acres could net an
unscrupulous agent an income much larger than his government salary.37 Commissioner
Jones hinted that there may have been some truth in the IRA's charges. Although the
Interior Secretary theoretically approved all leases, in reality the work was done by agents,
many of whom came from the areas around the reservations they served, and who wanted
to remain on good terms with their constituents. Consequently, if an acquaintance of an
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agent asked for a lease, it was usually approved. Jones admitted that there would be fewer
leases if agents were chosen from outside the local com m unities.^
The Omahas also recognized the ill effects of leasing. In 1900, an allottee asked
Francis La Flesche to deliver a message to whites that "the leasing business [was] ruining
the Omahas in every way." He worried that his people had become shiftless; many of them
"loaf[ed] about the towns" and drank to excess. Instead of working their farms, they used
rent money to pay railroad fares to visit other tribes.39 i n an effort to make them more
responsible, Agent Charles Mathewson suggested that in the future, "progressive" Omaha
allottees should have their lease money paid to them directly instead of through their agent.
He reasoned that with such a short time left in their trust period, they should gradually take
charge of their own affairs.40
When the Omaha Agency once more became independent of the Winnebago Agency
in 1904, its newly-appointed superintendent found the Omahas idle and demoralized and
living almost entirely on lease revenues. Remembering when these Indians were "selfsupporting, industrious, and thrifty," John F. MacKey saw the tribe going steadily
downhill as the result of leasing.41 Events on the Omaha reservation made it clear that
allotment was much different in practice than in theory. In reality, the allotted Indian was
allowed to turn over his land to whites and "go on his aim less way." In 1900,
Commissioner William A. Jones blamed the allotted Indians' problems on the leasing acts
passed after the original 1891 law. Had the statute stood as originally written, Jones would
have had no complaints; but he believed that the term "inability" . . . opened the door for
leasing in general," making it in many cases "the rule rather than the exception." Jones was
convinced that leasing had hurt the Indians. "By taking away the incentive to labor it
defeats the very object for which the allotment system was devised, which was, by giving
the Indian something tangible that he could call his own, to incite him to personal effort in
his own behalf."42 Twelve years later, Commissioner Robert G. Valentine charged that the
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purpose of the Dawes Act had been "perverted" by the 1891 leasing law. After the leasing
act, allotted Indians were free to lease their lands and "live . . . after their former
fashion. "43
Local white involvem ent in Omaha affairs during the 1890s is perhaps best
illustrated by two leasing controversies, both of which made their way into the courts. In
one case, local businessmen attempted to discredit an Indian lessee and her husband in
order to take over the Omahas' common pasture, and in the other, a controversial agent
tangled with a local land syndicate over reservation leasing irregularities and unauthorized
tenants. At least two groups of whites in newly-organized Thurston County hoped to profit
from Indian lands. One group specialized in cheating the Winnebagoes, allegedly leasing
Indian land at ten cents an acre, then sub-leasing to farmers for ninety cents more. The
syndicate interested in Omaha lands was led by Pender businessman William E. Peebles, a
political supporter of Nebraska Senator John M. Thurston and a would-be Omaha a g e n t . 4 4
Since the summer of 1884, Rosalie and Ed Farley had unofficially but successfully
managed the Omahas' unallotted common pasture, but in 1890, Peebles, along with A. C.
Abbott, D. N. W heeler, George F. Chittenden, and Harry F. Swanson, eager to profit
from Omaha lands, devised an elaborate scheme to nullify the Farleys' lease. When the
Omahas appointed W a ja pa, Henry Blackbird, and Omaha agency clerk Thomas McCauley
to go to Washington in December 1890 to discuss allotments with Commissioner Morgan,
Peebles, the front man for the so-called "Pender ring," saw his chance to undermine the
Farleys' contract. Peebles decided he should accompany the Omaha delegates as their
"guide." On Christmas Day, he sent Thomas McCauley "credentials" for himself and for
the Indian delegation with instructions for the clerk to have all the Omaha leading men sign
the form, then to deliver it to him in Pender. The credentials consisted of a sheet of cheap
stationery on which Peebles had introduced himself as a "true friend" to the Omahas, in
whom they had complete confidence. Attached to the bottom of the form was a sheet of
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paper containing six names: Fire Chief, White Horse, Wa ja pa, Two Crows, Sindahaha,
and Prairie Chicken. When Rosalie and Ed Farley learned of the scheme, they confronted
the clerk, who tried to bum the offending papers. The rescued documents contained no
signatures, since the leading men were totally unaware of Peebles'

p la n .

45

Peebles did nevertheless accompany the delegation to Washington, and the tribal
leaders suspected a Pender plot to gain possession of their unallotted lands. W ith this in
mind, and with Peebles out of town, the headmen asked Rosalie Farley to meet with them
earlier than planned to draw up a new lease for five years, renewable yearly at fifteen cents
per acre. Instead of a large number of Omahas signing this lease, a small delegation acted
for the tribe, probably to minimize outside influence. The twenty signers included three
leading men whose names Peebles had attached to his fraudulent credentials.46
In the spring of 1892, through Agent Robert Ashley, Rosalie Farley signed a new
lease on 2,632 acres of land for five years, this time renewable yearly at twenty-five cents
per acre. Future events would hinge on a clause in this lease stating that it would be
canceled if and when the pasture lands were allotted.47 W hen the suspicious Indians
refused Peebles' counter offer to lease the lands at fifty cents per acre for seven to eight
years, the Pender ring tried another tactic. Working through Henry Fontenelle and a few
others, Peebles and his cronies allegedly convinced some Omaha councilmen to sign a
widely-distributed circular stating that the Farleys' lease had expired, that an allotting agent
was en route to Nebraska, and that all cattle would have to be removed from the pasture.
Although several councilmen denied signing the circular and Henry Fontenelle admitted
using their names without permission, many stockmen did remove their herds.48
But most Omahas, recognizing who was behind the controversy, supported the
Farleys and encouraged them to continue accepting cattle. Failing in their attempt to ruin the
Farleys' business, Peebles and Wheeler, once again using a few Omahas as a front, filed
suit in Federal District Court during early 1893, charging Rosalie Farley with defrauding
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the Omahas. The suit, nominally brought by "Fire Chief, White Horse, et al," claimed that
the Omahas had not authorized Agent Ashley to negotiate the 1892 lease, and that the lease
was delaying allotments and therefore hindering tribal p ro g ress.^ It also appears that the
Pender conspirators had sent a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, using Fire
C hiefs and W hite Horse's names, inquiring as to the legality of the Farleys' lease. When
confronted, Fire Chief said Peebles and his friends had "badgered him" into signing the
letter.50 Henry Fontenelle finally tipped his hand and gave his reason for cooperating with
the men from Pender. In a statement revealing his intense jealousy, Fontenelle fumed, "We
want to break the La Flesche family, no matter what they always have their hands into
it ." 51
As a result of the lawsuit against Rosalie Farley, the Omahas became furious with
their councilmen, whom they accused of working for William Peebles rather than for the
tribe. They were especially angry that the council had pledged several hundred dollars in
tribal funds to pay attorneys from Sioux City to file the lawsuit, which they did not
support. A t a tribal meeting in late May 1893, the people united in denouncing the
councilmen who had allowed themselves to be used by Peebles. As the meeting adjourned,
someone suggested that all those should rise who disapproved of what had been done and
who agreed not to pay the Sioux City lawyers. Every man came to his feet. Early in
September, the Omahas elected a new council; only old Two Crows was retained. But the
new councilmen refused to take office until the old ones finished with the lawsuit and dealt
with Peebles.52 Later that fall, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs instructed Agent
William A. Beck to withdraw the Omahas' lawsuit against Rosalie Farley, but Mrs. Farley,
in the meantime, had sued Peebles and his partners for conspiracy to destroy her cattle
grazing b u sin e ss,^
Rosalie Farley's conspiracy case against Peebles and other Pender ring members
was heard in the District Court for Cuming County at West Point, Nebraska, beginning on

189
December 18, 1893, and according to Mrs. Farley and the Nebraska Supreme Court, the
trial was a mockery of justice. Because they were unprepared, defendants William Peebles
and D. N. W heeler did everything they could to delay the trial— even resorting to the
fabricated excuse that their star witness, Henry Fontenelle, was dying. When the trial did
get under way, the Pender gang claimed that the Omahas asked for their help because they
believed the Farley lease was fraudulent and was delaying further allotment.54
As the trial progressed, the irregularities multiplied. Henry Fontenelle, W hite
Horse, Sindahaha, and Big Elk lied on the stand, and during the trial, Sindahaha confessed
to Mrs. Farley that he was "under obligations" to the Pender men, as apparently was
presiding Judge W. F. Norris, who may have owed the Penderites a political debt. During
jury selection, the prosecuting attorney asked prospective jurors if they had any bias against
Indians. They all said they did not, yet in his summation, Peebles' attorney appealed to
racial prejudices, reminding the jurors of every atrocity ever committed by Indians.55
Despite the defense attorney's diatribe, the jury could not reach a verdict and asked to be
excused. Judge Norris refused to dismiss the panel, and instead, instructed them to find
against Rosalie Farley. A month later, ignoring these irregularities, the court refused to
grant a new trial.56
The Farleys' attorneys were of the opinion that had Judge Norris not made his
improper speech to the jury after its long deliberation, the case would have resulted in a
"hung jury," and a new trial would have been automatic. But having been refused a second
trial, they took the case to the Nebraska Supreme Court, where they believed Rosalie
Farley would receive a fairer hearing.57 On February 16, 1897, the state Supreme Court
overturned Judge Norris' ruling due to numerous errors in the conduct of the trial at West
Point.58
Henry Fontenelle's campaign to discredit the La Flesche family continued after the
conspiracy trial. In the spring of 1896, the Farleys leased tribal lands for agricultural
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purposes— apparently quite legal according to the 1894 leasing act revisions. But
Fontenelle drummed up opposition and sent a petition opposing the lease to the Indian
Commissioner. In his petition, Fontenelle charged that the Farleys were not paying the
Omahas enough, yet two other lessees paid less. Because of Fontenelle's "checkered past,"
Agent William Beck expected the commissioner to disregard the petition, but to be safe,
Beck countered with a petition of his own, signed by numerous Omahas who supported the
F a r l e y s . 59

There was some concern in Washington regarding the contract, for the Indian

Department did send an inspector to Nebraska to look into the agricultural lease. The Lyons
[Nebraska] Mirror recognized the lease's financial benefit to the Omahas, but had concerns
that, like all large leases, this one would violate the spirit of the Dawes Act by encouraging
Indian indolence.60 The government's inspector must have been satisfied, for in late June,
Alice Fletcher informed Rosalie Farley that Com missioner Browning had reported
favorably on the new lease, and was prepared to recommend it to the Interior Secretary.61
The entire history of the Farley leases is problematic. On the one hand, Rosalie and
Ed Farley apparently ran an honest business and regularly shared their profits with the
Omahas. On the other hand, the Lyons newspaper was correct; the leases did contribute to
Omaha idleness. Perhaps the Omahas considered the Farley enterprise the lesser of two
evils. They did not want Pender "land sharks" taking over the reservation, but Rosalie La
Flesche Farley, although married to a white man, was one of their own, and most Omahas
trusted her.
When cavalry officer William A. Beck took over as Omaha and Winnebago agent in
the summer of 1893, he was warmly welcomed by the citizens of Pender, who feted him at
the local hotel. However, the "honeymoon" ended abruptly when Beck refused to
cooperate with a powerful local land syndicate. The Fluomoy Livestock and Real Estate
Company had leased nearly 50,000 acres from individual Indians for "a few cents per
acre," and had sub-leased to farmers at a much higher rate, pocketing the difference.
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W ithout having access to the actual contracts, the IRA's C. C. Painter estimated that the
Fluomoy Company netted $60,000 to $75,000 per year, while each Indian received from
ten to twenty-five cents an acre for his land.62 Beck reported the leasing irregularities to his
superiors, and on July 17, the Indian Office directed him to inform illegal tenants that they
must either make legal leases or leave the land by December 31. By about October 1, all
illegal lessees had been notified.63
Taking Beck quite seriously, the Fluomoy Company brought an injunction against
the agent, preventing him from interfering with their leases, and by January 1, 1894, four
other land companies had followed suit. After a long delay, Judge Elmer Dundy of the
Eighth Circuit Court ruled that the injunction should be permanent.64 in return, Agent
Beck took the injunction to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. C. C. Painter, along with
everyone on or near the reservations, waited anxiously to see if Judge Dundy's restraining
order against Beck would be lifted. If not, Painter feared that few allotted Indians would
ever possess their own lands. The good news for the Omahas and W innebagoes came in
early December 1894. Arguing that the injunction was too broad and that the Fluomoy
Company had knowingly violated the law, the Appeals Court lifted the restraining order. In
his opinion, Judge Amos Thayer criticized Judge Dundy: "It is not within the legitimate
province of a c o u r t . . . to assist a wrongdoer . . . in retaining the possession of property
which it has acquired in open violation of an Act of Congress."65
The Fluom oy Company appealed Judge Thayer's ruling to the United States
Supreme Court, and while awaiting a decision, continued to make illegal leases with the
W innebagoes. In April 1895, an assistant United States D istrict Attorney sought
unsuccessfully to get a restraining order against the Fluomoy Company, and at about the
same time, the land syndicate proposed a compromise by which, in return for an end to
litigation, it would vacate the reservations by January 1, 1896. Beck refused to
compromise, and the battle went on. The agent expanded his police force, hiring sixteen
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additional men. Then in a series of events that would be almost comical if the situation were
not so tragic, the Thurston County sheriff tried to arrest an Indian policeman, and tribal
police arrested the sheriff, who in turn organized a posse to arrest Beck.6 6
In May, Captain Beck called for fifty more Indian policemen to counter opposition
from the land company and its sub-tenants. The extra men went on duty July 1, and the
W ar Department supplied Beck and his small "army" with seventy Springfield rifles and
ammunition. Now well-armed and with an adequate force, the agent set about evicting
illegal tenants. But shortly after he began, the Nebraska District Court issued an injunction
to stop the removals, and men from Pender armed themselves to arrest the Indian police
force. Beck now requested federal troops to protect his policemen, and asked the
department if he should obey the restraining order. The Indian Office ordered him to abide
by the state court ruling and the evictions stopped.67
According to Com missioner Browning's version of the controversy, Beck's
purpose in trying to remove the Fluomoy Company and its tenants was to allow the Indians
to get a fair rental for their lands. Besides cheating the Omahas and W innebagoes and
making a huge profit in the process, the company paid the Indians little or nothing from
1893 to 1895. Beck's campaign was against the land company— the middleman— not
against the settlers who occupied the land. From the beginning, he had advised the sub
lessees to sign legal leases. The problem was that many farmers had signed promissory
notes with the land company, which sold them to bankers who now wanted to be paid. If a
farmer signed a legal lease, he would have to pay double rent which he could ill afford, and
the land company naturally discouraged proper leases, since that would eventually cut
profits. 6 8
The near-violence between Beck and the Fluomoy Company brought the Nebraska
congressional delegation to the Omaha and Winnebago reservations in July 1895 to conduct
what they termed an "informal investigation." According to Rosalie Farley, the "so-called"
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congressional investigation was really promoted by "[William] Peebles and the Fluomoy
Co. land swindlers." Regardless of who instigated it, the "investigation" was definitely
more than a chat between congressmen and Indians, since the resulting reports of wrong
doing on the reservations made the front pages of the Omaha World-Herald and the Omaha
Daily Bee, and appeared in Commissioner Browning's 1895 annual report.
On the evening of July 23, the Pender opera house was the scene of a New
England-type town meeting, as the congressional delegation met with settlers who had
leased lands on the two reservations. William Peebles made the first accusations— against
Agent Beck— as he presented a memorial from sixty settlers who had invested everything
they had in the land and now resented paying "tribute" to the agent's friends. Fred
Jennewein, secretary of the Farmers’ Society, charged that in granting leases, Beck favored
"middlemen" John Beck (his son), Winnebago traders Thomas and John Ashford, F. B.
Hutchins of Sioux City, Joseph Blenkiron of Bancroft, E. J. Smith of Herman, Nebraska,
and John Beck's brother-in-law, Charles McKnight, of the Winnebago A g e n c y .^ Beck
was obviously not the crusader that Commissioner Browning had portrayed in his report.
From the testimony of many farmers who had leased from the Fluom oy Company, it
appears that Beck conducted a scheme in which he would have his Indian police evict a
Fluomoy lessee, then re-rent the land to the farmer through one of his middlemen. All of
the paperwork and personal negotiating was conducted through Beck's Omaha clerk,
Thomas L. Sloan, perhaps to disguise the agent's involvement in leasing irregularities.
Beck's scheme resulted in settlers paying double rent, but most had no choice, since they
had crops in the ground and no other income.^ 1
Fred Jennewein's damning testimony especially impressed the delegation. He
claimed that John Ashford told him he held a lease to Jennewein's land from Captain Beck,
and for $1.25 an acre, he would "fix things so that he would have no trouble with his
land." Jennewein agreed to pay, since he already farmed 320 acres and could not afford to
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be evicted. At least fifty other settlers had been approached by middlemen and ordered to
pay "protection money" to avoid eviction. Based on the settlers’ testim onies, the
congressional delegation informally charged Thomas Sloan and the middlemen whom the
farmers had accused with "speculating on leaseholds."72 The delegation declined to charge
Agent Beck with any wrongdoing. Perhaps because he represented the government, they
gave him the benefit of the doubt.
The hearings at W innebago on July 24 were well-attended by men from Pender.
Although billed as an "Indian council," to Rosalie Farley it smacked of a political meeting,
with all of the congressmen except Senator Allen favoring Peebles and the illegal lessees.
On July 25, Peebles packed a hearing in Pender with white settlers and "his Indians."
Three tribal representatives sent by the Omahas to defend Captain Beck were never heard;
they sat by the door all day, but were not allowed into the meeting room. Denied a hearing
before the delegation, over fifty Omahas wrote to Commissioner Browning expressing
their support for Agent Beck and thanking him for his efforts on their behalf. At a mass
meeting the following day, citizens of Bancroft also endorsed Beck's actions, and by July
28, fifty more Indians had signed the tribal letter.73
Omahas on both sides of the still-smoldering pasture allotment question did testify
before the congressmen, and Rosalie Farley accused the pro-allotment Indians of working
in concert with Peebles and against Agent Beck. This is highly likely, since the Omahas
presenting evidence against the agent were the same ones who had testified on Peebles'
behalf at W est Point.74 Speaking against allotment of the common pasture, Wa ja pa
compared himself to a man with his back against a wall, and asked the government to keep
whites from taking Omaha lands. He admitted that his people "[did] not know how to take
care of [their] possessions," and "could not keep the land if [they] had it." He also insisted
that it was not the Indians, but someone pulling strings in the background (probably a
reference to Peebles) who wanted Omaha lands allotted. A fter W a ja pa spoke,
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Representative Meiklejohn tried to weaken his testimony by pointing out that he was
Rosalie Farley's uncle, and therefore would not want the pasture allotted.75
In his testimony, frequent tribal spokesman and allotm ent proponent Daniel
Webster revealed further details of William Peebles' plot to have the pasture land allotted.
Webster told the congressmen that over dinner in Pender, Peebles had told him of his plan
to quickly allot the common pasture with only the councilmen's knowledge, and had asked
him to attend a late-night meeting at Fire Chiefs lodge. Webster admitted that he liked the
plan, but was afraid he would be punished if he participated. Peebles then allegedly offered
Webster $300.00 in expense money to go with him to Washington, and asked to be paid if
he was able to push the allotment through. Webster refused this offer as well.76
Silas Wood testified that he had originally supported allotment of the common
pasture, but had changed his mind when he realized that it would bring a white takeover of
the land. Wood recounted a dream in which the Great Spirit warned him not to disturb the
land, because there was a snake hidden there, and it would bite. To Wood, the snake was
the white man who wanted the Omahas to own land so he could take it away. Wood also
foresaw, with a great deal of accuracy, whites getting Indians drunk and having them sign
contracts. In addition, he charged that it was the old men of the tribe, who cared little for
the children's futures, who wanted allotments.77
White Horse, one of Silas Wood's "old men," admitted that he thought little about
future generations. He cared only for those Omahas living at the time, and strongly
supported allotment and the Omahas' right to lease to whomever they

p le a s e d .7 8

As he had

so often done before, Henry Fontenelle hurt his own cause. When asked his opinion, he
appeared to have no objections to the Interior Secretary approving or rejecting allotments,
but he bristled when Senator Allen suggested that the agent should control leasing, and
launched a personal attack on Agent Beck that clouded his entire
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Fontenelle was not alone in his criticism of Agent Beck. Sindahaha pointed out that
technically the Omahas had no agent, but Beck nevertheless tried to manage tribal affairs.
He accused the agent of being short-tempered and impatient, and looked back fondly to the
days when Indian agents were friendly and gave good

a d v ic e . 8 0

s. A. Combs, of Homer,

Nebraska, wrote to Senator Allen to inform him of the corrupt nature of Beck's
administration. He called Beck rotten and disreputable, and the agent's son, John, a
"drunken, gambling . . . vagabond" who ran a house of prostitution using Indian women.
Combs reminded the Senator that John Ashford had been convicted of selling liquor to
Indians. On the whole, he considered the people surrounding Beck a "gang of
scoundrels. "81 On the other hand, Daniel W ebster believed Beck looked out for the
Indians' welfare, and that those who fought the agent were out to ruin the Omahas.82
Agreeing with Webster, Wa ja pa considered Beck a good man falsely

a c c u s e d .8 3

When asked to testify regarding the common pasture, Beck lashed out at his Indian
detractors and the Pender ring, stating that the reason for the allotment push was that the
now-defunct firm of Wheeler and Chittenden had advanced individual Indians from $20.00
to $50.00 on the promise that the firm could lease their allotments when they received
them. Beck pointed out that oddly, all of the Indians signing illegal promissory notes
requested lands in the Farley pasture, certainly not the best lands available. The agent
viewed these dealings as yet another attempt to destroy the Farleys' lease through its
allotment clause. 84
A fter listening to hours of testimony on all aspects of the controversies, the
Nebraska congressional delegation filed a report on July

25, 1895,

recommending that all

settler evictions be halted, that the Fluomoy Company's lessees be allowed to harvest their
crops unmolested, and that the agency be

in v e s t ig a t e d .8 5

in addition to their joint report,

Senators Allen and Thurston and Representative Andrews sent personal letters to Acting
Interior Secretary John M. Reynolds, condemning the conduct of the Omaha and
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Winnebago Agency and urging a congressional inquiry into events there. Senator Allen
expressed his belief in William Beck's honesty, but charged that he was surrounded by "a
class of men whose conduct ought to be investigated." Allen believed that the trader, his
brother, and others holding government jobs intended to gain control of a huge tract of
Indian land.*^
There clearly were no heroes in the Omaha and Winnebago leasing controversies of
the 1890s, only victims and villains. The Indians were systematically cheated of their
lands, and white settlers were cheated of their leasing payments. William Peebles and his
cronies, the Fluomoy outfit, Agent Beck and his alleged agency "ring," even Rosalie and
Ed Farley wanted one thing— profit. During those troubled times, the widening split in
Omaha leadership became a chasm as Indians threw their support to opposing factions.
Unfortunately, testimony and support could be bought, and allegiances were often based
on favors given and received. The land syndicates knowingly broke the law, Omahas
peijured themselves and claimed fraudulent allotments, and Agent Beck apparently saw an
economic opportunity too tempting to resist.
By late 1896, William Beck knew that he would soon be replaced as Omaha and
Winnebago agent. Through his stormy term of office, he had been protected by his close
ties to high-ranking Interior Department officials and to Secretary of W ar Daniel Lamont,
but now Lamont was gone, and Senator Thurston was agitating for a new agent. 87 On
May 17, 1897, the army ordered Beck to rejoin his cavalry unit in

M o n t a n a .8 8

Earlier in 1897, with Captain Beck's days as agent numbered, the Thurst on
R epublic, and according to the newspaper, nearly every Indian and white in Thurston
County, endorsed William Peebles as his replacement. W hile allowing that the Indians
should have some input into the choice of a new agent, the Republic patem alistically
insisted that it was Thurston County's whites, burdened with the task of helping 2,500
Indians become "intelligent and civilized," who should ultimately decide. Oddly, the paper
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contended that over eighty percent of the Omahas supported Peebles, even after many of
them had agreed to testify against him in the Farley case.^9 On March 2, Peebles passed
through Omaha on his way to Washington, reportedly armed with a petition signed by
practically every Republican in Thurston County, endorsing him as the new agent for the
Omahas and Winnebagoes.90 Despite his campaign, Peebles did not get the job. On about
June 6, 1897, Beck was relieved by another army officer, Lieutenant William Mercer of the
Eighth Infantry.91
But Peebles did not give up; about a year later, he arranged a meeting between
Senator Thurston and several Omahas and Winnebagoes. He must have hoped that their
planned "speeches" would enhance his chances of replacing Mercer. However, one Indian,
claiming that Lieutenant Mercer had done nothing for him as agent, said he wanted Peebles,
who had promised him a new house in return for his support, and another admitted that he
disliked Mercer because he refused to put his friends on the tribal police force. Peebles, of
course, had promised that he would do so, if the Indian backed his campaign. The Indians'
painful honesty helped put an end to Peebles' aspirations.^
When the Omahas were expressing their opposing views on further allotment of
their lands before the congressional investigators, the question had already been answered
for them. Many Omahas did not understand why children rather than wives should inherit
land, or why wives did not receive lands of their own under the terms of the 1882
Allotment Act. Due to Indian complaints, as well as to W illiam Peebles’ incessant
lobbying, the Omaha Allotment Act was amended as part of the Indian Appropriation Act of
March 3, 1893. Under the terms of the new legislation, children bom between the time of
the original allotments and March 3, 1893, would receive eighty acres of land instead of
forty, each Indian woman would be given eighty acres, and any other allottee who had
received only forty acres would have that amount doubled.93 All of these additional
allotments were to be taken from the remaining tribally-held lands. In a master stroke of
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poor planning, the 1893 amendment did not address Omaha children born after March 3,
1893, thus leaving these children landless.
No action was taken on the new law for six years, but controversy over its passage
arose almost immediately. Within weeks after the second allotment act became effective,
Indian attorney Thomas Sloan began distributing allotment numbers to young Omahas who
promptly agreed to lease their prospective lands to D. N. Wheeler and other Pender men for
fifty cents an acre for terms of from five to seven y ears. 94 In the early confusion some
allotments were claim ed by two or three different Indians, and due to the chaotic
conditions, a group of Omahas prepared a petition asking the Indian Commissioner to put
the allotments on

h o ld .9 5

Other problems surfaced; some Indians began to doubt the

benefits of the bill, and Ed Farley claimed that the act was illegal since there was not
enough land to

a llo t .9 6

Francis La Flesche agreed; early in 1898, with the new allotments

imminent, he advised his sister Rosalie to "quietly" and "quickly" file papers for her
children with Agent William Mercer. Like Ed Farley, he did not believe there was enough
land to go around. La Flesche was happy to see the lands allotted, however, because he
hoped it would end inter-tribal land squabbles and "bring all land matters in the Courts—
where they belong[ed]." 97
On April 24, 1899, Special Agent John K. Rankin arrived at the Omaha Agency to
assign the new allotments. By August, the process was well under way, and Rankin had
nearly finished his work by January 1900. In all, he made 800 new allotments involving
about 50,000

a c r e s .9 8

Most of the allotments under the 1893 act were granted to women

and minor children, and were therefore legally subject to leasing. These lands had been
leased as pasture until 1899, and because many of the new allotments were approved after
planting time, they continued to be rented at pasture rates for another three years, since the
land had not been

b r o k e n .9 9
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The only land Rankin failed to allot was about 5,000 acres which remained in
dispute due to outstanding claims by mixed bloods. This litigation had been ongoing for
years, with no determination. In the event that the mixed blood claims were disallowed,
Agent Charles Mathewson thought an Act of Congress would be required to either allot or
sell the disputed lands. In 1904, the courts finally rejected the fifteen-year-old claims. The
lands left unallotted pending the litigation's outcome were later sold, and part of the
proceeds distributed among the tribe's landless children. 100
As they had in the past, agents, reformers, and occasional visitors to the Omaha
reservation varied greatly in their assessments of Omaha "progress" in the 1890s. In 1891,
Connecticut Women's Indian Association leader Sara T. Kinney compared the "savage"
Omahas of a decade earlier to the citizens of the early 1890s, who, she assured Lake
Mohonk delegates, were "self-supporting" and "self-respecting." In Kinney's opinion, the
Omahas were doing quite well. 101

a

year later, Charles C. Painter challenged rumors

circulating through Congress that the Omahas were in serious trouble. Every Omaha, he
insisted, had a "comfortable house on his own land." But when he visited the reservation in
1 8 9 4 ,

he was shocked to find the Indians in a "deplorable

c o n d it io n ." 1 0 2

Eighteen ninety-three had marked the beginning of the troubled tenure of agent
William H. Beck. Beck never minced words, and the first paragraph of his first report on
the Omahas summed up their situation:
The Omahas are presum ably self-supporting and have been
instructed by whites in the surrounding towns that they have all the
rights and privileges of the United States. Hence they assume . . .
an independent attitude toward the agent, regarding him somewhat
as one who interferes with their transactions rather than one to
whom they should look for guidance. As a result of this they use too
much intoxicating liquor, lease their lands, and generally are
worsted in their transactions with the white element with whom they
deal. 103
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In an impassioned speech at Lake Mohonk, Senator Henry Dawes accused the
Department of Indian Affairs of allotting the Omahas' lands and then turning its back on
them. They had a bright future in 1882, with 50,000 spare acres and $90,000 in the
treasury drawing six percent interest. But the government abandoned the Omahas. Twelve
years into their trust period, they were much worse off than when first allotted. They were
being paid just enough in rents to keep them in whiskey, and they still knew nothing about
citizenship. W ould a delegation of Omahas, asked Dawes, have asked Congress to "undo"
their allotment act if the government had acted properly in their behalf? 104
In the 1890s, nearly every concerned agent and reform er cited the Omahas'
growing dependence on alcohol. This had not always been the case; under Joseph La
Flesche's firm hand, alcohol abuse among the Omahas had been nearly non-existent. But
drinking increased among the tribe after they became citizens. Whites assured the Indians
that as citizens, they could buy whiskey wherever a white man could, and liquor sellers
were prepared to supply the Omahas with all the whiskey they wanted. 105 jn 1892, Agent
Robert Ashley reported a general decline in the Omahas' condition, caused mainly by the
"alarming" increase in alcohol abuse. But he also said that the "better element" within the
tribe was trying to stop the abuse of liquor, even asking that money from tribal land leases
be set aside to prosecute whiskey peddlers. 106

^

^

One contemporary journal held the Omahas up as an example of a promising tribe
that seemed "almost shipwrecked and ruined by the . . . presence of liquor sellers around
and among them." 107 Rather than helping the Omahas at a time when they needed
guidance, neighboring whites took advantage.oLthem. "Grocers," who were really liquor
sellers, settled around the reservation, and to a great degree succeeded in corrupting the
Indians and snatching their l a n d s . 108
The Indian Office had to deal with local prejudices to stop the flow of liquor to
Indians. Officials and residents of western towns wanted to see drunken Indians punished

but refused to testify against liquor suppliers, arguing that "it was not their business to aid
in their'pm secutions." Most Indians, too, declined to testify against liquor dealers. As]
citizens, they believed they had every right "to drink whiskey as the white people [did],"\
and did not want to betray their sources. Commissioner William Jones admitted that those
who complained of liquor law violations may have had good reasons not to testify. They
feared unpleasant publicity or even bodily harm, so Indian agents were left to bring charges
or to look the other way since they had neither the time nor the resources to gather
e v id e n c e .

Jones did not believe agents alone could handle the problem. In 1901 and

again in 1902, he asked Congress for a special $5,000 to $10,000 fund to pay detectives to
obtain evidence against liquor dealers. Congress refused to appropriate the funds, and the
angry commissioner denounced the lawmakers’ decision, since the Justice Department did
not have money to prosecute whiskey sellers before violations got out of hand.l ^
Even when apprehended and convicted, liquor dealers received little punishment.
Agent William Beck had as many whiskey sellers as he could arrested, but $25.00 fines
and court costs did little to stop the lucrative trade. Beck was angry that local courts and the
United States District Court cared so little about the damage being done to the Omahas.
Like Beck and his other predecessors, Omaha Superintendent John F. MacKey saw no
solution to the Omahas' alcohol problems. Indians would not testify against suppliers; local
whites ignored laws prohibiting liquor sales to Indians, and even when convicted /liq uor
traffickers were undeterred by the light sentences imposed byjthe District Court. 111
i^arly in 1896, in response to the alarming increase in alcohol use by Omahas and
other Indians, and in an effort to curtail the liquor traffic, Nebraska Third District
Representative George D. Meiklejohn sponsored a bill "to prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors to Indians providing penalties therefor [sic], and for other purposes." Although
prompted by conditions among the Indians in his home district, the congressman's
proposed legislation would pertain to Indians throughout the country. Commissioner
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Browning, Indian agents, the Indian Rights Association, and Indians themselves all
heartily endorsed the "Meiklejohn Bill," which they considered necessary to prevent further
Indian degeneration. H 2 Realizing that they had problems, 183 Omaha men and 52 Omaha
women signed a January 31 letter to Commissioner Browning urging him and all "friends
of the Indians" to secure the bill's passage. * ^ The bill, which became law on January 30,
1897, made it a crime for anyone to sell or supply liquor to any Indian allottee whose land
was held in trust, or to any Indian supervised by the government, and provided for the
following punishments for those convicted of liquor peddling: imprisonment for not less
than sixty days; a fine not less than $100.00 for a first offense; and a $200.00 fine for
subsequent offenses. 114
For about two years after its passage, the Meiklejohn law, combined with vigorous
enforcement, reduced the flow of alcohol onto the Omaha Reservation. But in July 1899,
the Justice Department removed its local deputy marshal, and the Indians began drinking
again. W hen admonished by Dr. Susan La Flesche, unapologetic Omahas told her, "We
can get all the whiskey we want, for the white men are selling it to us. . . . The government
says we can drink again." Agent Charles Mathewson continued to report liquor offenses,
but few traffickers were prosecuted. 115
Despite the concerted efforts of Agent Mathewson, other agency employees, the
federal court, and the local justice of the peace, the Omahas continued to have easy access
to liquor. Mathewson put the blame on the small town of Homer, Nebraska, which he
claimed supplied ninety percent of the liquor coming onto the reservation. Located only a
few miles from the W innebago Reservation's northern border, Homer, with its two
saloons and its "army of 'boot-leggers'," provided all the whiskey the Indians could
afford. Mathewson accused the town's.citizens_of putting greed above the Indians' welfare.
They could, he insisted, stop the liquor traffic, but they chose not to, since drunken Indians
were big spenders in Homer. 116
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In the report of his 1904 investigation into affairs on the Omaha and Winnebago
reservations, Supervisor A. O. Wright charged that "there is no place in the United States
where the defiance of the law has been so public and the sale of liquor to Indians has been
-
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>.

so thoroughly organized as in Homer, Nebraska." A part of the town's scenery was its
"bull-pens"— areas behind saloons hidden by high wooden fences and accessible from
either the saloons or from back alleys. When Omahas and Winnebagoes came to town,
Indian "runners" brought them to the saloons, where they were seated at tables in the bullpens. Bootleggers then bought them whiskey from the saloons and charged twenty to
twenty-five percent commissions. Indian runners were paid in whiskey, and each
bootlegger hired two, since one or the other was nearly always intoxicated. 1 17
Prior to 1903, Homer merchants rented buildings to saloon keepers, but even after
they discontinued the practice, businessmen did little to stop hquor sales. Many^claimed to
fear the bootleggers, some of whom were not above "burning them out or stabbing them in
the d a r k . " j n 1 9 0 4 , Pender attorney E. J. Smith asked Homer merchants C. J.
O'Connor and Thomas and John Ashford to donate money toward hiring someone to halt
the town's liquor traffic. The merchants agreed to contribute, but anonymously, because
they feared reprisals by bootleggers. Smith, O'Connor, the Ashford brothers, and a United
States deputy marshal paid the Dakota County, Nebraska sheriff to make the arrests, since
the deputy had been unsuccessful in his attempts. H 9 But even with many of Homer's
bootleggers behind bars, investigator A. O. Wright did not see Homer as a permanently
"dry" town. There was too much profit to be made. 120
On April 10, 1905, the United States Supreme Court overturned Kansan Albert
H eff s conviction for selling liquor to a Kickapoo Indian allottee, and in doing so, nullified
the Meiklejohn law. The court ruled that when allotted, Indians came under the jurisdictions
J'

of the states, and because they were no longer wards of the federal government, were free
to buy whiskey just as whites could. 121 The Heff decision made it even more difficult to
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stop liquor sales to Omahas. Superintendent MacKey did state that to their credit, some
towns bordering the reservation offset the court ruling by refusing to license new saloons,
or by licensing them with the condition that they sell no liquor J o Indians. But now
bootleggers plied their wares on the Iowa side of the Missouri River, and Indians crossed
the river in boats to buy whiskey. Unfortunately, the Iowa liquor dealers appeared to be
doing nothing illegal. 122
Indian’s Friend saw the Heff decision as the "death knell" for the Omahas and
Winnebagoes. According to this organ of the National Indian Association, as a result of the
Supreme Court's ruling, the "already besotted" Omahas would soon be exterminated, and
Superintendent Wilson of the Winnebago Agency predicted that in a few years, "every
able-bodied man on the reservation [would] drink himself to death." 123 jn 1904, Omaha
Daily Bee editor Edward Rosewater had proposed a ten-mile "prohibition zone" around the
reservations to cut off the Indians' whiskey supply. At the time, Superintendent MacKey
had scoffed at the idea. "The zone," he argued, " would have to be 100 miles each way,
and then a troop of United States Cavalry would be needed to patrol the lines of the
reservation... ."124

the opinion of the United States District Attorney, Rosewater's

plan, which never reached the floor of the State Legislature, would have passed had
Nebraska lawmakers been aware of the recent Supreme Court decision. 125
On July 26, 1905, Omaha Agency Superintendent John MacKey appealed to Iowa
law enforcement officers for help in stopping liquor sales on the Missouri's eastern shore.
Deputy United States Marshal J. A. Tracy in Sioux City responded that it would be difficult
to prosecute Iowa liquor traffickers such as William Wise, the most flagrant offender,
because he had an Iowa liquor license, and the recent Supreme Court ruling protected him.
Tracy advised MacKey to provide him with names and facts, especially the names of any
unallotted Indians, and he would discuss the case with the United States Attorney for
Iowa. 126 To comply with Marshal Tracy's request, Omaha notary public Carey La Flesche
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took the statements of over a dozen Indians and whites who had either witnessed
clandestine Iowa liquor sales or who had themselves bought whiskey from Iowa dealers.
Three Poncas, visiting on the Omaha Reservation, testified that two white whiskey
peddlers had pitched a tent on the Iowa shore, setting up a more or less permanent
o p e r a tio n .

127 W alter Adair of Decatur, Nebraska, swore that on August 2, 1905, he came

upon this camp on the Iowa side of the river, occupied by William Wise and two other men
whom he did not know. Early in the afternoon Little Rabbit, an Omaha, motioned to Wise
from the Nebraska shore. W ise rowed across the river and brought the sixty-year-old
Indian to his camp, where he filled a bottle with whiskey. He then returned Little Rabbit to
the Omaha

R eserve.

128 Five days after Adair testified, Little Rabbit admitted that he

bought $1.25 worth of whiskey from W ise and a second man on August 2.129 On the
same day that Little Rabbit made his purchase, Omahas Arthur M itchell and George
Ramsey bought a one-half gallon jug of whiskey from the Iowa peddlers. 130
William Wise and his companion undoubtedly knew the location of the Iowa state
line in the midst of the Missouri River. When fourteen-year-old James Wood and his friend
Jeremiah Parker purchased liquor for young Wood's father, the boys paid on the Nebraska
shore, then the peddler simply rowed Parker fifty yards out from shore and handed him his
whiskey. 131 Wise became even bolder. On August 22, Charles Funkhouser testified that
two weeks earlier, he had seen a white man row across the Missouri and deliver twelve
jugs of whiskey to two Omahas who waited on the Nebraska side within the boundaries of
the

r e s e r v a tio n .

132 The identities of the Iowa peddlers were never in doubt. Nearly

everyone who testified assured Superintendent MacKey that he either recognized William
Wise or could identify him and his partner, believed to be Charles Allen.
J, A, Singhaus, Tekamah, Nebraska, attorney and a United States Commissioner,
seemed eager to prosecute W illiam R. Marr of Decatur for bringing whiskey onto the
Omaha Reservation, and he offered his help in suppressing the Iowa traffic as well.
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Singhaus issued arrest warrants for Wise, Marr, and Allen, but Marshal Tracy in Iowa
could not apprehend them with a warrant from Nebraska. 133 On August 18, Tracy
received Iowa warrants to bring in the three whiskey peddlers, and on August 21, he took
W ise and Allen into custody. Unable to post bond, the two men were jailed in Sioux
C ity .

1^4 State jurisdictions now came into play; Wise and Allen were not brought to

Nebraska for trial until the Federal Judge for the Northern District of Iowa issued a removal
order. Marr remained free in Nebraska, but Commissioner Singhaus claimed that he could
arrest him at any time. The commissioner also intended to prosecute the Indians named in
affidavits as having brought liquor onto the reservation. 135
As a final move to halt the Iowa-to-Nebraska liquor traffic, Singhaus suggested that
Superintendent MacKey destroy what remained of Allen's and Wise's camp on the Iowa
shore "in such a way that it could not be shown who did it." 136 Thanks to the cooperation
of the Iowa authorities, the whiskey peddlers doing business on the Missouri's east bank)
were now virtually out of business. But it remained difficult to prosecute liquor traffickers./
Even when indicted, few were punished, since appeals were pending in one or two cases;
and the courts were waiting to see how they proceeded. 137
Leasing irregularities on the Omaha and Winnebago reservations did not end with
the Beck-Fluomoy era. In the early 1900s, six or seven speculators made enormous profits
by gaining control of leases for over 40,000 acres of Indian land, then sub-leasing them at
a fifty to two-hundred percent profit. Much of this land fell into the hands of four area
men— F. B. Hutchens, C. C. Maryott, brother of the Omaha Reservation trader, and the
O'Connor brothers, Indian traders at Winnebago. 138 Like Agent Beck before him, Omaha
and W innebago agent Charles P. M athewson was accused of favoring leases to
middlemen. Individual allottees were effectively locked out of the leasing process and could
not choose their own renters, since Mathewson favored leasing in large tracts and insisted
that he had too little time to approve contracts negotiated by Indians. 139
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Apparently patience with shady dealings grew thin in early 1902. On February 24,
editor Edward Rosewater charged Mathewson and trader C. J. O'Connor with "gross
m ismanagement" at the agency, and showed Indian Com m issioner W illiam Jones
"documentary proof" of wrongdoing. 140

a

week later, a delegation of Omahas and

Winnebagoes, unhappy with affairs on their reservations, arrived in W ashington to protest
Mathewson's leasing policies. 141 But the actions of one of Mathewson's clerks brought an
investigator to the agency. When Special Agent Eugene McComas arrived in Nebraska, he
had with him an extensive list of Indian leases to middlemen, complete with rentals paid.
Mathewson must have known that McComas possessed damaging evidence; the Pender
Times reported that the agent had hired Indian attorney Thomas Sloan to defend him, if
necessary. 142
McComas was considered a problem for Indian agents "on the ropes." Taking his
assignment seriously, he refused to allow Mathewson to "wine and dine" him. As he left
the agency after completing his investigation, he declared the leasing operation on the
reservations to be in "bad shape." Although Commissioner Jones declined to release the
contents o f the special agent's report until it could be reviewed, the Omaha Daily Bee
reported that McComas would recommend the dismissals of the agency farmer and the
chief agency clerk, as well as the rem oval of Agent M athewson. In addition, the
investigator would likely tell the Indian office that the Omahas received too little
compensation for their lands. 143 Sensing that they were on shaky ground, the new Pender
"ring" dispatched Agent Mathewson, C. J. O'Connor, and their "trouble-shooter," E. A.
Wiltse to Washington to try to "offset any bad effect" that McComas's visit may have had
on their operation. 144

In May, the Interior Department sent another inspector, Special Agent Frank C,
Churchill, to the Omaha Reservation. From the outset, locals complained about the way
Churchill conducted his investigation. Although he was in possession of widespread
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evidence against "parties on the reservation," he chose not to act on his knowledge.
Churchill began his interrogations behind closed doors, and when Edward Rosewater
complained, the investigation came to a halt. None of the parties involved held out much
hope for a "fair and impartial report." 145
Early in 1903, it appeared that the dishonest Mathewson would no longer have a
job. Since none of Nebraska's congressmen lobbied for an agent for the Omahas and
W innebagoes, Congress failed to appropriate money for his salary in fiscal year 1904.
Mathewson's position was eliminated effective July 1, 1903, and the agency was turned
over to bonded school superintendents, the first of which was to be the newly-unemployed
Omaha and W innebago agent. 146 Mathewson's appointment as superintendent was in
keeping with an Indian department custom of giving agents jobs "equally as good" as their
old ones. The advantage to Mathewson was that as a civil servant, he could now be
removed only for misconduct. Behind the scenes, land syndicate front man E. A. Wiltse
had urged Nebraska Senator J. H. Millard to back Mathewson for the superintendency.
The syndicate was naturally delighted with Mathewson's assignment, but most Thurston
County residents opposed the appointment of such a person to a secure civil service
job. 147
Mathewson and his middlemen gave the impression that they were still in business,
but they knew that their "gravy train" had been at least partially derailed. Under a new
1902 Interior Department rule, in the future, no one person would be allowed to lease more
than one section of farmland, and already, several hundred leases had been disapproved. In
reporting the new ruling, the Pender Times editor remarked, "Now it's Rosewater's turn to
smile." 148
Edward Rosewater could smile for a while, but the Omahas had not seen the last of
the Pender ring or other local "sharks" bent on taking advantage of Indians. And in 1902,
the United States government had passed the first in a series of laws that would drastically
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reduce Omaha real estate holdings through land sales. Little by little, Congress would make
it easier for whites to separate Omahas from their allotments, as heirship rulings and
competency commissions made more and more Indians eligible to sell their lands. In 1894,
the Board of Indian Commissioners had voiced their concern that the twenty-five-year trust
period to protect Indian lands from sale could be overridden by special legislation. They
foresaw a great temptation for Indians to sell their allotments, leaving many homeless:
We are getting possession of Indian lands quite fast enough by the
purchase of large unallotted tracts, and we can surely leave the
unallotted lands to their owners until a generation shall be educated
to appreciate their value, and use them for their own and their
children's benefit. 149
For the Omahas, this progressive vision was not to be.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE FINAL ASSAULT: TAXATION AND LAND SALES ON THE OMAHA
RESERVATION, 1902-1916

"There is not a wild Indian living who knows what a fee-simple is. . . . and there are
certainly very few Indians, civilized or uncivilized, who understand it." 1
Henry M. Teller, 1881
"So soon as the proper official declares that an Indian is competent to administer his own
affairs, let that Indian have . . . a patent in fee for his allotment, and let him shift for
himself.
James McLaughlin, circa 1909

The Board of Indian Commissioners' fears became reality for the Omahas during
the early decades of the twentieth century as each new law was designed to relieve tribal
members of their lands or incomes. Even more threatening was the fact that the Interior
Secretary was given discretionary power to issue land titles to Indians whose lands were
still held in trust. In many cases, inherited lands were sold as quickly as heirs received
them, and in 1910, a government competency commission issued hundreds of fee-patents,
sometimes to Indians who did not want them, and almost always to recipients who did not
understand what they were. In addition, taxation of Omaha lands became a major issue.
Thurston County organizers knew as early as 1889 that their county was composed of over
ninety percent Indian trust lands, and that their tax base would be small. Almost from its
inception, the county waged a campaign to tax Omaha lands, and most of Nebraska's
senators and representatives were happy to support tax legislation that would keep their
white constituents happy at the Omahas' expense. Land fraud continued on the reservation,

224

and unfortunately, some of the best-educated Omahas, who could have become effective
advocates for their people, often chose to align themselves with persons who victimized the
Indians. By late 1916, the Omaha land base had been drastically reduced. All the property
that remained in Indian hands was taxed, and despite the disastrous results of that first
competency commission among the Omahas, a new commission was hard at work on other
reservations, issuing thousands of fee-patents that would soon be in the hands of white
settlers and speculators.
On his way back east after conducting his 1902 investigation of the Omaha Agency,
Inspector Eugene McComas told reporters that the situation with regard to traders near the
reservation was "as near a hold-up as is possible to imagine." According to McComas,
traders were allowed to attend Indian "paydays," and most Omahas left the agency with
little or nothing. ^ In addition to the inspector's report, remarks made by a Catholic priest
and published in the W ashington Post prompted the Indian Department to send another
investigator in 1904. Upon his arrival in Nebraska, Inspector A. O. W right was met by
Father Joseph Schell, self-proclaimed missionary to the Winnebagoes and the author of the
inflammatory statements in the Washington newspaper.^ In oral testimony, Father Schell
accused Homer, Nebraska, merchants John and Thomas Ashford and C, J. O'Connor of
cheating the Omahas and Winnebagoes and of contributing to their dependence upon
alcohol. For instance, the priest accused the businessmen of charging the Indians 100 to
1,500 percent interest on loans, and claimed that they loaned the Indians "whiskey money."
According to Father Schell, drunken Indians were led into banks to sign notes for three
times the loaned amounts, and he insisted that Indians were "hunted down" and forced to
buy goods at exorbitant prices when merchants learned they were expecting money.
Finally, Schell charged that Homer merchants drove out other tradesmen who attempted to
sell Indians goods at reasonable prices.^
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Shortly after his first contact with Father Schell, Inspector W right began to suspect
the priest's motives. Schell presented W right with affidavits, allegedly from Indians, but
when W right informed the priest that his Indian witnesses must testify in person, they
never appeared. When questioned, several Indians swore that Father Schell had written the
affidavits and had them sign the documents when they were d ru n k . 6 Gradually, Wright
learned the true story behind the priest's accusations. Apparently, Joseph Schell had
reached Homer in April 1903, claiming to be the new missionary to the Winnebagoes. He
took over the town's Catholic church and demanded $4,000 from town citizens to repair
the church, to build a parsonage, and to pay his salary. W hen the Ashford brothers and
O'Connor refused to donate eighty percent of the money, Schell threatened to put them out
of business. The priest intimidated other merchants as well. When Homer butcher William
O'Dell was called to testify before Inspector Wright, Father Schell warned him that he, too,
would soon be bankrupt if he did not incriminate O'Connor and the Ashfords.^
Obsessed with his vendetta against local merchants, Father Schell portrayed them as
greedy and grasping, never missing an opportunity to exploit their Indian customers. In
their own testimony, the merchants agreed with Schell's accusations, to a point. C. J.
O'Connor confirmed that he did go to the agency to collect debts when the Indians received
lease money or other income, because he wanted to be paid while his debtors still had some
money. But he denied what the priest called "snapping" checks from Indians. On the
contrary, O'Connor testified that many Omahas voluntarily gave him their checks so that he
could deduct their payments.8
Trader Thomas Ashford, Jr. verified that on occasion he had loaned drunken
Indians enough money to reclaim their horses from livery stables, but swore that he had
never knowingly loaned any whiskey money. However, he knew that Indians sometimes
borrowed money for "food," then used it to buy liquor.^ In response to Father Schell's
charges of price-gouging, all of the merchants admitted charging "high-risk" Indians more
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for their purchases, but reservation trader George C. Maryott defended his pricing policy,
explaining that he had to transport goods over eighteen miles of bad roads. M aryott
believed the Indians took advantage of his "generosity," buying goods in town when they
had cash, and only dealing with him when they needed credit. W ithout exception, the
merchants admitted to charging clearly illegal interest rates for small loans, but they called
the extra charges "premiums," necessary to cover collection costs. ^
Although he realized that the local tradesmen were looking out for their own
interests, Inspector W right defended the merchants, even after they had pleaded guilty to
many of the charges. Wright insisted that while on the reservations, he never saw an Indian
forced to surrender a check; traders were simply urging their customers to pay their debts,
and sometimes they even gave Indians gifts for prompt payment. The inspector did observe
that not only merchants crowded around the agency on paydays; lawyers collected fees in
this way, and the justice of the peace became a familiar figure as he waited to collect fines.
Wright also explained to his superiors that many Indians' reluctance to pay their bills led
/
merchants to take chattel mortgages on their work horses, and when an Indian exhausted
his credit, the horses became collateral. As for Father Schell, Inspector W right
recommended that in the future, the priest should be barred from all Indian reservations. ^
In 1906, Congress finally agreed with Commissioner William Jones that the liquor
traffic among Indians was out of control. Between 1906 and 1916, federal lawmakers
appropriated nearly $300,000 to suppress liquor sales, but it was too little money spread
too thinly, and like weeds, bootleggers and liquor dealers resurfaced on the Omaha
Reservation. 12 With little help forthcoming, Omaha and Winnebago Superintendent Albert
H. Kneale took matters into his own hands in 1910. Faced with rampant alcohol abuse on
the two reservations, Kneale called upon Ed Brents, a Special Officer for the Suppression
of the Liquor Traffic among Indians, to help him stop liquor sales. Together, they devised
a plan in which they would accompany two Winnebagoes "of pronounced Indian type" to
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bars in towns near the reservations. After being served whiskey, the Indians would turn
their purchases over to Brents, who then labeled the bottles with date and liquor seller.
During their "sting operation," not one saloon refused to sell the Indians liquor. Because
there was a Nebraska law prohibiting liquor sales to Indians, Kneale and Brents presented
their evidence to the Thurston County Attorney in hopes of getting convictions. To their
surprise, the county attorney, who was him self part Indian, refused to press charges,
arguing that because it discriminated against Indians, the state law was unconstitutional.
Actually, he did not want to see the law enforced, because that would mean "[he] could not
even purchase a drink [himself]." 13 Having failed in Pender, the two investigators took
their case to the United States Attorney in Omaha, who cooperated fully. A grand jury
heard the case and handed down indictments that resulted in several arrests. Kneale and
Brents had largely curtailed Indian liquor sales in saloons, but they were unable to stop
bootleggers. 14
Despite the concerted efforts of Kneale and Brents, liquor continued to reach the
Omahas. In a January 1915 report, Kneale's successor, Axel Johnson, accused "notorious
character" W ill Estill of selling whiskey to Indians in order to separate them from their
lands, and he charged that George F. Phillips, who had been under investigation for two
years, was still distributing lemon extract among the Omahas. 15 Phillips was arraigned on
July 12, 1915 at Pender, for selling intoxicants to the Indians. 16 The previous year, Will
Estill had been exonerated of liquor trafficking charges, and had lashed out at those who
had initiated the charges and allegedly conspired against him. In a series of scathing letters,
he accused the government's star witness of perjury, claimed that a special investigator had
conducted a personal campaign against him, and implicated Omaha Agency clerk W. A.
M artindale in a plot to convict him of whiskey dealing. l^T w o Indian Departm ent
inspectors apparently agreed that Estill had been the victim of a conspiracy. E. B. Linnen

and E. M. Sweet, Jr. defended Estill, calling him "an honest and upright man," while
accusing clerk Martindale of discriminating against him in the granting of leases.
Due to budget constraints, in October 1914, the Indian Office had recalled its
special deputy assigned to help halt liquor traffic among the Omahas. Now it would be up
to a deputy at Sioux City, Iowa and a part-time officer to stop the whiskey flow. But this
arrangement proved ineffective, and in November 1915, Omaha Superintendent Axel
Johnson requested and received an additional enforcement officer. 19 In April 1916,
Superintendent Johnson himself was commissioned a Deputy Special Officer for the
balance of the fiscal year. 20
Axel Johnson and other superintendents ignored few sources in their campaign
against illegal whiskey. The Interior Department received permission to search mail
vehicles entering reservations, and in November 1915, Johnson informed Chief Special
Officer Henry Larson that he wished to cancel the leases of those persons who had brought
liquor onto the reservation. Larson supported Johnson's efforts,Und an assistant Indian
Commissioner reminded the superintendent that Omaha leases contained no provisions for
such cancellations, but that he had no objections to Johnson's inserting such a clause in
future leases.2 ! In June 1916, liquor arrests were made in W innebago and at Rosalie,
Nebraska, and instead of being fined, offenders were put to work on a county road
gang.22
In the meantime, a series of United States Supreme Court rulings contradicted the
Heff decision of 1905 and supported the earlier Meiklejohn anti-liquor law. In one of these
cases, attorney Thomas Sloan attempted to convince the high court to negate an Eighth
Circuit Appeals Court conviction of tribal member Simeon Hallowell for bringing liquor
onto his allotment. Sloan failed, and the ruling stood.2^ On June 25, 1916, the Supreme
Court overturned the controversial Heff decision, stating that the ruling had not reflected
the true intentions of Congress when it passed the 1887 Dawes Act. Now it was once again
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illegal to sell liquor to allotted

I n d ia n s .

24 Liquor traffic enforcement officers rejoiced at the

news of the high court ruling. Henry Larson predicted that keeping allotted Indians under
federal protection would increase the number of whiskey traffic convictions, and the special
officer in Sioux City looked forward to "lots of fun" as more arrests were made.25
But on the Omaha Reservation, the traffic continued, and co n cern ed T hurston
County residents received little help in combating the problem. In August 1916, a vicepresident of the Farmers State Bank of Rosalie asked Axel Johnson to send a "good Indian
or two" to testify against a "new crop of boot legers [sic]."26 The W althill [Nebraska]
Times editor, sharply critical of Third District Representative Dan Stephens, accused the
Nebraska congressman of dragging his feet in regard to stationing a special agent on the
Omaha Reservation to stop bootlegging. The irate editor believed that as a Democrat in a
Democrat-controlled Congress, Stephens could get the agent if he really wanted to.27 it
would obviously take more than zealous agents and a Supreme Court decision to solve the
Omahas' alcohol problems.
Buried in the 1902 Indian Appropriation Act was a section that would bring about
the first phase of wholesale land loss among the Omahas. Section Seven stated that "the
adult heirs of a deceased Indian to whom a trust or other patent containing restrictions upon
alienation has been or shall be issued for lands allotted to him may sell and convey the
lands inherited from such descendent. . . . " Buyers of "heirship lands" would receive
unencumbered titles, as though allottees' patents had been unrestricted.28 This law
allowing Indians to sell heirship lands was a natural progression from the 1890s leasing
laws. The acres lost to Indians through the sale of inheritances was only a tiny percentage
of the total lands turned over to whites, but heirship sales devastated Indian futures.
Combined with the later sales of surplus lands, the loss of inherited acreage left many
allottees' grandchildren nearly landless.29 Congress passed the 1902 heirship law because
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1) it did not want deceased Indians' lands lying untilled; 2) it hoped Indians would apply
their heirship proceeds toward improving their own allotments; 3) some people did not
want to see Indians become heirs to large estates, because it would encourage idleness; and
4) perhaps most important, whites wanted the land.30
Shortly after the bill's passage, Commissioner William Jones's office fielded many
inquiries from whites living near reservations, and he hoped that delays in implementing
the law would give Indians time to learn their rights, to ascertain the true value of their
lands, and to decide whether they really wished to sell.31 Reaction to the new law was
overwhelmingly favorable among whites on and around the Omaha Reservation. Agent
Charles Mathewson considered the law a wise one for the Omahas whose trust period
would expire in a few years. To Mathewson, selling heirship lands would be "a valuable
lesson in the management of their own affairs."32 The Pender [Nebraska] Times viewed
the legislation as a step toward equalizing the tax burden in Thurston County; white county
residents hoped that the trust limitations of about 40,000 heirship acres would be lifted as
allottees died and their lands were sold.33
Before the rules governing the sale of heirship lands arrived at the Omaha and
Winnebago Agency, attorney Thomas Sloan procured a copy and released some of the
guidelines. The entire procedure would be controlled by the agent, who was supposed to
look out for the Indians' welfare. Any contracts were to be witnessed by two prominent
Indians, and before any action could be taken, each land tract had to be probated in county
court, a process that, optimistically, would take three months. Lands of minors could not
be sold without a court order, and then would go to the highest bidder. Buying heirship
lands could be risky, since Indian land titles were often contested, and under Nebraska
law, heirs could come forward after probate to claim their rights.34
W hile Thurston County whites extolled the virtues of the new law, the Omahas,
whose lives would be most directly affected, opposed it. At a general council in late July
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1902, 149 of 150 Omahas in attendance signed a protest and vowed not to sell their lands.
In specific terms, the council outlined their trampled rights, identified the guilty whites, and
voiced their annoyance with certain Omahas who had aided whites in their schemes. In
addition, the council claimed that the May 27 act was passed without their knowledge, and
they wanted it repealed. In summing up their protest, the Omahas declared:
All proceedings tending to the destruction of our rights, happiness
and prosperity . . . are hereby disapproved. That the Act of
Congress of May 27, 1902, providing for the sale of the lands of
deceased Indians of our tribe, is hereby disapproved and not binding
on our people. . . . That our tribal council . . . are hereby invested
with power to . . . obtain relief from the wrongs we have so long
suffered, even to the bringing of suits or actions . . . in any court of
justice, against any person or persons who violate our rights. . . .35
At about the same time the Omahas issued their protest, Edward Rosewater of the
Omaha Daily Bee accused the Thurston County "land lease ring," allegedly presided over
by Superintendent Charles Mathewson, of putting up $500,000 to purchase Indian heirship
lands. A provision of the statute requiring purchase money to be deposited prior to sales
allegedly played right into the syndicate's hands and effectively shut out those settlers who
would buy lands if they could do so in installments.-^ Recognizing that ordinary farmers
would have difficulty raising the full purchase price of a parcel of land, Nebraska
congressman John S. Robinson asked Commissioner Jones to amend the rules to allow
mortgages. 37
In September 1902, the Interior Department changed the heirship land rules to
require sealed bids, with sales going to the highest bidders. In response to criticisms of the
original rules, Interior Secretary Ethan Hitchcock nullified deeds already issued and
ordered the land resold. The Pender Times gleefully reported that speculators in Omaha
lands had lost several thousand dollars that had been paid to Indian heirs asbribes.3 8
Despite the pleas of newly-elected Nebraska Third District

congressman John J.

McCarthy, Commissioner Jones and Secretary Hitchcock refused to back down regarding
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the new rules. On one day in early September 1903, Hitchcock disapproved thirty-one
heirship land sales in Thurston County. Heretofore, according to the Pender newspaper,
land transfers had been "going through as though greased." The Times surmised that the
Interior Secretary had found something badly amiss, and that he planned to conduct an
investigation. ^ 9
The Times was correct. Hitchcock returned the money for the rejected land sales
and promptly dispatched an Interior Department inspector to Nebraska. Hitchcock had
discovered that Omaha and Winnebago Superintendent Charles Mathewson had continued
his association with the land syndicate.40 Inspector O'Fallon remained at the Omaha and
Winnebago Agency for about a month, vowing to "weed out the whole outfit." At a
meeting with the inspector in late September, the Omahas vented their anger at the
superintendent and his cronies. However, outspoken tribal member Silas Wood, who was
eager to sell his land, defended Mathewson and accused attorney Hiram Chase of lowering
Indian land prices by telling prospective buyers that the titles were no good. Shortly after
the Omaha meeting, Superintendent Mathewson, pleading ill health, suddenly resigned.
But given his history, few believed that his sole reason for leaving was his health. Edward
Rosewater, who had been "hounding" Mathewson for two years, took credit for his early
departure.41
The requirement for sealed bids was the first of several adjustments to the Indian
heirship act. On September 16, 1903, the Indian Office ordered the "newspaper of widest
circulation in the county" to publish an updated weekly list of available Omaha heirship
lands. The Pender Times printed the list, and went a step further by publishing a
convenient map of the Omaha Reservation showing Indian allotments and inherited lands
available for purchase. Regular Times subscribers could buy a copy of the map for just one
d o lla r .4 2

in 1904, Commissioner Jones suggested that cash from sales of inherited lands

be deposited in individual Indian accounts in national banks near reservations, so that each
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Indian could gain business experience by personally withdrawing ten dollars from his or
her account each month. By June 30, 1905, Omahas had deposited $62,164.40 in either
the Pender National Bank or Security National Bank of Sioux City.43 However, after
taking office, Commissioner Robert Valentine became convinced that Indians had become
dependent upon their monthly stipends and had ceased to "progress." Accordingly, in
March 1909, he instructed superintendents and agents to stop these small payments. The
Commissioner claimed that with the stipends discontinued, more Indians began working
their lands.44
On October 28, 1905, all agents received instructions to insert a clause in deeds for
inherited Indian lands, prohibiting the use or sale of alcohol on those parcels. The proviso
proved unpopular with land buyers, and due to protests from whites living on or near
South Dakota's Yankton Reservation, the Indian office asked its attorneys to review the
amendment. After reviewing the clause, the legal department advised that it be removed,
because it would slow land sales and reduce prices, and would have little impact on liquor
traffic, since it pertained only to heirship lands. The Attorney General's office agreed, and
on February 3, 1906, the liquor restriction ended. During fiscal 1906, sales of inherited
Omaha lands dropped sharply, a decline that Commissioner Francis E. Leupp attributed
directly to the liquor clause that was in effect for part of the year.45
The first Indian heirship lands subject to the law of May 27, 1902 and the amended
rules of October 4, 1902 went on sale on March 4, 1903, and by June 30, 1904, 142 tracts
of land on the Omaha and Winnebago reservations, comprising 9,542 acres, had been sold
for a total of $239,284.50, or an average price of $25.58 per acre.46 Between July 1904
and August 1905, another fifty Omaha parcels totaling 3,126 acres sold for about $26.00
per acre, and by August 1906, despite the short-lived liquor clause, another eighteen tracts
changed hands.47 According to the Indian Department plan, Indians would use the
proceeds from sales of heirship lands to improve their allotments, but little of the money
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was used for its intended purpose. The Omahas were the only tribe for which figures on
these expenditures were reported, and of the $147,150 realized between 1902 and 1904,
less than twenty percent went toward improvements. 48
Unfortunately, much of the Omahas' heirship land money made its way into the
coffers of local merchants who, anticipating heirs' sudden windfalls, had extended credit
to the unsuspecting Indians. Many Omahas went deeply into debt, and in 1905 and 1906,
over 400 claims were paid from heirship land proceeds on deposit in local b an k s. 49 Ten
years later, little had changed. In a 1915 report, Superintendent Axel Johnson stated that
the Omahas still had no understanding of a credit economy, and many of them would "sign
any paper" to obtain goods or money on credit. An Omaha would mortgage his horses, his
tools, even his crops, and in order to pay his debts, would often have to sell his land. In
Johnson's opinion, unless the credit system among the Omahas stopped, the tribe would
face financial ruin. 50
Heirship lands comprised only a small portion of the Omaha Reservation, but a
1906 law placed much more Omaha land in jeopardy. Confusion over Indians' rights as
citizens and the differing degrees of acculturation among allotted Indians had made a
modification of the Dawes Act necessary. The Indian Office saw its need to manage the
affairs of the "helpless class," while at the same time discontinuing its role as guardian of
an increasing number of "competent" Indians. The 1905 Heff decision had basically given
allotted Indians equal rights with whites. As a result, Congress worried that it could no
longer protect Indians, and that the Supreme Court ruling would slow the pace of
allotment. Representative Charles H, Burke of South Dakota argued that the Heff ruling
had "demoralized" Indians. In order to prevent further degeneration and to return Indians to
United States jurisdiction, Burke introduced sweeping Indian legislation that would become
known simply as the Burke Act.51
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To circumvent the effects of the Heff decision and to prevent future liquor sales to
Indians, the 1906 Burke Act would allow the Interior Secretary or the President to shorten
or lengthen trust periods for individual Indians based upon their ability to manage their own
affairs. Any Indian categorized as "competent" could then be issued a patent in fee simple
with no restrictions as to sale, encumbrance, or taxation.52 This open-ended proviso
would later justify the disastrous 1910 competency commission and the tragic loss of
Omaha lands.
The Burke Act enjoyed nearly unanimous support in Congress and among Indian
Department officials. Indian Commissioner Francis E. Leupp argued that prior to the
passage of this law, the only way a self-sufficient Indian could be released from the
"shackles of wardship" was through special legislation, and Leupp saw that route as an
open invitation to "graft and blackmail." The commissioner enthusiastically supported feepatents and predicted that "the Burke law, wisely administered" would do more to end the
Indian problem "than any other single factor in a generation of progress."53 The pragmatic
House Committee on Indian Affairs backed the bill because it would reduce the paperwork
involved in approving individual allotments. That responsibility would now fall to the
Indian Department, which Burke insisted " [knew] best when an Indian [had] reached such
a stage of civilization as to be . .. capable of managing his own affairs." 54
Reformers were less than enthusiastic about the new law. W hile the Board of
Indian Commissioners did not question the bill's good intentions, they did see it as a step
backward for Indians. It was, they argued, impossible for the Interior Secretary to know
each Indian's circumstances. Therefore, it appeared to be left to an Indian who wanted
citizenship to convince the Indian Bureau that he or she deserved it. The commissioners
also believed it was wrong "to make citizenship for an Indian depend upon his keeping on
the pleasant side of the local officials at the agency. . . ."55 Samuel Brosius of the Indian
Rights Association complained that Indians denied citizenship until their trust periods
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expired were also being denied the opportunity to learn valuable lessons on surviving in a
white world. In addition, it seemed incongruous to Brosius that some tribal members
would become citizens subject to state laws, while others would remain under federal
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 56

Unfortunately, no one seemed concerned about the possible ramifications of

the removal of restrictions on Indian lands.
In order to receive a fee-patent under the terms of the Burke Act, an allottee was
required to submit an application to his superintendent, who would then forward it to the
Indian Office along with his own evaluation of the Indian's competency. Persons believing
that a patent should not be issued had thirty days to come forward and give their reasons
for o b je c tio n .57 Commissioner Leupp was happy to see that the process was "well
safeguarded." At this early date, he really believed that the procedure would work properly,
since superintendents, agents, or inspectors would thoroughly investigate each case.58 But
in determining applicants' competency, agents and superintendents held personal opinions
that no doubt influenced their recommendations. While later admitting that mistakes had
been made, and that more would be made in the future, Leupp insisted that most resulted
from misinformation received from sources other than Indian agents.59
By December 1908, 123 Omahas had been issued titles to 6,882 acres of land
under the terms of the Burke Act. According to Superintendent John M. Commons, many
Indians had sold their lands, some had mortgaged them, and a few had retained their
allotments. But he believed that about seventy-five percent of the Omahas who had received
fee-patents had used good judgment in handling their affairs, and he recommended that
patents should continue to be issued gradually, to prevent a huge number at the termination
of the trust period. Commons had correctly heard that whites around the reservation
anticipated "something of a harvest" when the trust period expired in 1909.60
But much to the dismay of Thurston County land-seekers, the trust period for the
"old" Omaha allotments did not expire as scheduled in 1909. A campaign to extend the trust
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period had begun in January 1904, when 397 Omahas, claiming old age or bad fortune,
petitioned the government to prolong their trust relationship. The petitioners feared that
because of their lack of business acumen, the very young and the very old would continue
to be preyed upon by greedy whites and, without their trust umbrella, would soon lose
their lands. The list of petitioners included some surprises, such as former agency clerk
Thomas McCauley, who undoubtedly was able to manage his own affairs. But the most
glaring name among the signers was that of attorney and judge Hiram Chase, obviously a
capable Omaha.61
The editor of the Pender Times called Chase's participation in the petition
hypocritical. By signing the document, Chase had placed himself among those Omahas
who considered themselves unprepared to continue without government support. Yet
Chase had held public office in Thurston County for ten years as county attorney and
judge, and was currently campaigning for reelection to the bench. The Times sarcastically
asked its readers if they were willing to pay an "admittedly incompetent" Indian a salary for
two more years. W ithout using the actual words, the irate editor accused Chase of tax
evasion. W hile holding public office, he owned and received revenue from over 600 acres
of land, but in ten years, had been billed for only $84.50 in taxes, some of which remained
unpaid. The newspaper predicted that the thoroughly political Omaha attorney would issue
an election-eve statement that he was in favor of paying taxes, knowing that he would not
have to if the trust period continued. 62
Provisions of the 1906 Indian Appropriation Act giving the President power to
extend the twenty-five-year trust period of any Indian outside Indian Territory enraged the
Pender Times editor. Accusing the Nebraska congressional delegation of being "asleep
when this section passed," he complained that whites in Thurston County had hoped that
their tax burden would be lightened when the trust period expired. The county, he feared,
would now "be left shackled in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior."63 At least one
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Omaha questioned the tribal trust extension request. In a letter to the Times. Levi Levering
argued that retaining an Indian agent would retard Omaha progress and merely "create [an]
office for an old worn out politician."64 Suspicious superintendent John F. MacKey
doubted the tribe's motives. He believed the Omahas wanted a trust extension so they could
fall back on "Uncle Sam" if they failed as farmers. They were, he charged, perfectly
willing to assert their rights as "citizens" when it served their purposes, but if it meant
avoiding responsibility, they chose to remain simply

" I n d i a n s . "65

Superintendent MacKey's replacement, John M. Commons, agreed completely
with the Omaha petitioners. Like them, he feared that Omaha senior citizens and minors
would become landless if the trust period ended, and he recommended that it be extended a
few years for some, and indefinitely for others.66 Com mons gained an ally in
Commissioner Robert Valentine, who, in March 1909, instructed the superintendent to
provide lists of all minor, elderly, and handicapped Omahas so that their lands could be
protected. A few weeks later, he amended his instructions to include the lands of deceased
Omahas whose heirs included m inors. 67
By May, Commons had compiled a detailed list of Omahas in each category
requested by the commissioner. He included the names of ninety-two "old and incapable"
Indians, thirteen whom he considered "old but capable," eight disabled tribal members, and
thirty-three younger Omahas who had requested extensions over the superintendent's
objections. Commons also forwarded a list of the 115 Omaha minors who would not turn
twenty-one until after the trust period was due to expire. These were all "new," or Rankin
allotments, and Commons provided each minor's annuity number, allotment number, and
the date on which he or she would reach majority. He also included the names of seventeen
Omahas between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five and recom mended trust
extensions for

e a c h .6 8

Commons' reply contained a list of 164 deceased allottees with

minor heirs, along with a recommendation that these lands remain in trust until each heir
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reached majority. The superintendent did not consider trust extensions necessary for five
minor heirs who had white fathers. 69
In his attempt to protect as many Omahas as possible, Commons added three
categories not requested by Commissioner Valentine. He hoped that thirty-seven parcels of
heirship land to which heirs had not yet been determined would remain in trust, along with
the proceeds from the sale of inherited lands that were deposited in area banks.70 In June,
Commons forwarded a list of thirty-one land parcels that had been sold or that were
currently advertised for sale, asking that these lands and monies also be held in trust until
sales were completed or proceeds paid to Indian sellers.71
Just a month before the scheduled end of the trust period for the old Omaha
allotments, Thurston County taxpayers eagerly anticipated two-thirds of the Omaha
Reservation lands coming onto the tax rolls. The Pender newspaper stated flatly that the
end of the trust period would place 150,000 acres of land "into the hands of the whites,
who have awaited this move." The Tim es admitted that the recent law allowing the
President to grant trust extensions clouded the issue, but its editor believed that most
requests for extensions would be denied, and the trusteeship would end on schedule.72 As
the July 10, 1909 deadline approached, the reservation was overrun by land speculators
who tricked many Omahas into signing away their lands. Pender businessmen and two
Indians formed a syndicate to buy up Indian lands as they were removed from trust.
Omahas Thomas Sloan and William F. Springer, along with W ill Estill, Llewelyn C.
Brownrigg, and Garry P. Meyers, stockpiled currency so that they could purchase land
immediately after midnight on July 10. Estill and Springer alone invested nearly $20,000
of their own money, and borrowed another $15,000 to finance land contracts with about
forty Indians.73
In a series of letters to the Interior Secretary and Commissioner Valentine, Dr.
Susan La Flesche Picotte accused these same men of interfering with an agency
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investigation conducted by E. B. Linnen. Dr. Picotte claimed she could prove that Sloan,
Estill and their cronies had incited the Indians to complain about Superintendent Commons'
job performance. W hile Commons lay seriously ill, Estill, Springer, and Brownrigg
allegedly rounded up Indians and took them to Inspector Linnen to prefer charges, after
telling them exactly what to say. Dr. Picotte pleaded with Valentine not to remove
Commons, who had become a great protector of her people.74 But the syndicate apparently
succeeded in its campaign to discredit the crusading superintendent, for he was transferred
a few months later.75
Due to the rampant irregularities on the reservation, on July 3, 1909, President
William Howard Taft extended the trust period on nearly all of the original Omaha
allotments for ten years. This was done with the condition that competent Omahas would
continue to be singled out and given patents in fee. The Pender speculators who had
entered into premature land contracts lost huge sums of money when Taft ordered the
extension, and to cut their losses, they urged Omahas still under trust agreements to apply
for land titles.76 Thurston County taxpayers felt betrayed by the President's action, and
their frustration surfaced on the front page of the Pender Times, whose editor charged fully
competent Omahas with shifting the burden of taxation to local whites when they could
have taken title to their lands and paid their share. 77
To placate angry Nebraskans, the Indian Office offered assurances that every effort
would be made to "free" the lands of competent Om ahas.78 The method used to free
Omaha lands was both arbitrary and unfair. To expedite fee patenting, Commissioner
Valentine had proposed special "competency commissions" on the Kiowa Reservation in
Oklahoma, among the Yakimas in W ashington, and at the U m atilla and Santee
reservations. But the very first commission operated on the Omaha Reservation. Because
they had been allotted for twenty-five years, and many worked farms, the Omahas were
considered the nation's most competent Indians, and Valentine wanted to see them
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completely independent. In addition, the commissioner believed that allowing capable
Indians to sell the land they did not actually farm would be the best way to end the
destructive practice of leasing.79 Local whites, eager to purchase Omaha lands, supported
Valentine’s idea, since they knew that at least some of the Indians would sell their lands
either to speculators or to current lessees.
Because he believed the local superintendent had too narrow a view and could not
possibly represent all the interests involved, Valentine doubted his ability to judge Indian
competency. He therefore appointed a three-man commission to determine which Omahas
could handle their own affairs. On October 10, 1909, Indian Office traveling auditor W.
W. McConihe, former Omaha superintendent Andrew G. Pollack, and H. P. Marble,
prominent Thurston County newspaper editor, began their work among the unfortunate
O m a h a s . 80

All Indians over age eighteen were to be presented forms containing seventy-

five questions regarding their financial and physical condition, their education, the current
use of their lands, and most important, whether or not they desired fee-patents. Two local
businessm en were to certify each Omaha's fitness for land ownership, and the
commissioners would then add their own comments. By February 1, 1910, McConihe,
Pollack, and Marble had supposedly questioned 605 Omaha allottees.81
In early March, the commissioners submitted their report to Robert Valentine.
Based on testimony and their questionnaires, they had divided the Omahas into three
classes. Class One Indians were declared fully competent to receive fee-patents; those in
Class Two could lease their lands and handle their own funds, but their allotments would
remain in trust. Class Three included "wholly incompetent" Indians "who should remain
under the supervision and jurisdiction of the Governm ent for a further period of
tutelage. "82 On February 28, an Omaha newspaper had estimated that approximately 250

Indians would receive titles to their lands. A week later, W. W. McConihe put the number
at 300, and assured his superiors that "everything [was] working out beautifully. "83 Two
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hundred ninety-four Omahas officially became "competent" on March 10, 1910, and on
that same day, the Land Office issued 244 fee-patents for 20,199 acres of Indian land.84
Later that month, Superintendent Albert Kneale received the official list of Omahas whom
the Indian Office considered ready to receive titles to their lands. At the Department's
request, Kneale published the list in local newspapers, along with each Indian's acreage
and a warning that any contract to buy or sell these Indians' lands would be void if the
patent had not yet been recorded by the General Land

O f f i c e . 85

In choosing competent Omahas, the three commissioners often violated their own
rules. Self-sufficiency and knowledge of English were essential criteria, yet allottees who
could not read, write, or speak English, and who could not manage on their own received
fee-patents. In addition, the commissioners never met some of the Indians whom they ruled
competent.86 Historian Richmond R. Clow further argues that those Omahas who agreed
to accept fee-patents did not really understand the meaning of their assent. Allottees' forms
were filled out by the commissioners; there was no place on the competency form for an
Indian to sign, and it is unlikely that taxation, mortgages, and other land-owning
obligations were explained to confused Omahas. Clow also asserts that Omahas may have
accepted fee-patents because they would agree to anything to keep their lands.87 Of 258
Indians who actually appeared before the commissioners, fifty-three stated that they did not
want fee-patents. But their lands, totaling 4,002 acres, were patented over their objections,
meaning that one of every five Omaha allottees interviewed by the three commissioners was
"forced to accept a fee-patent to his or her land."88
The commission's arbitrary division of Omahas into three competency classes
caused controversy from the beginning. On March 11, 1910, approximately 500 Indians
attended a tribal meeting to voice their objections to government interference in their affairs.
Many of the 243 Class Two Omahas believed they were as capable as their fellow
tribesmen labeled Class One. For their part, Class One allottees felt they were being
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discriminated against. They believed it was unfair to tax only the lands of "competent"
Indians, and at the council, many demanded to be declared Class Two so that they could
keep their allotments, tax-free. Not surprisingly, land-hungry Thurston County whites tried
to convince the three commissioners to include more Omahas in the Class One category.89
With the issuance of deeds imminent, on March 31, the Omaha Reservation teemed
with speculators from Winnebago, Sioux City, and other "nearby financial centers," who
hoped to snap up the lands of those Indians on the "competent list." However, the deeds
had not yet been filed with the General Land Office, and by early April, speculation was
rife as to the status of the Indian patents. None had been delivered, and no announcement
had been made; everyone remained in the dark. Rumors claimed that fifty deeds had been
registered in Pender, but no one knew for sure, and "everyone . . . [had] the headache
from sustained deep thought on the subject."90 Finally, Superintendent Kneale announced
that all patents had been delayed pending an investigation into possibly illegal land
contracts. E. P. Holcomb, Chief Superintendent, Special Indian Agent W. W. McConihe,
and Interior Department Inspector E. B. Linnen conducted the inquiry, which resulted in
grand jury land fraud indictments of eight local men and former Superintendent John M.
Commons, now a resident of New Mexico.^ 1
According to the charges, the defendants had induced Indians to sign away their
lands while they were still in trust. In some instances, Indians were persuaded to sell their
property at prices far below true value; the speculators then transferred the deeds to third
parties at over double the price. In other cases, unsuspecting Omahas were led to believe
they had signed leases, when in fact they had sold their lands for "a mere pittance." Many
allottees, upon receiving their fee-patents, found that deeds, sometimes for the lands on
which they were living, had been filed as much as a year earlier. By the time third, or even
fourth, parties took over the lands, it had become difficult to trace the transactions.
Consequently, the Indian Office intended to cancel every patent obtained by fraud, and to
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invalidate the resulting deeds. The seven Nebraska defendants, H. L. Keefe, W. T.
Diddock, E. S. Kelly, Will Estill, E. W. Rossiter, and James J. Orr, all of W althill, and
Frank Coddington of Decatur, all pled "no contest" to illegally trafficking in Omaha lands,
and were fined from $25.00 to $300.00 each. The unsuspecting Omahas who had sold
their lands prematurely found themselves reclassified as "incom petent. "92
The work of the Omaha competency commission was a complete failure. A
carefully researched list of land transactions involving both "old" and "new" allottees who
received fee-patents in March 1910 and shortly thereafter reveals a pattern of forced
patents, mortgages, and quick sales. Many allottees sold their lands outright within weeks
of receiving them. For example, Ernest Merrick, Thomas White, Charles Thomas, and
Mary Esau W alker were issued patents on March 10, and all had sold their allotments,
totaling 280 acres, by March 31. By October 5, Will Estill alone had purchased the lands of
at least four Indians, one of whom had not given his consent to receive a fee-patent. James
Porter, Edward Esau, Madeline Tyndall, and John Sheridan were among those Omahas
who answered "no" to the question, "Do you desire a fee-patent?" Tyndall subsequently
mortgaged her land eight times before selling it in 1913; Esau's land transaction record
shows fifteen mortgages in four years; Porter had already borrowed on his land when he
sold it in August 1911; and Sheridan's record reveals ten loans in just two years. He sold
his land for a mere dollar.93
An appalling number of Omahas mortgaged and re-mortgaged their lands. Roce
Grant received his fee-patent on September 1, 1910, and had already borrowed on his
acreage five times when he sold it the following June. Etta W ebster (Warner), Eugene
Pappan, and Jackson W olf each had thirteen or more loans on their records, and Daniel
Webster, who had not consented to a fee-patent, had twenty-one unpaid mortgages on his
land when he sold it for one dollar in October 1916. Homer Walker borrowed on his land
seven months before he received it, and later mortgaged it seven more times. Amos Walker
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told the competency commission he was too old to receive title to his lands. The
commissioners said he was intelligent, and issued him a fee-patent anyway. Walker leased
his land for three years, then took out fifteen different mortgages. Maggie Walker, either
his wife or daughter, sold the land in 1916, again for just one dollar. Upton Henderson
received a fee-patent on March 10, 1910, mortgaged his land eleven times, then sold it for
one dollar in 1916. Henderson was blind.94
As it had so many times before, the Indian Department ignored the disastrous
results of its policies among the Omahas. Many tribal members had already sold or
mortgaged their lands when Commissioner Valentine appointed another competency
commission in 1910 on the nearby Santee Sioux Reservation. But Valentine soon
questioned his own decision. The Omaha experiment had obviously failed, and the Santee
com m issioners were using sim ilar slipshod methods. Given the "carelessness and
incompetence" of the commissioners on the two reservations, Valentine reluctantly decided
that fee-patents were not in the best interest of the Indians, since they were "at cross
purposes with other efforts of the governm ent to encourage industry, thrift, and
independence." He subsequently canceled plans for further commissions and disregarded
the Santee report. The Indian Office now temporarily returned to reviewing fee-patents on a
case-by-case basis.95
Concerned with the possible damage done by his competency commissions, in
April 1912, Valentine asked Indian superintendents to tell him what effects fee-patenting
had had on their charges. He especially wanted to know how many Indians had sold their
newly-acquired lands to w hites.96 Later that year, S. A. M. Young sent Commissioner
Valentine the bad news regarding the Omahas. Young reported that ninety percent of the
Omahas who had been issued fee-patents by the commission had sold their lands, eight
percent had mortgaged them, and only two percent still retained their allotments. One
inspector stated the obvious — "The work of the 1910 commission was not a success"—
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but rather than condemning the commissioners, he placed the blame on Thurston County
whites who had badgered the Omahas to apply for fee-patents before they were ready. 97
Citing "mental wear and tear" and "the struggle between all kinds of opposing
forces . .

a weary and ailing Robert Valentine resigned as Commissioner of Indian

Affairs in September 1912.98 W ith Valentine gone from the Indian Office and with
President Woodrow Wilson's election, "progressivism" replaced humanitarianism in Indian
affairs. Progressives, who were determined to force Indians to make it on their own,
turned to a much more liberal fee-patenting policy. Over the objections of some Indian
Department officials, new Commissioner Cato Sells and Interior Secretary Franklin K.
Lane instituted a "policy of greater liberalism" in which all able-bodied adult Indians of less
than one-half Indian blood would be given complete control of their properties, and those
more than one-half Indian would receive patents in fee if found competent. To accomplish
this goal, Sells reinstated competency commissions. Between 1917 and 1920, the Indian
Department issued over 17,000 Indian land patents.99
Commissioner Sells did not stumble forward blindly. Recognizing that "a more
liberal policy with regard to the issuance of patents in fee [had] been followed at the Omaha
and W innebago reservations than elsewhere," in December 1914, Sells asked Omaha
Superintendent Axel Johnson and Winnebago Superintendent S. A. M. Young to study the
effects and results of fee-patenting on their reservations and to report to him as soon as
possible. The commissioner wanted facts and figures, but he was also concerned with
moral issues, and wanted Johnson's and Young's recommendations as to whether a future
fee-patenting policy should be liberal or restricted. 100 Superintendents at the Santee,
Sisseton, Yankton, and Pottawatami agencies each received a copy of Sells' letter to
Johnson and were also asked to forward reports. 101
In reply to Sells' request, Axel Johnson submitted a detailed report that included a
list of 140 male Omaha patentees divided into four categories: 1) those who retained their
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lands; 2) those who sold their lands, but used the proceeds wisely; 3) those who had little
or nothing to show for the sale of their allotments; and 4) those who signed away their
holdings or squandered their payment due to the influence of alcohol. Of the 140 allottees
listed, eighteen, or fewer than thirteen percent, kept their lands. Ten used their land
proceeds wisely, and a disturbing 112, or eighty percent, had nothing left. In at least
sixteen of these cases, liquor was to blame. 102
Johnson believed that the liberal granting of fee-patents demoralized both Indians
and whites. The large amounts of Indian land that could be alienated attracted unscrupulous
whites, who relieved the Omahas of their lands by fraud, by the use of whiskey, and by
encouraging them to go into debt. Knowing that they were being cheated demoralized the
Indians, as did the increased use of alcohol. Superintendent Johnson stated emphatically
that liberal issuance of fee-patents would result in Indian land loss. But, he cautioned, if the
government insisted on pursuing that policy, patents should be issued gradually and only
upon the recommendations of local superintendents, who could best judge Indians'
competency. 103 In their investigative report of March 1915, Indian Department inspectors
E. B. Linnen and E. M. Sweet, Jr. agreed that to keep the Omaha land base from eroding
further, the department should be very cautious in its issuance of f e e - p a t e n t s . 104
Just a few days before Superintendent Johnson submitted his disturbing account of
the Omahas, Superintendents Young of the Winnebago Agency and E. D. Mossman of the
Sisseton Agency had filed almost identical reports. Like the Omahas, few Winnebagoes
retained their lands or used their land proceeds wisely, and like their Indian neighbors,
many lost their property due to alcohol. 105 Patents in fee had been issued on the Sisseton
Reservation over a period of years, but in late 1914, Superintendent Mossman told Sells
that of 222 Indians receiving titles to their lands, only nine had successfully kept them. The
"most intelligent class" among the Sissetons opposed fee-patents and saw them as a means
to make paupers of the Sioux. Mossman agreed, and believed that granting a large number
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of fee-patents at one time would cause a "feast of graft." He had recommended that only a
handful of Indians receive land titles during his superintendency, and he planned to
continue that policy. 106
Totally ignoring the disastrous results reported by Johnson, Young, Mossman, and
Yankton Superintendent A. W. Leech, Interior Secretary Lane proceeded with his renewal
of a liberal fee-patenting policy: "It is the judgment of those who know the Indian best, and
it is my conclusion . . . that we should henceforth make a . . . systematic effort to cast the
full burden of independence and responsibility upon an increasing number of Indians of all
tribes." Citing the powers granted to him by the 1906 Burke Act, Lane promised to use that
authority "as soon as the machinery of administration can be set in m otion." 107 Lane's
policy was encouraged by the Indians of South Dakota’s Cheyenne River Reservation, and
especially by tribal member Henry C. Lafferty, who, in a series of letters to the Secretary,
urged him to "hurry up the process of removing restrictions and cutting red tape." Any
doubts Lane may have entertained were erased when he received a petition from thirty-two
of Lafferty's tribesmen, supporting his plan. 108
A few days after receiving the Cheyenne River petition, Lane appointed Interior
Department Inspector Major James McLaughlin and Frank A. Thackery of the Pima Indian
School in Arizona to "[ascertain] just what Indians should be allowed to handle their own
affairs." At each reservation, the two would be joined by the local superintendent as the
third member of the competency

c o m m is s io n .

109 Thackery apparently had doubts about

his new role. In a letter to the Indian Rights Association's Matthew K. Sniffen, he asked
questions about the workings of a competency commission, the most revealing of which
was, "Do you think it would be advisable to force citizenship upon thoroughly competent
Indians who do not desire it? , ,

110

Lane and Sells’ new policy produced the results expected by Indian officers in the
field. Delivery of fee-patents at the Yankton Agency invited a "mad rush by land buyers,"
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and Superintendent Leech feared that "the Secretary [would] feel very much disappointed
over results [there]." 111 When the competency commissioners, accompanied by Secretary
Lane and a film crew, arrived on the Santee Sioux Reservation to conduct an elaborate
citizenship ceremony, they discovered that at least twenty-five Santee patentees had already
arranged to sell their lands for about one-half their value. Unperturbed, Lane withheld the
patents in question and continued with the ceremony, before a "large and appreciative
audience." 1

In Thurston County, land speculators became even bolder under the

liberalized fee-patenting rules. Through an Indian Department informant, they knew when
each Indian patent would be issued, and were able to snap up the land before the local
superintendent had the paperwork. Real estate brokers often used liquor to pry Omahas
loose from their lands, and on several occasions actually held drunken Indians captive until
their fee-patents came through, then induced them to turn over their deeds for practically
nothing. 11^
In 1916, Superintendent W. A. Leech expressed his concern for Yankton Sioux
children who would likely become landless because of wholesale fee-patenting on their
reservation.! 14 Seven years earlier, shortly before the trust period for the old Omaha
allotments was due to expire, Interior Secretary James R. Garfield suddenly realized that
over 500 Omaha children had not been issued allotments. The oversight dated back to the
1882 Omaha Allotment Act and the government's failure to issue a trust patent for the
unallotted tribal lands. Section Eight of the original act provided that each Omaha child bom
before the end of the trust period (July 10, 1909), should receive an allotment from these
"excess" lands, but for some unexplained reason, these allotments were never made. The
only lands allotted to Omaha children after 1882 were the additional acreages provided for
in the act of March 3, 1893. Now the Interior Department determined that each child bom
after March 3, 1893 was entitled to forty acres of land. 115

250
The government had a problem. In 1909, there were 520 living Omaha children
who had been bom after 1893, and only 4,500 acres of unallotted land. It appeared that
Secretary Garfield had two choices; he could allot forty acres to only 112 children, leaving
the rest landless, a plan fiercely fought by Omaha parents, or he could divide the acreage
equally, giving each child only 8.6 acres of sometimes marginal land, too little to farm or to
lease. But Omaha Superintendent John Commons offered a third alternative. Why not, he
suggested, sell the 4,500 acres, which were worth approximately $100,000, and give each
child an equal share of about $192,116 Garfield took Commons' advice, with the
stipulation that each young Omaha's money would remain in the United States Treasury at
five percent interest until he or she reached age twenty-five. This plan would net an Omaha
fifteen-year-old the grand sum of $285,117
The Interior Department had not yet finished with these unfortunate Omaha
children. True, the proceeds from 4,500 acres of land would be divided 520 ways, but
before one Omaha child received one cent, the $3,000 cost of implementing the land sales
would be deducted from the profits, meaning that landless children would pay for a twentyfive-year-old governm ent e rro r.H 8 In early 1910, a new Interior Secretary, R. A.
Ballinger, found another way to reduce the children's share of the land proceeds. Since
young Omahas would benefit most from increased property values after the completion of
an ongoing reservation drainage project, Ballinger proposed that the project's $600 cost be
subtracted before the children could receive their shares.
Having disposed of the embarrassing problem of children's allotments, with the
Omahas' concurrence, Congress passed an act on May 11, 1912 "to provide for the
disposal of the unallotted land on the Omaha Indian Reservation. . . . " Not all of the land
would be sold: forty-nine acres was reserved for the Indian agency; the Omahas could
select ten acres to be used as a tribal cemetery, and the Presbyterian Church retained ten
acres. Two acres of the grounds of the old Presbyterian mission would be deeded to the
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Nebraska State Historical Society, and a 164-acre town-site would be surveyed and platted.
The act authorized the Interior Secretary to survey, appraise, and sell forty acre tracts of the
remaining land. No one person could purchase more than 160 acres, and Omahas whose
allotments were being eroded by the Missouri River could choose new farms from the
unallotted lands. Their original aliotmentswould then be sold. 120
There was some question as to which Omahas could apply for new allotments to
replace eroded ones. The Interior Department finally ruled that those allottees whose lands
had entirely disappeared and those who had inherited lands subject to erosion could
exchange their lands. Those whose property was close to the river but not actually in
danger, could not. 121 The problem of lands in litigation added to the confusion over the
sale of the remaining unallotted lands. In March 1914, Assistant Indian Commissioner C.
F. Hauke informed Superintendent John Spear that six of the seven applications for new
allotments due to erosion were for lands currently involved in lawsuits. Hauke assured the
Omaha superintendent that as soon as court decisions were received, the Indians involved
would be notified. In the meantime, to expedite land sales, he urged those allottees to make
other

s e le c tio n s .

122 jn early 1915, new Omaha superintendent Axel Johnson inquired

about the disputed allotments. Hauke reminded Johnson that nothing could be done
regarding substitute allotments for the six patient applicants until the lawsuits cleared the
courts. Once more, he urged the Indians to choose other lands. 123
The six Omaha allottees would have a long wait. In 1914, attorneys John L.
Webster and Hiram Chase filed twenty-one suits with the Federal District Court that would
determine ownership of the remaining Omaha tribal lands. W ebster and the United States
Attorney agreed that, regardless of the outcome, when the court handed down its rulings,
they would take one decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals as a test case. The others
would await the Appeals Court verdict. In March 1915, two cases came before Appeals
Court Judge W alter H. Sanborn. Interestingly, one involved land claimed by Hiram
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Chase. 124 Chase asserted that as sole heir of his mother, Clarissa Chase, he owned the
forty acres assigned to her in 1870 by the terms of the 1865 treaty. Another Omaha, Rose
W olf Setter, claimed the same land as widow and sole survivor of Reuben Setter, who was
allotted the forty acres in 1899 and received a trust patent for it in March 1902, under the
1882 Omaha Allotment Act. The questions involved were whether the land assignment in
1870 was a title, or merely permission to occupy the land, and whether the provisions of
the 1882 act superseded all other agreements. 125 The Eighth District Court had found in
favor of Rose W olf Setter, but in April 1915, Judge Sanborn overturned the earlier
decision and awarded the disputed land to Chase, ruling that his mother did have title to the
allotment. 126
When the Attorney General's office informed Assistant Indian Commissioner E. B.
Meritt of the Appeals Court decision, Meritt voiced his disagreement. He believed that the
1882 act took precedence over the earlier treaty, and that Mrs. W olf Setter should have the
land. Because of his disagreement and the far-reaching implications of the ruling in this
case, Meritt recommended that the Attorney General take the matter to the United States
Supreme Court. 127 in hjs objections, Meritt faulted Judge Sanborn for not following the
opinions of two earlier cases involving Omaha Thomas Sloan. Sanborn had reviewed the
Sloan cases, but decided that they were too dissimilar to the Chase litigation to be cited as
precedents. 128
On July 21, 1915, First Assistant Interior Secretary A. A. Jones asked the Attorney
General to present the Chase-Wolf Setter claims to the Supreme Court. On April 24, 1916,
the high court heard the arguments, but refused to render a decision. Instead, the justices
asked for the Court of Appeals records so that they could further review the case. 129
Finally, on November 5, 1917, more than three years after the suit had first been filed in
District Court, the Supreme Court rendered its verdict. Stating that Hiram Chase's mother
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merely had the right to occupy the forty disputed acres, the court ruled in favor of Rose
W olf Setter. As a result, future reservation land disputes would be decided in favor of
Omahas who were granted allotments in 1882.130
W hile Omaha allottees remained on their eroding lands and awaited the Supreme
Court's decision, the Nebraska State Historical Society enlarged its reservation preserve
and tribal leaders ensured their people adequate burial grounds by correcting a deficiency in
the 1912 land sales act. Neither the tribe nor the Historical Society was content with the
terms of the May 1912 act. Walthill attorney Harry L. Keefe complained that the two-acre
Presbyterian mission site earmarked for transfer to the Society did not include an historic
spring-house and cemetery. Keefe hoped to enlarge the Historical Society's tract so that
these points of interest could also be preserved, and he asked the Omaha Agency clerk to
bring his request to the Indian Department's atten tio n . 131 Upon learning of Keefe's
request, Commissioner Cato Sells asked Francis La Flesche to attend a tribal meeting and
ascertain whether his people would agree to enlarge their land donation to the Historical
Society. 132
In late November, 1913, Keefe informed Sells that, on behalf of the Historical
Society, he wanted to buy the entire forty-acre tract surrounding the mission. He pointed
out that this land was unfit for farming, and suggested that the Omahas could "well afford
to give the 40 acre tract to [his] society." But barring a donation, the attorney was confident
that the Historical Society could raise enough money to make the purchase. 133 Sells in turn
notified the Omaha superintendent that he would try to enact legislation to include the
spring-house and cemetery in the Society's land patent, but he saw no need to rush, since
the Nebraska legislature would have to approve funds for the historic site. 134 Unless
Keefe and the Historical Society wanted to pursue the mission preservation immediately,
Sells suggested that it would be better to issue the patent when all the lands were ready for
sale. 135 The Omahas apparently refused to give up the additional thirty-eight acres without
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compensation, for in January 1915, the State Historical Society agreed to buy the extra
land. H arry Kccfe appeared especially anxious to secure the property. He told
Superintendent Axel Johnson that if the land could be made available before the rest of the
unallotted parcels, he and two other Society members would buy it and be reimbursed later.
He intended to ask the legislature to designate the entire forty acres as an "historical
monument. "136
In the original draft of the 1912 act to sell unallotted Omaha lands, the tribe was to
be allowed only a seven-acre burial ground, but before the bill became law, the Interior
Secretary agreed to grant the Indians an additional three acres for cemetery purposes. 137
Before Congress even considered the 1912 legislation, the Omahas had outgrown their
cemetery and had been burying their dead, without congressional approval, on an adjoining
tract to the north of the original burial grounds. In December 1914, Superintendent
Johnson, at the tribe's request, asked the Indian Department to approve their use of the
entire cemetery tract, which now comprised eighteen acres. The Omahas' request arrived
too late to be included in the 1916 Indian Appropriation Act, but Assistant Commissioner
E. B. M eritt promised that, if necessary, his office would support special legislation to
provide the extra land. 138
But the Omahas still were not satisfied, and in April 1915, in council with
Superintendent Johnson, they asked for a total of forty-eight acres on which to bury their
dead. A ssistant Com m issioner M eritt, who had been involved in all the cemetery
negotiations, questioned whether the tribe really intended to use the entire acreage as a
c em etery .

139 At a second tribal council in early June, the Omahas made their final request

to the Indian Department, this time asking for a total of seventy-eight acres of burial
grounds, to be located in two different areas of the reservation. M eritt acceded to their
request and prepared legislation for introduction at the next session of Congress. 140 The
Interior Department agreed that the Omahas' present burial grounds were inadequate, and in
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July 1916, at the urging of Secretary Franklin Lane, Congress approved a bill to set aside
seventy acres of Omaha Reservation land as a tribal cem etery . 141 Like any lands
withdrawn from sale for special purposes, the extra cemetery acres reduced each Omaha
child's share of land sale proceeds. But enlarging the burial grounds benefited the young as
well as the old by ensuring that Omahas would be buried on their own lands, with their
own people.
From the time the Omahas had settled on their reservation, whites in northeast
Nebraska had resented their occupation of that valuable land and had tried to buy it, lease it,
or cheat the Indians out of it. What land whites could not wrest from the Omahas, they
attempted to tax. These were trust lands, and as such, remained tax exempt, but as the
Board of Indian Commissioners had predicted, Omaha trust status was violated time and
again by special legislation. The formation of Thurston County in 1889 marked the real
beginning of the cam paign to tax Omaha lands, and some Nebraska senators and
congressmen became willing county allies by sponsoring Indian tax bills.
For the first three years of its existence, Thurston County made no attempt to tax
Omaha lands, but revenues did not meet expenses. In April 1892, in a bizarre plan to
induce the government to make up their revenue shortfall, county officials entered into a
contract with the ubiquitous Pender "businessman," William E. Peebles. Peebles agreed to
lobby Congress for money for Thurston County in lieu of taxes not forthcoming from
Indian trust lands. In return for successful passage of a tax relief bill, Peebles would
receive ten percent of any money Congress appropriated. Peebles' strange contract did not
sit well with the House Committee on Indian Affairs. On July 26, 1894, the county
received a telegram from Peebles canceling his contract and asking the county
commissioners to officially inform Nebraska Third District Congressman George D.
Meiklejohn that a deal no longer existed between him and the county in the event that a tax
bill p a s s e d . 142
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However, invalidating the Penderite's contract with the county had not ended the
efforts to tax Omaha lands. Perhaps in response to Peebles' lobbying, on September 6,
1893, Representative Meiklejohn had introduced a bill "extending relief to Indian citizens
and for other purposes." Unfortunately, the "other purposes" included taxing the
Omahas. 143 Commissioner of Indian Affairs Daniel M. Browning opposed Meiklejohn's
bill, mainly because it provided that the land taxes would be deducted from the tribal trust
fund, without Indian approval. The bill failed to pass, but its introduction foreshadowed
the coming struggle between whites in Thurston County and the county's overwhelming
Indian majority. 144
Thurston County's tax problems were real. On March 2, 1900, the Pender Times
published a supplement illustrating the county's unique tax situation. According to one
chart, only a little over seven percent of the county's taxable real estate lay within the
Omaha and Winnebago reservations, yet these lands comprised ninety-one percent of the
county. A high crime rate on the reservations necessitated large Indian court costs which
white taxpayers resented paying. It is therefore not surprising that the county wanted to tax
the other ninety-one percent of its land. 145 Early in 1902, nervous Omahas were led to
believe that a law to tax their lands was currently before Congress. When confronted by
concerned Indians, Congressman John S. Robinson assured them that no such bill had
been introduced, and even if it had, it could not become law without violating treaty
rights. 146 The Omahas must have been relieved to learn in 1903 that the United States
Supreme Court had ruled that the treasurer of Roberts County, South Dakota could not tax
the lands, improvements, or personal property of Indians whose lands were held in
trust. 147
Ignoring the high court decision, Thurston County officials stepped up their taxing
campaign. On June 13, 1905, the County Board of Equalization passed a resolution
requiring that all funds from heirship lands deposited in individual Omaha accounts be
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added to the tax list, and ordered Superintendent John MacKey to turn over Omaha deposit
records. MacKey refused, and on June 14, the Equalization Board met again and instructed
County Assessor Thomas Pollack to go to the Omaha Agency and bring back a list of the
names of all Omahas having money on deposit in banks or in other institutions. Pollack
apparently got the names, for on June 19, the board had in its possession a printed list,
along with increases in assessment due to heirship deposits. 148

activity did not go

unnoticed. In late July, the United States District Attorney filed suit in Circuit Court, asking
Judge W. H. Munger to grant a temporary injunction prohibiting Thurston County from
pursuing its taxation policy. A deputy United States marshal then notified the county clerk
and treasurer that they could not tax or attempt to tax money in Omaha accounts. 149
In September 1905, the government once more took its complaint against Thurston
County to the Eighth Circuit Court, this time to request a ruling on the legality of Omaha
heirship funds taxation. After hearing the arguments, Judge Munger, citing the freedom
given Indians by the Heff decision, and arguing that monies from heirship lands were
deposited to the credit of individual Indians, ruled that these accounts could be taxed "the
same as the property of any ordinary citizen." Interestingly, Omaha attorney Thomas Sloan
represented Thurston County before Judge Munger. 150 Upon receipt of a telegram from
Omaha informing him of the judge's decision, Indian Commissioner Francis E. Leupp
instructed the Attorney General to have the United States Attorney appeal the ruling. 151
Six months later, with Thomas Sloan once more representing Thurston County, the Court
of Appeals overturned Judge Munger's decision. In the opinion of Judge W alter H.
Sanborn, "the lands and their proceeds, so long as they are held or controlled by the United
States and the term of the trust has not expired . . . are not subject to taxation by any state
or county," 1^2 Judge Sanborn's ruling was a rare Omaha victory, but the county continued
to take advantage of any opportunity to produce revenue at Indian expense. Section Two of
a reservation drainage act of February 18, 1909 provided that up to $240 could be
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demanded of each Omaha allottee to protect his or her land from flooding. County officials,
of course, took full advantage of this "tax" windfall. 1^3
But the big blow fell in 1910, when Nebraska Senator Norris Brown introduced a
bill in Congress to tax Omaha lands. Nebraska's Third District Congressman, James F.
Latta, a member of the House Indian Affairs Committee, and South Dakota Representative
Charles Burke shepherded Brown's bill through the House. 154 Qn April 27, congressmen
nearly came to blows over Brown’s tax proposal. Burke presented the case for Thurston
County, arguing that despite President Taft's Omaha trust period extension in 1909, it was
unfair for the Indians to remain tax-exempt, since they had paid no taxes for twenty-five
years and owned nearly all the county's land. Using county officials' standard argument,
Burke claimed that taxation would benefit the Omahas, with improved roads and schools
increasing their property values. Representative John J. Fitzgerald of New York had no
real aversion to taxing Indians, but he was concerned that paying taxes to Thurston County
would bankrupt the Omahas, and Congress would then have to support them. Oklahoma
Congressman Charles D. Carter objected to Senator Brown's attempt to tax allotments still
in trust, and asked Burke, "Is not that a new departure in Indian

le g is la tio n ? "

155

In a letter accompanying reports from both the Senate and House Indian Affairs
Committees, Interior Secretary R. A. Ballinger enumerated a host of reasons to tax Omaha
property: 1) because of low revenues, Thurston County had no courthouse and could not
afford to prosecute Indian crimes; 2) Indians paid no taxes while requiring high
expenditures, especially in court costs; and 3) the county was in debt. The Secretary agreed
that the trust period had been a good idea, but he also believed that it was time for the
Omahas to take on the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship. Omahas, he argued,
could afford to pay taxes. Most leased their lands, and in February 1910, the Indian Office
had been authorized to pay them the balance from their federal trust fund. Finally, echoing
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Charles Burke, Ballinger claimed that the increase in the Omahas1property values over the
next ten years would more than equal their tax bill. 156
On May 6, 1910, Congress passed the "Brown Act," which dictated that all Omaha
lands allotted prior to 1885 would now be "subject to appraisement and assessment for the
purposes of taxation and subject to taxation for local, school district, road district, county,
and state purposes as provided by the laws of the State of Nebraska. . . . " The law
included the following provisions: 1) lands could not be sold for unpaid taxes; 2) if taxes
remained unpaid one year after they became due, the Thurston County treasurer could
report delinquencies to the Interior Secretary, who was then authorized to pay the taxes
from rent money on deposit; 3) however, if no funds were available, that year's taxes
would be excused. 157 The Brown Act effectively reversed Judge Sanborn's ruling in
United States v. Thurston Countv. and conflicted with Part Three, Section Four of the
Enabling Act of April 1864, which admitted Nebraska to statehood and dictated that "no
taxes shall be imposed by the State on lands or property therein belonging to or which may
be purchased by the United States." 158
At a meeting in Macy, Nebraska in November 1910, attended by Congressman
Latta and county officials, Senator Norris Brown's private secretary began to explain the
new taxation act to a large group of Omahas, and soon found him self defending the
legislation. Nearly all of the Indians objected to the Brown Act; Silas Wood blamed county
officials for its passage, and Hiram Chase criticized Congress for passing the bill without
Indian consent. Latta pointed out that an Omaha delegation present in Washington while the
bill was being debated had voiced no objections. 159 i n 1915, Indian Commissioner Cato
Sells denied that the "taxation of the Omaha lands impose[d] any great hardship on the
Indians." 160 But chief Indian Department Inspector E. B. Linnen disagreed. Omahas had
complained to him that lessees were deducting their Indian landlords' taxes from their rent
payments, thus depriving the Omahas of income. The provision of the Brown Act allowing
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those Omahas with no money in the bank to have their taxes excused was an open
invitation for Indians to withdraw their deposits to avoid being taxed. It was especially
unfair that some Omahas paid taxes while others did not. Ultimately, non-competent
Indians with no control over their own funds bore the heaviest tax burden. 161
President Taft's 1909 order had extended the trust period on "old" Omaha
allotments to July 10, 1919. Nearly four years before the new expiration date, forces were
at work ensuring that the first trust extension would be the last. On November 16, 1915,
Walthill, Nebraska citizens met to discuss the issue. A Pender banker, who could not be
present, nevertheless expressed his views. George J. Adams, cashier of the Pender State
Bank, adamantly opposed any further trust extensions. In his opinion, the President had
over-stepped his authority in granting the first one, and he was convinced that "if [the
Omahas [were] not now capable of manageing [sic] their own affairs they never [would]
be." It was the duty of the United States, he insisted, to free up Omaha lands for taxation,
since Thurston County had "incurred obligations" anticipating Omaha tax revenues. 162
Eighth Circuit Court Judge Guy T. Graves, who should not have become involved in the
dispute, also opposed further trust extensions, citing the unfairness to both white and
Indian Thurston County taxpayers. Graves emphasized that even with the Brown Act in
effect, less than fifty percent of county lands were taxed, and he wanted to see all Indian
allottees share the burden. 163
Also in 1915, an Omaha "committee," whose members included attorneys Hiram
Chase and Thomas Sloan, joined local whites in opposing further trust extensions. Both
Chase and Sloan had been involved in shady land deals in the past, and their presence on
the committee made it suspect. Their fellow Indians apparently did not trust the two Omaha
attorneys. Early in 1916, the editors of Indian School Journal reprinted an article from an
Indian newspaper whose author suspected that the committee's leaders wanted their
people's lands. 164 But at least one admirer considered the group public-spirited citizens
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with "absolutely no ulterior motives." This anonymous letter writer praised the committee's
efforts to end the trust period, calling their campaign "a great cause" that would "benefit
both . . . the much down trodden and abused Indian, and the taxpayers of Thurston
County. "1^5
Indian Department employees familiar with conditions on the Omaha Reservation
unanimously supported a second trust extension. In 1915, Inspectors E. B. Linnen and E.
M. Sweet, Jr. reported that eighty-seven percent of the Omahas who had been issued land
patents had sold their property, and they "strongly recommend[ed] that "in the best interests
of these Indians . . . this trust period should be extended for another ten years. . . ."
Linnen and Sweet also informed their superiors that because of his concerns, Axel Johnson
had recommended the issuance of only one fee-patent in his first seven months as Omaha
s u p e r in te n d e n t.

1^6 Johnson, one of only a handful of white men to truly befriend the

Omahas in the early twentieth century, urged the government to extend the trust period so
that they could keep their l a n d s . 167
In 1916, the Omaha trust extension issue became moot as Thurston County and
Congress found ways to tax the remaining Omaha lands. Section Twelve of that year's
Indian Appropriation Act included an assessment against Omaha allottees' patents in fee
that violated the "letter and spirit" of both the 1882 Omaha Allotment Act and the Dawes
Act of 1887, which promised that all allotments would be issued "free of all charges or
incrumbrances

w h a ts o e v e r ."

168 Drainage ditches were to be constructed upon certain

Omaha allotments, and the offending appropriation act required that Indians owning these
parcels be assessed up to ten dollars per acre for the cost of construction. When any Omaha
received a patent to land within the drainage district before the assessment was paid, the
unpaid drainage taxes would become a first lien against the property— an obvious
"encumbrance." 169
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To please their constituents, in 1916, both Nebraska Senator Norris Brown and
Third District Representative Dan V. Stephens introduced bills to tax Omaha allotments
issued in 1885 or later and therefore not covered by the 1910 Brown Act. In pushing his
bill, Congressman Stephens claimed that "there [were] few, if any, either white or Indian
who [were] opposed to its passage." Stephens was wrong; although a few Omahas backed
the bill, believing that more lands to tax would reduce their own liabilities, most Omahas
opposed the legislation. 170 Both Thurston County and the Nebraska lawmakers appeared
anxious to rush the bill through Congress. Citing the heavy tax burden of the county's
white minority, the Senate hastily approved the legislation on May 27, 1916.171
To bolster their case on Capitol Hill, the Thurston County Commissioners had
hired noted Washington, D. C. Indian issues attorney Charles J. Kappler as their lobbyist.
Early in August, both he and Nebraska Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock advised Stephens to
save time by substituting the Senate version of the bill for his own, since it had already
cleared that chamber and therefore would not have to go back for reconsideration. 172 The
Democrat-sponsored bill faced opposition from House Republicans, but Walthill Attorney
Harry Keefe assured Representative Stephens that he would use his political influence to
convince House M inority Leader James R. Mann to drop his objections. The House
approved the bill in December with just one insignificant word

change.

173 No high

ranking Interior Department official raised a hand to stop this unfair legislation; Secretary
Franklin Lane had no objections to taxing all Omaha lands as long as they could not be sold
if taxes became delinquent. 174
Probably because of his unflagging efforts to put Omaha lands on the Thurston
County tax rolls, the Walthill [Nebraska] Citizen urged all Indians on the reservation to
vote for Dan Stephens, "their truely [sic] good

fr ie n d ."

175 Dan Stephens was no Indian's

friend, as he proved in a December 18, 1916 letter to Pender Republic editor E. L. Barker:
"It gives me pleasure to advise you that I have today secured the passage through the
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House of the bill taxing Indian lan d s.. . . I am veiy glad indeed to have been able to render
this service to the people of your county." 176 On December 30, 1916, the disastrous
Brown-Stephens Act became law. Under its Section Two, all allotments issued in 1885 or
later, whether or not they were still in trust, would be taxed. As in the earlier Brown Act,
taxes could be deducted from Indians' funds, but would be excused if no money was
available, and lands could not be forfeited for unpaid taxes. 177 Thurston County officials
aggressively implemented the Brown-Stephens Act, taxing trust lands and, in some cases,
violating the new law by selling the lands of penniless Indians who could not pay their
taxes. For its part, the Interior Department abetted the county's taxation efforts by
arbitrarily designating July 10, 1919 as the expiration date for the trust periods of even the
"new" 1893 allotments, which were scheduled to remain under government protection until
1925, 1926, or even 1929.178
With the aid of Congress, and at a tremendous cost to its Indian majority, Thurston
County had largely solved its revenue problems by late 1916. But the Omahas' troubles
had escalated. Local merchants continued to skirt the law by charging Indians usurious
interest on loans and inflated prices for goods, and liquor remained a problem despite the
best efforts of law enforcem ent officers. The tribe did receive another trust period
extension, in 1919, but it made little difference, since "special legislation" had already taken
away most government protection. Hundreds of unfortunate Omaha children, bom after
1893, had received little more than pocket change from the sale of their people's last
unallotted lands, and many Indian adults were now both landless and poverty-stricken.
For decades, white and Indian land speculators and government officials had "used
every method, fair and foul," to separate Omahas from their valuable lands. 179 By 1916,
nearly ninety percent of Omaha allottees holding fee-patents had either sold their lands or
taken mortgages they could not repay, and the property they managed to keep could now be
taxed. In an address before the Nebraska State Historical Society in 1928, Omaha tribal
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member William F. Springer traced his people's "greater hardships" to the 1906 Burke Act
and the discretionary powers that it granted the Secretary of the Interior. 180 Springer was
probably correct. As damaging as it was, the sale of heirship property, legalized in 1902,
involved only a small percentage of reservation lands. But the Burke Act made possible the
1910 competency commission and its tragic consequences.
Except for isolated, minor victories, the years 1902-1916 had been disastrous for
the struggling Omahas. Because of their perceived high degree of acculturation, they had
been forced to become "independent" much too soon. Now, surrounded by hostile whites,
victimized by some of their own tribal members, and at the mercy of bureaucrats, they had
become pawns in the struggle to control prime Nebraska lands. In 1896, anthropologist
Alice Fletcher had marveled at the resilience of the allotted Indian: "That he stands at all
under his burden is a wonder; that he staggers as he walks should not surprise us; that he
falls often should not destroy our hope in him, or relax our efforts to help." 181. To face the
future after decades of such "help," the Omahas would need all the strength they could
muster.
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CONCLUSION

The [Sacred] Pole stands for the authority of your ancestral ways. The spirit of these ways
remains strong within you. That spirit does not depend upon particular material things from
the past like hunting buffalo or living in earth lodges as your ancestors did. It lives on in
the generosity with which you live your lives. It lives in the help and respect you give to
one another. It lives in the blessings you pass on to those who come after you. .. .1
Robin Ridington, August 1989

A Study of the Omaha people during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
represents a microcosm of the government's general policy-making toward Native
Americans. Perhaps because the Omahas had always befriended Americans and cooperated
with the government, federal program after federal program had its beginnings on their
reservation. Nearly every one failed miserably, and government officials appeared to learn
nothing from this experimentation. In their zeal to assim ilate Indians, they ignored
warnings from concerned agents and from the Omahas themselves, and blindly applied the
same disastrous policies to other unsuspecting tribes throughout the United States.
The governm ent seldom honored its commitments to the Omahas. Repeated
promises of protection from the Sioux never produced tangible results, and treaty
obligations of mills, blacksmiths, and teachers were only slowly implemented. Likewise,
the tribe often waited years for annuities, and proceeds from land sales met delay after
delay. On the other hand, Congress acted quickly to accommodate Thurston County whites
in their campaigns to tax Omaha lands and alienate Indian allotments. By late 1916, the
Omahas' future was bleak. The newly enacted Brown-Stephens Act ensured that
henceforth all allotments would be taxed, and tribal members saw their precious lands
rapidly slipping away. Merchants who had systematically cheated the Indians conducted
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"business as usual," and alcohol remained a serious problem. These concerns, along with
the violation of their trust agreements, threatened the tribe's survival.
Many times in the past, explorers, reformers, and Indian agents had predicted the
Omahas' demise. In 1800, travelers along the Missouri River believed smallpox had
virtually ended their existence as a tribe, and during the height of the Sioux attacks in the
1840s, Indian agents worried that the Omaha nation would starve to death or be
annihilated. In 1888, even the usually optimistic Alice Fletcher thought the people's culture
was dying and that the tribe might not endure. Fletcher and Francis La Flesche, fearing that
the Omahas' Sacred Pole and its cultural secrets would be buried along with its last
"keeper," Yellow Smoke, persuaded the elderly man to allow them to transfer the
"Venerable Man" to the Peabody Museum at Harvard University for safe-keeping.^
In her 1932 study of the Omahas (the "Antlers"), anthropologist Margaret Mead
claimed that the tribe's culture had only "the shadow of [its former] rich complexity," and
thirty-three years later, in a new introduction to her book, she was even more pessimistic,
referring to the Omahas as a "culturally deprived" people.3 True, the goal of many
reformers, government officials, and missionaries had been to dilute Omaha culture and to
assimilate the people into the white world. They had partially succeeded, as traditional
Omaha government had disintegrated with allotment, and many tribal customs had been
temporarily abandoned. But, in more recent times, anthropologist Robin Ridington and
Nebraska folklorist Roger Welsch have vehemently denied that the Omahas are or ever
were "culturally deprived." Even Margaret Mead, while announcing the end of the Omahas
as a distinct culture, admitted that the tribe remained "emotionally bound" to an Indian
identity.4 Ridington argues that, despite pressure to assimilate, the tribe has remained
determined to devise "some means by which the bands of the tribe might be kept together
and the tribe itself saved from extinction. "5 Omaha culture has survived during the past
century in music, oratory, games, and annual powwows held in Macy, Nebraska. Welsch,

282
a student of the Omahas and an adopted member of the tribe, insists that "there is scarcely
an Omaha occasion without opportunity for speech-making, gift-giving, and music— three
pervasive characteristics of Omaha culture. "6
The Omahas have kept their culture alive throughout the twentieth century, and
recently, events of great importance have contributed to a tribal cultural renaissance. In the
1980s, the Omahas reestablished the Hethu shka or Warrior Society, whose aim is to "keep
alive the memory of historic and valorous acts," and to reacquaint the people with their
ancestral customs.^ The tribe also recently received remastered wax cylinder recordings of
their music that had originally been gathered by Francis La Flesche at the turn of the
century. Likewise, many young Omahas are becoming vitally interested in learning and
preserving tribal traditions. One teenager told the Peabody Museum curator, "Our young
generations of Omahas do cherish the sacred ways. . . . Just as our elders have kept and
are teaching us the ways now, we will teach the future Omahas."^
One event above all others defines the Omaha cultural renewal. In 1988, exactly
100 years after Yellow Smoke surrendered the Sacred Pole, his great-great-grandson once
more touched the tribe's most sacred object. In an emotional ceremony conducted in a
courtyard outside the Peabody Museum, the Sacred Pole was officially returned to its
rightful owners. On July 12, 1989, a Creek Indian artist associated with the museum
accompanied the "Venerable Man" as he returned to Nebraska. Today, the Sacred Pole
rests at the Center for Great Plains Studies in Lincoln as he awaits his final journey to a
planned Omaha cultural center on the reservation.9
Although culturally rich, the Omahas have faced economic impoverishment during
the last century. But in 1992, with the opening of Casino Omaha a few miles west of
Onawa, Iowa, tribal financial fortunes began to improve. In 1992, each of the
approximately 5,000 tribal members received $1,000.00 from casino profits, and the
following year, the casino's management made a $500.00 per capita distribution. 10 Even
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more important, gambling revenues have made possible much-needed programs and
improvements that will benefit all Omahas. The most visible improvement is repair of
reservation roads, but casino profits have also paid for renovation of the Macy public
school, scholarships for Indian students, expansion of health-care facilities and nutrition
programs, reduction of tribal debt, and an emergency youth shelter. H
Casino Omaha is not a "cure-all" for the tribe's financial woes. Although it utilizes
largely Indian employees, the gambling establishment is neither a sure source of future
tribal income nor a solid economic base on which to build a tribal future. Despite the recent
financial windfall, the Omaha people still face serious problems. Many Omahas lack higher
education, and many are unemployed. As a result, a large percentage of families continue to
live in poverty. Alcoholism, a legacy of the earliest contact with whites, continues to plague
the tribe, and many babies are bom with fetal alcohol syndrome. Nevertheless, tribal
members express eternal hope. Seventy-nine-year-old form er Omaha health director
Pauline Tyndall sees better days ahead: "I think things are looking up for us. We've been
so weary here— almost without a future." 12
In the impassioned words of anthropologist Robin Ridington, Native Americans
"survive as communities of relations. They survive in ceremonies and prayers. They
survive in the gifts they give to honor one another. . . . They survive in cities and on
reservations. They survive as nations. . . ."13 The Omahas are survivors. They have
weathered decades of exploitation by land-hungry whites. They have endured the wellintentioned but often misguided efforts of reformers. Their children reluctantly surrendered
their Indian names and Omaha language to ethnocentric missionaries, and they survived the
unfair laws designed to separate them from their lands. Many tribal members today remain
on that tiny portion of their ancestral lands that became home to their forefathers in 1854.
Through all of their trials, the people have retained their rich tribal culture and their distinct
identity as the Omaha Nation. Today, tribal members struggle to maintain their Indian ways
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in a predominantly non-Indian society. In 1984, tribal historian Dennis Hastings addressed
his people's challenge to survive in a bi-cultural world as he cautioned, "We have to take
the good from our own Omaha ways and the good from non-Indian ways and try to go
forward now. "14 Hopefully, with the Venerable Man once more among them, the Omaha
people will go forward into a brighter future.
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APPENDIX I

A treaty o f peace and friendship, made and concluded between William
Clark, Ninian Edwards, and Auguste Chouteau, Commissioners
R atifie d D e c.26,1815.
Plenipotentiary o f the Un ited States o f America, on the part and
behalf o f the said States, o f the one pa rt; and the Chief s and War
riors o f the Mahas, on the part and behalf o f said Tribe or Nation,
o f the other part.
J u ly 20, Is is .

i siat.. 1-jo.

T h e parties being desirous of re-establishing peace and friendship
between the United States and the said tribe or nation, and of being
placed in all things, and in every respect, on the same footing upon
which they stood before the late war between the United States and
G reat Britain, have agreed to the following articles:
ir!v"nm e s ’ et°" for
A r t i c l e 1 . Every injury or act of hostility committed by one or
either of the contracting parties against the other, shall be mutually
forgiven and forgot.
frienc^htipa leItcRCeand
A r t . 2 . There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between all
the citizens of the United States of America and all the individuals
composing the tribe or nation of the Mahas, and all friendlj’ relations
that existed between them before the war, shall be, and the same are
hereby, renewed.
s ta t^ teacknno w i e d ^
A r t . 3 . The undersigned chiefs and warriors, for themselves and
their said tribe or nation, do hereby acknowledge themselves and their
tribe or nation to be under the protection of the United States, and of
no other nation, power, or sovereign, whatsoever.
In witness whereof, the said William Clark, Ninian Edwards, and
Auguste Chouteau, commissioners as aforesaid, and the chiefs and
warriors of the aforesaid tribe or nation, have hereunto subscribed
their names and affixed their seals, this twentieth day of Ju ly , in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifteen, and of the
•ndependence of the United States the fortieth.

William Clark,
[ l. s.
W a a n o w r a b a i , o r t h e b l a c k b i r d ’s
Ninian Edwards,
ft*, s.
_ g ra n d s o n , h is x m a r k ,
[ l. s. ]
e e , o r t h e p o i n t m a k e r , h i s xAuguste Chouteau,
[ l- 3Oupaatanga, or the big elk, his x
mark,
[ l. s.]
m ark,
[ l . s . ] Toireechee, or the cow's rib, his x
Waslicamanie, or the hard walker,
m ark,
[ l. s.]
his x mark,
[ l . s . ] Manshaquita, or the little soldier,
Kaaheeguia, or the old chief, his x
his x mark,
[u s .]
m ark,
[ l . s . ] Pissinguai, or he who has no gall,
his x mark,
[ h s.]

Done at Portage des Sioux, in presence of—
R. Wash, secretary to the commission,
Jo h n Miller, colonel Third Infantry,
R. Paul, C. T. of the C.
Edw. Hall, lieutenant late Twenty-eighth
Infantry,
4
Jo h n B. Clark, adjutant Third Infantry,
Manuel Lisa, agent,.

Thos. Forsyth, Indian agent,
J. W. Johnson, Indian agent,
Louis Decouagne,
Louis Dorion,
John A. Cameron,
Jacques Mette.

PORTAGE DES SIOUX TREATY - 1815
Charles J. Kappler, comp, and ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 115
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APPENDIX II

TREATY WITH THE MAHAS.
A rticles o f a convention made on the tw e n ty -th ir d d a y o f Septem ber , one thousand e ig h t hundred and twenty^g
C a m p C ouncil B lu ffs on the M issouri river , between H e n ry A tk in so n , brigadier general o f U nited States arm^
a n d B enjam in O ' t'a llo n %In d ia n ag ent f a r the tribes on the 3fissouri , being sp ecia lly auth o rized thereto ij
the S ecreta ry o f W a r y a n d the undersigned chiefs a n d headmen o f the M a h a nation o f In d ia n s f duly author,
iz e d a n d empowered by sa id nation.
A r t i c l e 1. T h e undersigned chiefs and h e a d m e n o f the M aha nalion o f In d ia n s, for them selves, and In behalf
o f their nation, cede and relinquish to the U nited S ta te s all right, title, interest, and claim which they have,#
e v e r had, to a tra c t o f fifteen miles s q u a re o f the c o u n try around Council Bluff, to be b o u n d e d by due east, wen,
north, an d south lines, and so located th a t the ilag-staff in the a re a o f the new c a n to n m e n t cn Council Bluff shall be
the c e n tre o f the aforesaid tra c t o f fifteen miles squ a re .
A r t . 2. T h e said I i c n r y A tk in s o n , brigad ier general o f U nited States a rm y , a n d B e n ja m in O ’F allon, Indian age#
for the tribes on the M issouri, on the part o f the U n ite d S ta te s , hereby stipulate and a g r e e th a t, in consideration of
the re lin q u ish m en t o f title by the M a h a n ation, as sta te d in the p re ce d in g artic le , the U n ite d S ta te s will pay to tbe
M a h a nation th irty sm oo th -b ored guns, one nest o f brass kettles, s ix ty -th re e point M a c k i n a w b lank ets, two hundred
and tw e nty-fiv e y a rd s o f strouding, two h u n d re d p o und s o f po w der, four h u ndre d po u n d s o f lead, in balls, one thou,
sand flints, forty-eig ht dozen belt kn iv es, and two h un d re d and fifty pounds o f to b a cc o , in o r before the month of
J u n e next, at this place, provided this co nv en tion is duly ratified by the G o v e r n m e n t o f the U n ite d States.
A r t . 3. T h e U nited S ta te s g r a n t to the M a h a nation the privilege o f h unting o n such parts of the aforesaid
ced ed tr a c t as m a y not be used for m ilitary p u rp o se s, tra d in g establishm ents, farm in g, a n d ran g e for stock.
D one a t the p lace and on the d a y and y e a r first ab ov e written.
H . A T K I N S O N , B r ig . G en. U. S . Amy.
B. O ’F A L L O N , U. S . In d ia n Agent.
[S ig n e d , also, by the chiefs and h e a d m e n o f the M ah a Indians.]

W e certify that the foregoing a g r e e m e n t has bcen.faithfu lly in te rp re te d to the chiefs a n d h e a d m e n who hare sabscrib ed to the within articles.
J O H N D O U G H E RT Y , U. S . I n d ian A gen t a n d In terprctcr.
M I C H A E L B A R D A , Interpreter.

TREATY WITH THE MAHAS - 1820
American State Papers. Indian Affairs, vol. 2, 226.
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APPENDIX III

TR EA TY W IT H TH E MAKAH T R IB E , 1825.
O c t. 6, 1825.
7 S ta t., 282.
P r o c la m a tio n , F e b .
6, 1826.

F o r the purpose of perpetuating the friendship which has heretofora
existed, as also to remove all future cause of discussion or dissension,
as it respects trade and friendship between the United States and their
citizens, and the Maha tribe of Indians, the President of the United
States of America, by Brigadier General H enry Atkinson, of the United
States’ Army, and Major Benjamin O’Fallon, Indian Agent, with full
powers and authority, specially appointed and commissioned for that
purpose, of the one part, and the undersigned Chiefs, Head-men and
Warriors, of the said Maha tribe of Indians, on behalf of their tribe,
of the other part, have made and entered into the following articles
and conditions, which, when ratified by the President of the United
States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall be
binding on both parties—to wit:
A r t ic l e

Supremacy
U n ite d S t a t e s
k n o w le d g e d .

of
ac

1.

It is admitted by the Maha tribe of Indians, that they reside within
the territorial limits of the United States, acknowledge their supremacy,
and claim their protection. The said tribe also admit the right of the
United States to regulate all trade and intercourse with them.
A r t ic l e . 2.

U n ite d S ta te s re 
c e iv e th e m u n d e r
th e i r p ro te c tio n .

The United States agree to receive the Maha tribe of Indians into
their friendship, and under their protection, and to extend to them,
from time to time, such benefits and acts of kindness as may be con
venient, and seem just and proper to the President of the United States.
A r t i c l e 3.

Places for trade to
be designated by the
President.

All trade and intercourse with the Maha tribe shall be transacted at
such place or places as may be designated and pointed out by the Pres
ident of the United States, through his agents: and none but American
citizens, duly authorized by the United States, shall be admitted to
trade or hold intercourse with said tribe of Indians.
A r t ic l e

Regulation of trade.

4.

That the Maha tribe may be accommodated with such articles of
merchandise, &c. as their necessities may demand, the United States
agree to admit and license traders to hold intercourse with said tribe,
under mild and equitable regulations: in consideration of which, the
Maha tribe bind themselves to extend protection to the persons and

FORT ATKINSON TREATY - 1825
Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties, vol. 2,
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 260.
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the property of the traders, and the persons legally employed under
them, whilst they remain within the limits of their particular district of
country. And the said Maha tribe further agree, that if any foreigner,
or other person not legally authorized by the United States, shall come
into their district of country, for the purposes of trade or other views,
they will apprehend such person or persons, and deliver him or them to
some Unitea States’ superintendent or agent of Indian Affairs, or to the
Commandant of the nearest military post, to be dealt with according to
law.—And they further agree to give safe conduct to all persons who
may be legally authorized by the United States to pass tnrough their
countr}T; and to protect in their persons and property, all agents or
other persons sent by the United States to reside temporarily among
them; nor will they, whilst on their distant excursions, molest or inter
ru p t any American citizen or citizens who may be passing from the
United States to New Mexico, or returning from thence to the United
States.
A r t ic l e

5.

That the friendship which is now established between the United 8UedUi^e0^ertu> pr£
States and the Maha tribe should not be interrupted by the miscon- ^duais* etc* by indl
duct of individuals, it is hereby agreed, that, for injuries done by
individuals, no private revenge or retaliation shall take place, but
instead thereof, complaints shall be made by the party injured, to the
superintendent or agent of Indian affairs, or other person appointed
bv the President; and it shall be the duty of said Chiefs, upon com
plaint being made a.s aforesaid, to deliver up the person or persons
against whom the complaint is made, to the end that he or they may
be punished agreeably to the laws of the United States. And, m like
manner, if any robbery, violence, or murder, shall be committed on
any Indian or Indians belonging to said tribe, the person or persons
so offending shall be tried, and if found guilty shall be punished in
like manner as if the injury had been done to a white man. And it is
recover
agreed, that the Chiefs of said Maha tribe shall, to the utmost of their stolen property,
power, exert themselves to recover horses or other property, which
may be stolen or taken from any citizen or citizens of the United
States, by any individual or individuals of said tribe; and the property
so recovered shall be forthwith delivered to the agents or other person
authorized to receive it, that it may be restored to the proper owner.
And the United States hereby guarranty to any Indian or Indians of
said tribe, a full indemnification for any horses or other property
which may be stolen from them by any of their citizens: P rovided, P r o v la o That the property stolen cannot be recovered, and that sufficient proof
is produced that it was actually stolen by a citizen of the United States.
And the said Maha tribe engage, on the requisition or demand of the
President of the United States, or of the agents, to deliver up any
white man resident among them.
A r t ic l e

6.

And the Chiefs and W arriors, as aforesaid, promise and engage, that
their tribe will never, by sale, exchange, or as presents, supply any
nation, tribe, or band of Indians, not in amity with the United States,
with guns, ammunition, or other implements of war.
Done at fort Atkinson, Council Bluffs, this 6th day of October, A. D.
1825, and of the independence of the United States the fiftieth.
In testimony whereof, the said commissioners, Henry Atkinson and
Benjamin O’Fallon, and the chiefs, head men, and warriors of the
Maha tribe, have hereunto set their hands, and affixed their seals.

No jrana, etc., to be
fam ished by them to
those hostile to United
States.

H. Atkinson, brigadier - general
U. S. Army,
[ l. s.]
Benj. O’Fallon, U. S. agent Indian
affairs,
[ l. s .]
Opa-ton-ga, the big elk, his x mark, [ l . s . ]
Ono-shin-ga, the man th a t cooks
little in a small kettle, his x
mark,
[l. s.]
Wash-ca-ma-nee, th e fast walker,
his x mark,
. [ l , 9, ]
Shon-gis-cah, the white horse, his
x mark,
[ l. s. ]
We-du-gue-noh, the deliberator,
his x mark,
[ l. s. ]
Wa-shing-ga-sabba, the black bird,
his x mark,
[ l . s.]

Ta-noh-ga, the buffalo bull, his x
mark,
Tl. s.l
E sh-sta-ra-ba,
, his x m ark, [ l . s . j
Ta-reet-tee, the side of a buffalo,
his x mark,
[ l. s.]
Sa-da-ma-ne, he th at arrives, his x
m ark,
[ l. s.]
Mo-pe-ma-nee, the walking cloud,
his x mark,
[ l . s.]
Momee-shee, he who lays on the
arrows from the num ber th at
pierce hitn, his x mark,
[ l. s. ]
Ma-sha-ke-ta, the soldier, his x
mark,
[ l . s. ]
Te-sha-va-gran, the door of the
lodge, his x mark,
[ l . s.]

In the presence of—
A. L. Langham, secretary to the commis
sion,
A. R. Woo ley, lieutenant-colonel U. S.
Army,
J. Gantt, captain Sixth Infantry,
John Gale, surgeon U. S. Army,

George C- H utter, lieutenant Sixth In 
fantry,
M. W. Batman, lieutenant Sixth Infantry,
G. H. Kennerly, U. S. S. Indian agent,
Michael Burdeau, his x mark, interpreter,
W illiam Rodgers.
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APPENDIX IV

TREATY W IT H T H E SAUK AND FOXES, ETC., 1830.

A rticles o f a treaty m ade a n d concluded by William- Clark SuperinJuly is', im
tenden t o f Indian A ffairs a n d Willoughby Morgan, Col. o f the U nited ’ stat., 328.
States 1st Regt. I n fa n tr y , Commissioners mi behalf o f the U nited 24,i83i.amat °n’ eb'
States on the one gjart, a n d the undersigned Deputations o f the Con
fed e ra ted Tribes o f the Sacs arid Foxes the j\[edawah-Kanton , Wahpacoota, Wahpeton a n d Si*setong R an ds or Tribes o f Sioux / the
Omahas, loways , Ottoes a n d luissourias on the other p a r i.
T h e said T ribes being1a n x io u s to rem ove all causes which may here
a fter create any u n frien d ly fe e lin g betw een them , and b eing also an x
ious to provide other sou rces fo r su p p ly in g their wants besides those

of hunting, which they are sensible must soon entirely fail them; agree
with the U nited States on the following Articles.
A rticle I. The said Tribes cede ana relinquish to the United States
forever all their right and title to the lands lying within the following
boundaries, to wit: B eginningat tb e u p p e rfo rk o f the Demoine River,
and passing the sources of the Little Sioux, and Floyds Rivers, to the
fork of the first creek which falls into the Big Sioux or Calumet on the
east side; thence, down said creek, and Calumet River to the Missouri
River; thence down said Missouri River to the Missouri State line,
above the Kansas; thence along said line to the north west corner of
the said State, thence to the high lands between the waters falling into
the Missouri and Desmoines, passing to said high lands along the divid
ing ridge between the forks of the Grand River; thence along said high
lands or ridge separating the waters of the Missouri from those of the
Demoine, to a point opposite the source of Ik>yer River, and thence in
a direct line to the upper fork of the Demoine, the place of beginning.
But it is understood that the lands ceded and relinquished by this
Treaty, are to be assigned and allotted under the direction of thePresident of the United States, to the Tribes now living thereon, or to such
other Tribes as the President may locate thereon for hunting, and
other purposes.
A rticle II. The confederated Tribes of the Sacs and Foxes, cede
and relinquish to the United States forever, a tract of Country twenty
miles in width, from the Mississippi to the Demoine; situate south, and
adjoining the line between the said confederated Tribes of Sacs and
Foxes, and the Sioux; as established by the second article of the Treaty
of Prairie du Chien of the nineteenth of August one thousand eight
hundred and twenty-live.
A rticle III. The Medawah-Kanton, Wah-pa-coota, "Wahpeton and
Sisseton Bands of the Sioux cede and relinquish to the United States
forever, a Tract of Country twenty miles in width, from the Mississippi
to the Demoine River, situate north, and adjoining the line mentioned
in the preceding article.

cession of lands,

purposes to which
are 10 ^
app
Cession by the Sacs
and Foxea-

cession by the Me-.
dawah-Kanton, etc.

PRAIRIE DU CHIEN TREATY - 1830
Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties, vol. 2
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 305.
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A rticle IV. In consideration or toe cessions and relinquishments consideration,
made in the first, second, and third articles of this Treaty, the United
States agree to pay to the Sacs, three thousand dollars*—and to the A n n u itie s .
Foxes three thousand dollars; To the Sioux of the Mississippi two thou
sand dollars;—To the Yancton and Santie Bands of Sioux three thou
sand dollars;—To the Omahas, two thousand five hundred dollars;—
To the loways two thousand five hundred dollars;—To the Ottoes and
Missourias two thousand five hundred dollars, and to the Sacs of the
Missouri River five hundred dollars; to be paid annually for ten suc
cessive years at such place, or places on the Mississippi or Missouri, as
may be most convenient to said Tribes, cither in money, merchandise,
or domestic animals, at their option; and when said annuities or any
portion of them shall be paid in merchandise, the same is to he deli vered
to them at the first cost of .the goods at St. Louis free of transportation.
And the United States further agree to make to the said Tribes and F u r th e r a iio w a n c e s .
Bands, the following allowances for the period of ten years, and as long
thereafter as the President of the United States may think necessary
and proper, in addition to the sums herein before stipulated to bepaici
them; that is to say; To the Bands of the Sioux mentioned in the third
article, one Blacksmith at the expense of the United States, and the
necessary tools; also instruments for agricultural purposes, and iron
and steel to the amount of seven hundred dollars;—To the Yancton
and Santie Bands of Sioux, one Blacksmith a t the expense of the United
States, and the necessary tools, also instruments for agricultural pur
poses to the amount of four hundred dollar's; To the Omahas one Blaeksmith at the expense of the United States, and the necessary tools, also
instruments for agricultural purposes to the amount of five hundred
dollars;—To the loways an assistant Blacksmith at the expense of the
United States, also instruments for agricultural purposes to the amount
of six hundred dollars; To the Ottoes and Missourias one Blacksmith
a t the expense of the United States, and the necessary tools, also instru
ments for agricultural purposes to the amount of five hundred dollars;
and to the Sacs of the Missouri River, one Blacksmith a t the expense
of the United States and the necessary tools; also instruments for
agricultural purposes to the amount of two hundred dollars.
A r t i c l e V. And the United States fu rth er agree to set apart three tiorunuity for educ*'
thousand dollars annually for ten successive years, to be applied in
the discretion of the President of the United States, to the education
of the children of the said Tribes and Bands, parties hereto.
A rticle VI. The Yanckton and Santie Bands of the Sioux not bjJ^j‘cktoaandsanUe
being fully represented, it is agreed, th at if they shall sign this Treaty,
they shall be considered as parties thereto, and bound by all its stipu
lations.
A rticle VII. It is agreed between the parties hereto, that the lines Lines to be run.
shall be run, and marked as soon as the President of the United States
may deem it expedient
A rt. V lli. The United States agree to distribute between the sev- E*rnesL
eral Tribes, parties hereto, five thousand, one hundred and thirty-two
dollars worth of merchandise, the receipt whereof, the said Tribes
hereby acknowledge; which, together with the amounts agreed to be
paid, and the allowances in the fourth and fifth articles of this Treaty,
shall be considered as a full compensation for the cession and relin
quishments herein made.
A r tic le IX . The Sioux Bands in Council having earnestly solicited h^yTbK^l3!.nforSloux
that they might have permission to bestow upon the half breeds of
their Nation, the tract of land within the following limits, to wit:
Beginning at a place called the barn, below and near the village of the
Rea Wing Chief, and running back fifteen miles; thence in a parallel :
line with Lake Pepin and the Mississippi, about thirty-two inues to a
oint opposite Beef or O-Boeuf River; thence fifteen miles to the
rrand Encampment opposite the River aforesaid; The United States
agree to suffer said half Breeds to occupy said tract of country; they
holding by the same title, and in the same manner that other Indian
Titles are held.

g
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A rticle X. The Omahas, loways and Ottoes, for themselves, and tSi^reeda.11*°r°Ul*r
in behalf of the Yanckton and Santie Bands of Sioux, having-earnestly
requested that they m ight be perm itted to make some provision for
their half-breeds, and particularly th at they might bestow upon them
the tract of country within the following limits, to wit; Beginning at
the mouth of the Little Ne-mohaw River, and running up the main
channel of said River to a point which will be ten miles from its mouth
in a direct line; from thence in a direct line, to strike the Grand Nemohaw ten miles above its mouth, in a direct line (the distance between
the two Ne-mohaws being about twenty miles)—thence down said .
River to its mouth ;\ thence up, and with the Meanders of the Missouri
River to the point of beginning, it is agreed that the half-breeds of
said Tribes and Bands may-be suffered to occupy said tract of land;
holding it in the same manner, and by the same titte that other Indian
titles are held; but the President of the United States may hereafter
assign to any of the said half-breeds, to be held by him or them in fee
simple, any portion of said tra c t not exceeding a section, of six hun
dred and forty acres to each individual- And this provision shall
extend to the cession made by the Sioux in the preceding Article.
A rticle X I. The reservation of land mentioned in the preceding rromomtoia^etc?**5*
Article having belonged to the Ottoes, and having been exclusively
ceded by them; it is agreed th at the Omahas, the loways and the
Yanckton and Santie Bands of Sioux shall pay out of their annuities
to the said Ottoe Tribe, for the period of ten years, Three hundred
Dollars annually; of which sum the Omahas snail pay one hundred
Dollars, the loways one hundred Dollars, and the Yanckton and Santie
Bands one hundred dollars.
A rticle X II. I t is agreed that nothing contained in the foregoing saving of rights of
Articles shall be so construed as to affect any claim, or rig h t in com- the tribesmon, which has heretofore been held by any Tribes, parties to this
Treaty, to any lands not embraced in the cession herein made; but
that the same shall be occupied and held by them as heretofore.
A rticle X III. This Treaty, or any part thereof, shall take effect, Treaty bindingwhen
and be obligatory upon the Contracting parties, so soon as the same
shall be ratified by the President of the Unitea States, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate thereof.
Done, and signed, and sealed at P rairie du Chien, in the T erritory
of Michigan, this fifteenth day of Ju ly , in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and thirty, and of the independence of the
United States, the fifty-fifth.
Wm. Clark, superintendent Indian
Sioux of the Mississippi, Medawakanaffairs,
[ l. s.]
ton band:
Willoughby Morgan, colonel First
Wabishaw, or red leaf, his x mark, [ l. s . ]
Infantry U. S. Army,
[ u s.] Tchataqua Manie, or little crow,
commissioners.
his x mark,
[ l . s .]
Sacs:
. . . . .
W aumunde-tunkar, the great caluMash-que-tai-paw, or red head, his
met eagle, his x mark,
[ l. s.]
x ™a,rk >
. . . . . U - sd Taco-coqui-pishnee, he th at fears
Sheco-Calawko, or turtle shell, his
nothing, his x mark,
[ l . s.]
Kee-o-Sfck, the watchful fox, h i s ^ ' 8' 3
r> •

v m ark

, l ;. ’ „

h f f x m a rk

Tl

L ..

L

V

s i

■-*

a 1

Wah-coo-ta, th at shoots arrows, his
X m ark»

Lr“ 3- J

* m a rk '

£ '~ 3' ]

Pay-taw-whar, the fire owner, his

Os-hays-kee, ridge, his x mark,
s.'j KaU| hm" r°kh r’ the fioati"« '° s ’ hiSr L „ ,
She-shee-quanince, little gourd, his
’
r
,
x mark
[i>. s.] ” Etarz-e-pah, the bow, his x mark, [l. s . ]
0-saw-wish-canoe, yellow bird, his
Teeah-coota, one th at fires at the
x mark,
[ l. s.]
yellow, his x m a r k ,
[ l. s.]
1-onin, his x mark,
I 1*-S-J Toh-kiah-taw-kaw, he who bites
Ara-oway, his x mark,
( l . s.]
the enemy, his x mark,
[ l . s.]
Niniwow-qua-saut, he th at fears
Nasiumpah, or the early riser, his
:
mankind, his x mark,
[ l. s.)
x m ark«
CL- 3-J
Chaukee Manitou, the little spirit,
Am-pa-ta-tah-wah, his day, his x
h i s x mark,
[ l . s.]
mark,
[ l . s.]
Moso-inn, the scalp, his x mark, [ l. s.] W ah-kee-ah-tunkar, big thunder,
Wapaw-chicannuck, fish of the
his x mark,
[ l. s.]
white marsh, his x mark,
[ l. s.1 Tauchaw-cadoota, the red road, his
Mesico, jic, his x mark,
[n. s.J
x mark,
[ l. s.]

Foxes:
Tchaws-kesky, the elder, his x
Wapalaw, the prince, his x mark, [ l. s.]
mark,
[ l. s . ]
Taweemin, straw berry, hisxm ark, [ l. s.] Mauzau-hautau, the grey iron, his
Pasha-sakay, son of Piemanschie,
x mark,
[ l. s . ]
his x mark,
[ l. s.] Wazee-o-monie, the walking pine,
Keewauseite, he who climbs every
his x mark,
(l. s . J
where, his x m ark,
[ l. a.] Tachaw-cooash-tay, the good road,
Naw-mee, his x mark,
[ l . s.]
his x mark,
[ l. s . ]
Appenioce, or the grand child, his
Kie-ank-kaw, the mountain, his x
x mark,
^
[l. s.
mark,
Cl. s . ]
Waytee-mins, his x m ark,
[ l . s.
Mah-peau-mansaw, iron cloud, his
Nawayaw-cosi, his x m ark,
[ l . s .'
x mark,
Cl. s . ]
Manquo-pwam, th e bear’s hip,
(M organ,) his x mark,
[ l. s.] E-taych-o-caw, half face, his x
mark,
CL- s-3
Kaw-Kaw-Kee, the crow, his x
mark,
[ l. s. ] Anoug-eenaje. one that stands on
both sides, his x mark,
* C1*- 8-J
Mawcawtav-ee-quoiqnenake, black
neck, his x m ark,
C l . s.] • Hough-appaw, the eagle head, his
x mark,
CL- 8-]
Watu-pawnonsh, his x mark,
[ l. s . j
Hooka-mooza, the iron limb, his x
Meshaw-nuaw-peetay, the large
mark,
CL- s-]
teeth, his x m ark,
[ l. s.]
Cawkee-Kamack, always fish, his
Hoatch-ah-cadoota, the red voice,
x m a rk ,
Cl . s . ]
h is x m a rk ,
[ l. s.]
Mussaw-wawquott, his x mark,
[ l. s. ] Wat-chu-da, the dancer.
[ l . s. j
Wah-pah-coota band:
W iarh-noh-ha, french crow, his x

Pah-a-manie, one who walks on the
snow, his X' mark,
^ CL- *■
m a rk ,
' [l. s.]
Pie-kan-ha-igne, the little star, his
Shans-konar, moving shadow,' his.
x mark,
.
C1*- ®x mark,
[ u s.] Niayoo Manie, walking rain, his x
Ah-pe-batar, th e grey mane, his x
mark,
CL* 8
mark,
[ l. s.]
Nautah-hoo, burnt-wood, his x
W ahmedecaw-cahn-bohr, one th a t
. mark,
CL* 8
praya for the land, his x mark, [ l. s.] Pai-tansa, the white crane, his x
Wah-con-de-kah-har, the one th a t
mark.
CL- 8
makes th e lightning, his x
Ottoes:
mark,
[ l . s.] I-atan, or Shaumanie-Cassan, or
Mazo-manie, or the iron th a t walks,
prairie wolf, his x mark,
C1^ 8his x mark,
[ l. s.] Mehah-hun-jee, second daughter,
Mah-kah-ke-a-munch, one th a t
his x mark,
_ C^- s*
flies on the land, his x mark, [ l. s ] Wawronesan, the encircler, his
Mauzau-haut-amundee, th e walk
x mark,
CL- 8*
ing bell, his x m ark,
[ l. s.] Kansa-tauga, the big Kansas, his x
Kah-hih, the Menominie, his x
mark,
C1- 8mark.
[ l. s.) Noe-kee-sa-kay, strikes two, his x
Sussiton band:
mark,
_
CL- 8Ete-tahken-bah, th e sleeping eyes,
Tchai-au-grai, the shield, his x
his x mark,
[ l. s.]
mark,
Cu 8Ho-toh-monie, groans when he
Mantoigne, the little bow, his x
walks, his x mark.
[ l . s.]
mark,
CL* 8Omahahs:
Thee-rai-tchai-neehgrai, wolf-tail
Opau-tauga, or the big elk, his x
at the heel, his x m ark,
CL- 8mark,
[ l. s.] Oh-haw-kee-wano, th at runs on the
Chonques-kaw, th e white horse,
hills, his x mark,
CL* 8his x mark,
[ l. s.] Rai-grai-a, speckled turtle, his x
Tessan, the white crow, his x m ark, ( l. s. J
mark,
CL- 8Ishtan-mauzay, iron-eye, ch iefs
going by, his
son, his x mark,
( l. s.] Tchai-wah-tchee-ray,
x mark,
Cl. s .
Waw-shin-ga-sau-bais, black bird,
Krai-taunica, the hawk, hisx m ark , [i.. s.
his x mark,
[ l. s.] Mauto-a
Kee-pah, th a t meets the
Waugh-pay-shan, the one who
bear, his x mark,
^
CL- 8scalps but a small part from
Kai-wan-igne, little turtle, his x
the crown of the head, his x
mark.
[ l. s.
mark,
[ l. s.
Mi&sourias:
Au-gum-an, the chief, his x mark, [ l. s.
Eh-shaw-manie, or the one who
Age-en-gaw, the wing, his x mark, ( l. s.
walks laughing, his x mark, [ l . s .
Non-bau-manie, the one th a t walks
double, his x mark,
[ l. s.] Ohaw-tchee-ke-sakay, one who
strikes the Little Osages, his x
Way-eosh.-ton, the frequent feast
mark,
( L- s.
giver, his x mark,
[ l. s.]
Wamshe-katou-nat, the great man,
Eh-que-naus-hus-kay, the second,
his x mark,
( L- s.
his x mark,
[ l. s.]
Shoug-resh-kay, the horse fly, his
Iosey, (the son of K awsay,) his x
x mark,
CL- 8mark.
[ l. s.]
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low ays:

Wassau-nie, or the medicine club,
his x mark,
[u s .]
Mauhoos Kan, white cloud, his x
mark,
[ l. s.]
Wo-hooinpee, the broth, his x
mark,
[ u s.]
Tah-roh-na, a good many deer, his
x mark,
[ l. s.]
W a-n au -q u ash - coonie, w ithout
fear, his xmark,
[ l. s.]

Tahmegrai-Soo-igne, little deer’s
dung, his x mark,
Missouri Sacs:
Sau-kis-quoi-pee, his x mark,
She-she-quene, the gourd, his
mark,
Noehewai-tasay, his x mark,
u s.
Mash-quaw-siais, his x mark,
Nawai-yak-oosee, his x mark,
Wee-tay-inain, one th a t goes with
the rest, his x mark,
[ l. s.]

The assent of the Yancton and Santie Bands of Sioux, to the fore
going- treaty is given. In testimony whereof, the chiefs, braves, and
principal men of said bands have hereunto signed their names and
acknowledge the same, at St. .Louis, this 13th October, 1830.
Yancton and Santie Bands of
Siouxs:
Matto-Sa-Becha, the black bear,
his x mark,
Pa-con-okra, his x mark,
Citta-eutapishma. he who dont eat
buffalo, his x mark,
[ u s .]
To-ki-e-ton, th e stone w ith horns,
his x mark,
[ u s.]
Wah-gho-num-pa, cotton wood on
the neck, his x m ark,
f u s.l
Zuvesaw, warrior, his x mark,
[ u s.J
Tokun Ohomenee, revolving stone,
h isx m ark ,
[ l. s.]
Eta-ga-nush-kica, mad face, his x
mark,
[ u s.]
Womendee Dooter, red war eagle,
his x mark,
[ u s.]
Mucpea A-har-ka, cloud elk, his x
mark,
[ l. s.]
To-ka-oh, wounds th e enemy, his
x mark,
[ l. s.]
Pd-ta-sun eta womper, w hite buf
falo with two faces, his x m ark, [ u s.]

Cha-pon-ka, or mosquitoe, his x
mark,
[ u s.]
To-ki-mar-ne, he th at walks ahead,
his x mark,
[ u s.]
Wock-ta-ken-dee, kills and comes
back, hisx mark,
[ l. s.]
Ha Sazza, his x m ark,
[ u s.]
Ghigga Wah-shu-she, little brave,
his x mark,
[ u s.]
Cha-tun-kia, sparrow hawk, his x
mark,
[ u s.]
Ke-un-chun-ko, swift flyer, his x
mark,
[ u s.]
Ti-ha-uhar, he that carries his horn,
his x mark,
[ u s.]
Sin-ta-nomper, two tails, his x
m ark,
[ l. s.]
Wo-con Cashtaka, the w hipt spirit,
his x mark,
[ u s.]
Ta Shena Pater, fiery blanket, his
x m ark,
[ u s.]

In presence o f—
Jno. Ruland, secretary to the commission.
Jon. L. Bean, special agent,
Law Taliaferro, Indian agent at St. Peters,
R. B. Mason, captain, First Infantry,
G. Loomis, captain, First Infantry,
James Peterson, lieutenant and adjutant,
H. B. M., T hirty-third Regiment,
N. S. Harris, lieutenant and adjutant,
regiment, U. S. Infantry,
Henry Bainbridge, lieutenant,U. S. Army,
John Gale, surgeon, U. S. Army,
J. Archer, lieutenant, U. S. Army,
J. Dougherty, Indian agent,
Thos. A. Davies, lieutenant, infantry,
Wm. S. Williamson, sub-Indian agent,
And. S. Hughes, sub-Indian agent,
A. G. Baldwin, lieutenant, T hird Infan
try,

David D. Mitchell,
H. L. Donsman,
W ynkoop W arner,
Geo. Davenport,
Wm. Hempstead,
Benjamin Mills,
Wm. H. Warfield, lieutenant, T hird In
fantry,
Sam. R. Throokmoor,
Jo h n Connelly,
Amos Farror,
Antoine Le Claire, interpreter of Sacs and
Foxes,
Stephen Julian, United States interpreter,
Jacques Mette, interpreter,
Michel Berda, his x mark, Mohow inter
preter,
S. Campbell, United States interpreter.

Witnesses to the signatures of the Yancton and Santie bands of
Sioux, at Fort Tecumseh, Upper Missouri, on the fourth day of Sep
tember, 1830:
Wm. Gordon,
James Archdale Hamilton,
David D. Mitchell,
Wm. Saidlau,
Jacob Halsey.
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Witnesses present at the signing and acknowledgment of the Yanc
ton and Santie Deputations:
Jno. Ruland, secretary to Commissioners.
Jon. L. Bean, sub-Indian agent for Upper
Missouri,
Felix F. Wain, Indian agent for Sacs and
Foxes,
John F. A. Sanford, United States Indian
agent.

William C. Heyward, U. S. Army,
D. J. Royster, U. S. Infantry,
Samuel Kinney, U. S. Army,
M erewether Lewis Clark, Sixth Regiment
Infantry,
Jacques Mette.
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APPENDIX V

TR EA TY W IT H TH E OTO, ETC., 1836.

Articles o f a convention entered into and concluded at Bellevue U pper
---Missouri the fifteenth day o f October one thousand eight hundred and p^amation Feb.
thirty-six, by and between John Dougherty U. S. agt. fo r Indian 16,1837.
Affairs and Joshua, Pilcher U. S. Ind. s. agt being specially author
ized therefor/ and the chiefs braves head men dec o f the Otoes Missouries Omahaws and Yankton and Santee bands o f Sioux, duly
authorized by their respective tribes.
A r t i c i . e 1 st. Whereas it has been represented that according to the i 83o iaty of July *
stipulations of the first article of the treaty of Prairie du Chien of the
fifteenth of July eighteen hundred and thirty, the country ceded is
“ to be assigned and allotted under the direction of the President of
the United States to the tribes now living thereon or to such other
tribes as the President may locate thereon for hunting and other pur
poses,” and whereas it is fu rth er represented to us the chiefs, braves
and head men of the tribes aforesaid, that it '*s desirable that the lands
lying between the State of Missouri and the Missouri river, and south
of a line running due west from the northwest corner of said State
until said line strikes the Missouri river, should be attached to and
become a part of said State, and the Indian title thereto be entirely
extinguished; but that notwithstanding as these lands compose a part
of the country embraced by the provisions of the said first article of
the treaty aforesaid, the stipulations whereof will be strictlj' observed,
until the assent of the Inaians interested is given to the proposed
measure. Now we the chiefs braves and principal men of the Otoes
Missouries Omahaws Yankton and Santee bands of Sioux aforesaid
full}' understanding the subject and well satisfied from the local posi
tion of the lands in question, that they never can be made available for the^nited°states? 10
Indian purposes; and that an attem pt to place an Indian population on
them must inevitably lead to collisions with the citizens of the United
States; and, further believing that the extension of the State line in
the direction indicated, would have a happy effect by presenting a
natural boundary between the whites and Indians; and willing more
over to give the United States a renewed evidence of our attachment
and friendship; do hereby for ourselves and on behalf of our respec
tive tribes (having full power and authority to this effect) for ever
cede relinquish and quit claim to the United States all our rig h t title
and interest of whatsoever nature in and to the lands lying between
the State of Missouri and the Missouri river, and south of a line run
ning due west from the northwest corner of the State to the Missouri
river, as herein before mentioned, and freely and fully exonerate the
United States from any guarantee condition or limitation expressed
or implied under the treaty of Prairie du Chien aforesaid or otherwise,
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as to the entire and absolute disposition of said lands, fully authorizing
the United States to do with the same whatever shall seem expedient
or necessary.
P r e s e n t o f $ 4 ,5 0 0 i n
A k t . 2d. As a proof of the continued friendship and liberality of
mere an ise.
^ United States towards the said Otoes Missouries Omahaws and
Yankton and Santee bands of Sioux, and as an evidence of the sense
entertained for the good will manifested by the said tribes to the citi
zens and Government of the United States as evinced in the preceding
cession and relinquishment; and as some compensation for the great
sacrifice made by the several deputations at this particular season, by
abandoning their fall hunts and traveling several hundred miles to
attend this convention the undersigned John Dougherty and Joshoa
Pilcher agrees on behalf of the United States to pay as a present 1 )
the tribes herein befote named the sum of four thousand five hundred
and twenty dollars in merchandise, the receipt of which they hereby
acknowledge having been distributed among them in the proportions
trib«rtions °f eaeh following. To the Otoes twelve hundred and fifty dollars, to the Mis
souries one thousand dollars to the Omahaws twelve hundred and
seventy dolls, to the Yankton and Santee bands of Sioux one thousand
dollars.
riw r n o 1 bcn<fu r n i? h e d
A r t . 3d. In consequence of the removal of the Otoes and Missouries
w ith 500 b u s h e ls o£ from their former situation on the river Platte to the place selected
cornfor them, and of their having to build new habitations last spring at the
time which should have been occupied in attending to their crops, it
appears that they have failed to such a degree as to make it certain
tnat they will lack the means of subsisting next spring, when it will be
necessary for them to commence cultivating the lands now preparing
for their use. It is therefore agreed that the said Otoes, and Missouries (in addition to the presents herein before mentioned) shall be fu r
nished at the expense of the United States with five hundred bushels of
acre“ of“roanhdabroke corn
delivered a t their village in the month of April next. And
u p , e tc .
the same causes operating upon the Omahaws, they having also aban
doned their former situation, and established at the place recommended
to them on the Missouri river, and finding it difficult without the aid of
ploughs to cultivate land near their village where they would be secure
from their enemies, it is agreed as a fartner proof of the liberality of
the Government and its disposition to advance such tribes in the culti
vation of the soil as may manifest a disposition to rely on it for the
future means of subsistence; that they shall have one hundred acres of
ground broke up and put under a fence near their village, so soon as it
can be done after the ratification of this convention.
raObU|atory w h e n
A r t . 5 . This convention shall be obligatory on the tribes parties
ra 1 '
hereto, from and after the date hereof, and on the United States from
and after its ratification by the Government thereof.
Done, signed, and sealed at Bellevue, U pper Missouri, this fifteenth
day of October, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, and of the
independence of the United States, the sixty-first.
Jno. Dougherty, Indian agent,
[ l . s .]
Joshua Pilcher, United States Indian subagent,
[l. s . ]
Otoes:
Jaton, his x mark,
l. s.
Big Kaw, his x mark,
l. s.
l . s.
The Thief, his x mark,
Wah-ro-ne-saw, his x mark,
L. 3.
L. S.
Buffalo Chief, his x mark,
L. 3.
Shaking Handle, his x m ark,
L. 3.
We-ca-ru-ton, his x m ark,
Wash-shon-ke-ra, his x mark,
L. S.
Standing W hite Bear, his x mark, h . 3.
O-rah-car-pe, his x mark,
L . S.
L. S.
W ah-nah-shah, his x mark,
L. S.
Wa-gre-ni-e, his x mark,

Mon-nah-sbu-jah, his x mark,
[ l . s .]
Missouries:
Hah-che-ge-sug-a, his x mark,
[ l. s .
Black Hawk, his x mark,
[l. s .
No Heart, his x mark,
[ l . s.
Wan-ge-ge-he-ru-ga-ror, hisx mark, [ l . s .
The Arrow Fender, his x mark,
[n. s.
Wah-ne-min-er, his x mark.
[ l. s.
Big Wing, his x mark,
[ l. s.
Omahaws:
Big Elk, his x m ark,
P l. s .
Big Eyes, his x mark,
lY. s.
Wash-kaw-mony, his x mark,
[*>. s.
W hite Horse, his x mark,
[ l. a.
W hite Caw, his x mark,
[ l. s.
Little Chief, his x mark,
[ l. s..

A-ha\r*paw, his x mark,
W alking Cloud, his x mark,
Wah-see-an-nee, his x mark,
No Heart, his x mark,
Wah-shing-gar, his x m ark,
Standing Elk, his x mark,
Ke-tah-an-nah, his x mark,
Mon-chu-ha, his x mark,
Pe-ze-nin-ga, his x mark,
Yankton and Santees,
Pitta-eu-ta-pishna, his x mark,

L. S.

l. a.
l . a.
L. S.
L. S.

l. a.
. a.

l

L. S.

l. a.
[ L . S .]

W&sh-ka-shin-ga, his x mark,
Mon-to-he, his x mark,
W ah-kan-teau, his x mark,
E-ta-ze-pa, his x mark,
Ha-che-you-ke-kha, his x mark,
Wa-men-de-ah-wa-pe, his x mark,
E-chunk-ca-ne, his x mark,
Chu-we-a-teau, his x mark,
Mah-pe-a-tean, his x mark,
Wah-mun-de-cha-ka, his x mark,
Pah-ha-na*jie, his x mark,

L. S.
L. S.

l.

a.

Li. S.
L. S.
L. S.

L. S
s.
L. S.
Ij.

I.. S .

L. S.

Witnesses:
J. Varnum Hamilton, sutler U. S. Dragoons and acting secretary,
William Steele,
John A. Ewell,
William J. Martin,
M artin Dorion, his x mark.
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APPENDIX VH

W hereas the Government of the United States through the Hon. George W.
Manypenny Commissioner of Indian Affairs expressed a desire to purchase a part or the
whole of the land owned by the Omaha Tribe of Indians when he visited them last fall, and
at the time said Omahas signified their willingness to sell a portion of their country to the
United States, and whereas the Government of the United States has now asked the said
Omaha Tribe of Indians to send some of their chiefs to W ashington City to conclude a
treaty, and the Agent Col. James M. Gatewood submitted to the Omahas said proposal; and
whereas the Omahas have refused to make a treaty through their delegates at Washington
City or at any other place in the absence of all the Chiefs, Head Men, Warriors and Young
Men of the tribe; and whereas it is deemed of the utmost importance to the United States
Government and to the Omaha tribe that a treaty be concluded with as little delay as
possible for the mutual benefit of both parties: Therefore James M. Gatewood Indian Agent
at the Council Bluffs Indian Agency on the part of the United States Government and the
Chiefs, Head Men, W arriors and young Men of the Omaha tribe in general council
assembled at the Council Bluffs Indian Agency have made and agreed upon the following
articles and conditions of a treaty.
ARTICLE 1
The Chiefs, Head Men, Warriors and Young Men in behalf of the Omaha tribe do
by these presents cede and relinquish forever to the United States all their right, title and
claim to the tract of country included within the following boundaries: Beginning in the
middle of the main channel of the Missouri River opposite the middle of the main channel
of the great Nebraska River, thence up the middle of the main channel of the Missouri
River to a point opposite the place where the Ayoway River disembouges out of the Bluffs
thence from the said point in the middle of the main channel of the Missouri River to said
point where the Ayoway River disembouges out of the Bluffs thence in a direct west line to
the western boundary of the country, now owned by said Omaha tribe of Indians, thence
South to the waters of Loup Fork of the great Nebraska River; thence down the waters of
the Loup Fork to the middle of the main channel of the great Nebraska River thence down
the middle of the main channel of said river to the place of beginning.

PREAMBLE AND ARTICLES OF THE GATEWOOD TREATY
JANUARY 27, 1854
Letters Received bv the Office of Indian Affairs. Council Bluffs Aeency. 1836-1857.
National Archives Microfilm Pulications, Record Group 75, Microcopy 234, Reel 218.
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ARTICLE 2
It is agreed and stipulated that said Omahas shall, as soon as the United States shall
make the necessary provisions for fulfilling the stipulations of this treaty vacate the country
hereby ceded to the United States and remove to and settle upon their lands north of the
before mentioned Ayoway River.
And it is further stipulated that said Omahas relinquish to the United States all
claims that may be due them under all former treaties except so much as remains unpaid of
the twenty five thousand dollars agreed to be paid them for agricultural purposes by the
United States in the year eighteen hundred and fifty one; said residue to be paid to said
tribe, in such sums, in such manner, and at such time as the President of the United States
shall deem most proper.
ARTICLE 3
In consideration of said relinquishment and cession of same the United states
stipulate and agree to pay to the Omaha tribe of Indians the sum of forth thousand dollars a
year for the term of thirty years, one half of each payment to be made in the spring and the
other half in the fall of the year; and in adition [sic] shall furnish a good gun and black
smith and an assistant to reside at their new home and provide and maintain a good shop
for the exclusive benefit of the Omahas. And it is further stipulated and agreed that the
United States shall cause to be ploughed in good condition and at the right time of the year
for planting two hundred acres of land. And it is further stipulated and agreed that the
United states shall protect the Omahas at their new homes against the Sioux tribe and all
other tribes of Indians that may be hostile to them until such time as protection shall be
deemed no longer necessary by the President of the United States. And the United States
shall cause a treaty to be made as soon as possible , with the Ponca and Sioux tribes of
Indians which treaty shall provide for the perpetual friendship, peace and amity of the said
tribes.
And it is agreed and stipulated by the Omahas that they will not make war upon
other Indian tribes except in self defence [sic] but will submit all causes of dispute to the
government of the United States or its agent for decision. And it is further agreed and
stipulated that the said Omahas will not rob or take from any tribes or from the whites any
property not their own and in case this provision shall be violated by any of said tribe and
the fact thereof be proven before the agent the full value of property taken or damage done
shall be paid to the person or party injured by the United States out of the money stipulated
to be paid by this treaty to the Omahas.
The Omaha tribe of Indians acknowledge themselves justly indebted to Peter A.
Sarpy in the sum of six thousand three hundred dollars for credits extended to them at
different times, which credits they have not been able to pay; to Logan Fontenelle in the
sum of five hundred dollars; to Lewis Saunsoci in the sum of five hundred dollars which
debts they desire shall be paid out of the first installment due under this treaty.
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ARTICLE 4
It is further agreed, stipulated and expressly understood that the United States shall
pay to the said Omahas the money due them under the provisions and stipulations of this
treaty in cash.
ARTICLE 5
And it is finaly [sic] agreed and stipulated by the said Omaha tribe of Indians that
the following named Chiefs: viz Logan Fontenelle, Joseph La Flesche, Ta-wa-gah-ha or
Village Maker, Gre-tan-nan-gis or Standing Hawk, Wa-no-qui-ga; Ca-hi-que-ginga or
Little Chief and So-ge-nan-yis or Yellow Smoke have full power in the name of the Omaha
Nation in as full and ample a manner as if the whole nation were present, to fully ratify and
confirm and to slightly modify alter or amend any or all of the foregoing provisions or
stipulations of this treaty.
ARTICLE 6
These agreements and stipulations shall be obligatory and binding when ratified by
the President and Senate of the United States.
Done at the Council Bluffs Indian Agency this twenty seventh day of January in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty four.
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APPENDIX VIII
T R E A T Y W I T H T H E OMAHA, 1854.

Articles o f agreement and convention 7nade and concluded at the city
March i6.lss-t.
o f Washington this sixteen th day o f March, one thousand eight hun- 10 stats., io«. ^_
dred and fifty-foxtr, by George W. Mdnypenny, as commissio7ier on isi^u
Apr'
the part o f the United States, and the fotlounng-named chiefs o f the i80 OCl'iimed June-1’
Omaha tribe o f Indians, viz: Shon-ga-ska, or Logan Fontenelle;
E-Sta-mah-za, or Joseph Le Elesche; Gra-tah-nah-Je, or Standing
Hawk; Gah-he-ga-gin-gah, or L ittle Chief; Ta-wah-gah-ha, or Vil
lage Maker; Wah-no-ke-ga, or Noise; So-da-nah-ze,or Yellow Smoke;
they being thereto duly authorized by said tribe.
A r tic le 1. The Omaha Indians cede to the United States all their theeunu^°LLatefs to
lands west of the Missouri River, and south of a line drawn due west
from a point in the centre of the main channel of said Missouri River
due east of where the Ayoway River disembogues out of the bluffs,
to the western boundary of the Omaha country, and forever relinquish
all right and title to the country south of said line: Provided, h/no- di®n|erve for th0 In’
ever, That if the country north of said due west line, which is reserved
by the Omahas for their future home, should not on exploration prove
to be a satisfactory and suitable location for said Indians, the Presi
dent may, with the consent of said Indians, set apart and assign to
them, within or outside of the ceded country, a residence suited for
and acceptable to them. And for the purpose of determining a t once
and definitely, it is agreed that a delegation of said Indiaus, in com
pany with their agent, shall, immediately after the ratification of this
instrument, proceed to examine the country hereby reserved, and if it
please the delegation, and the Indians in counsel express themselves
satisfied, then it shall be deemed and taken for their future home; but
if otherwise, on the fact being reported to the President, he is author
ized to cause a new location, of suitable extent, to be made for the
future home of said Indians, and which shall not be more in extent
than three hundred thousand acres, and then and in th at case, all of
the country belonging to the said Indians north of said due west line,
shall be and is hereby ceded to the United States by the said Indians,
they to receive the same rate per acre for it, less the number of acres
assigned in lieu of it for a home, as now paid for the land south of
said line.
A rticle 2. The Omahas agree, that so soon after the United States Removal of the inshall make the necessary provision for fulfilling the stipulations of dIan3*
this instrument, as they can conveniently arrange their affairs, and
not to exceed one year from its ratification, they will vacate the ceded
country, and remove to the lands reserved herein by them, or to the
other lands provided for in lieu thereof, in the preceding article, as
the case may be.
A rticle 3. The Omahas relinquish to the United States all claims, Relinquishment oc
for money or other thing, under form er treaties, and likewise all claim former cl*1™3-
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which they may have heretofore, at any time, set up, to any land on
the east side of the Missouri River: Provided, The Omahas shall still
be entitled to and receive from the Government, the unpaid balance
of the twenty-live thousand dollars appropriated for their use, by the
act of thirtieth of August, 1851.
P a y m e n t to t h e InA r t i c l e 4. In consideration of and payment for the country herein
11in iin.
ceded, and the relinquishments herein made, the United States agree
to pay to the Omaha Indians the several sums of money following,
to wit;
1st. Forty thousand dollars, per annum, for the term of three
years, commencing on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and
fifty-five.
2d. Thirty thousand dollars per annum, for the term of ten years,
next succeeding the three years.
3d. Twenty thousand dollars per annum, for the term of fifteen
years, next succeeding the ten years.
4th. Ten thousand dollars per annum, for the term of twelve years,
next succeeding the fifteen years.
Hmv made.
All which several sums of money shall be paid to the Omahas, or
expended for their use and benefit, under the direction of the Presi
dent of the United States, who may from time to time determine at
his discretion, what proportion of the annual payments, in this article
provided for, if any, shall be paid to them in money, and what pro
portion shall be applied to and expended, for their moral improve
ment and education; for such beneficial objects as in his judgment will
be calculated to advance them in civilization; for buildings, opening
farms, fencing, breaking land, providing stock, agricultural imple
ments, seeds, Ac.; for clothing, provisions, and merchandise; for iron,
steel, arms, and ammunition; for mechanics, and tools; and for med
ical purposes.
F u r th e r paym ent.
A r t i c l e 5 . In order to enable the said Indians to settle their affairs
and to remove and subsist themselves for one year at their new home,
and which they agree to do w ithout further expense to the United
States, and also to pay the expenses of the delegation who may be
appointed to make the exploration provided for in article first, and to
fence and break up two hundred acres of land at their new home, they
shall receive from the United States, the further sum of forty-one
thousand dollars, to be paid out and expended under the direction of
the President, and in such manner as he shall approve.
Dispo si ti on of th e
A r t i c l e 0. The President may, from time to time, at his discretion,
l a m l s re s e r v e d .
cause the whole or such portion of the land hereby rese'rved, as he
may think proper, or of such other land as may be selected in lieu
thereof, as provided for in article first, to be surveyed into lots, and
to assign to such Indian or Indians of said tribe as are willing to avail
of the privilege, and who will locate on the same as a permanent home,
if a single person over twenty-one years of ag-e, one-eighth of a sec
tion; to each family of two, one quarter section; to each family of
three and not exceeding five, one half section; to each family of six
and not exceeding ten, one section; and to each family over ten in
number, one quarter section for every additional five members. And
he may prescribe such rules and regulations as will insure to the fam
ily, in case of the death of the head thereof, the possession and enjoy
ment of such permanent home and the improvements thereon. And
the President ma}', at any time, in his discretion, after such person or
family has made a location on the land .assigned for a permanent home,
issue a patent to such person or family for such assigned land, condi
tioned that the tract shall not be aliened or leased for a longer term
than two years; and shall bo exem pt from levy, sale, or forfeiture,
which conditions shall continue in force, until a State constitution,
embracing such lands within its boundaries, shall have been formed,

and the legislature of the State shall remove the restrictions. And if
any such person or family shall at any time neglect or refuse to occupy
and till a portion of the lands assigned and on which they have located,
or shall rove from place to place, the President may, if the patent
shall have been issued, cancel the assignment, and may also withhold
from such person or family, their proportion of the annuities or other
moneys due them, until they shall have returned to such permanent
home, and resumed the pursuits of industry; and in default of their
return the tract may be declared abandoned, and thereafter assigned
to some other person or family of such tribe, or disposed of as is pro
vided for the disposition of the excess of said land. And th e residue
of the land hereby reserved, or of that which may be selected in lieu
thereof, after all of the Indian persons or families shall have had
assigned to them permanent homes, may be sold for their benefit,
under such laws, rules or regulations, as may hereafter be prescribed
by the Congress or President of the United States. No State legisla
ture shall remove the restrictions herein provided for, without the
consent of Congress.
A r t i c l e 7. Should the Omahas determine to make their permanent i,oSuIe tribes. fr ’ "
home north of the due west line named in the first article, the United
States agree to protect them from the Sioux and all other hostile
tribes, as long as the President may deem such protection necessary;
and if other lands be assigned them, the same protection is guaranteed.
A r t i c l e 8 . The United States agree to erect for the Omahas, at their
oustum isaw m iii.
new home, a grist and saw mill, and keep the same in repair, and pro
vide a miller for ten years; also to erect a good blacksmith shop, sup
ply the same with tools, and keep it in repair for ten years; and
provide a good blacksmith fo ra like period; and to employ an expcrienccd farmer for the term of ten 3 ’ears, to instruct the Indians in
agriculture.
A r t i c l e 9 . The annuities of the Indians shall not be taken to pa}' taken
to W
the debts of individuals.
A r t i c l e 1 0 . The Omahas acknowledge their dependence on the Indians’’Ml 01 l,u:
Government of the United States, and promise to be friendl}r with all
the citizens thereof, and pledge themselves to commit no depredations ncprc'iutmns.
on the property of such citizens. And should an}r one or more of
them violate this pledge, and the fact be satisfactorily proven before
the agent, the property taken shall be returned, o r in default thereof,
or if injured or d e stin e d , compensation may bq made by the Govern
ment out of their annuities. Nor will the}' make war on any other
tribe, except in self-defence, but will submit all matters of difference
between them and other Indians to the Government of the United
States, or its agent, for decision, and abide thereby. And if any of
the said Omahas commit any depredations on any other Indians, the
same rule shall prevail as that prescribed in this article in cases of
depredations against citizens.
A r t i c l e 11. The Omahas acknowledge themselves indebted to . s n S w ! l” Ll’" 1s
Lewis Sounsosco, (a half-breed,) for services, the sum of one thousand
dollars, which debt they have not been able to pay, and the United
States agree to pay the same.
A r t i c l e 12. The Omahas are desirous to exclude from their country tr^VucUo"’.^
the use of ardent spirits, and to prevent their people from drinking *i>ir>t*the same, and therefore it is provided that any Omaha who is guilty of
bringing liquor into their country, or who drinks liquor, may have his
or her proportion of the, annuities withheld from him or her for such
time as the President may determine.
A r t i c l e 13. The board of foreign missions of the Presbyterian
tj?r. cA'AyteChurcli have on the lands of the Omahas a manual-labor boarding- r i a u ciiun:!i.
school, for the education of the Omaha, Ottoc, and other Indian youth,
which is now in successful operation, and as it will be some time before
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the necessary buildings can be erected on the reservation, and [it is]
desirable that the school should not be suspended, it is agreed that the
said board shall have four adjoining quarter sections of land, so as to
include as near as may be all the improvements heretofore made by
them; and the President is authorized to issue to the proper authority
of said board, a patent in fee-simple for such quarter sections,
A r t i c l e 14. The Oinahas agree that all the necessary roads, high
ways, and railroads, which may be constructed as the country improves,
and the lines of which may run through such tract as may be reserved
for their permanent home, shall have a right of way through the res
ervation, a just compensation being paid therefor in money.
A r t i c l e 1 5 . This treaty shall be obligatory on the contracting
parties as soon as the same shall be ratified by the President and Senate
of the United States.
In testimony whereof, the said George W. Manypenny, commissioner
as aforesaid, and the undersigned chiefs, of the Omaha tribe of Indians,
have hereunto set their hands and seals, at the place and on the day and
year hereinbefore written.
George W . Manypenny, Commissioner.
Shon-ga-ska, or Logan Fontenelle, his x mark.
E-sta-mah-za, or Joseph Le Flesche, his x mark.
Gra-tah-mah-je, or Standing Hawk, his x mark.
Gah-he-ga-gin-gah, or Little Chief, his x mark.
Tah-wah-gah-ha, or Village Maker, his x mark.
Wah-no-ke-ga, or Noise, his x mark.
So-da-nah-ze, or Yellow Smoke, his x mark.
Executed in the presence of us:
dames M. Gatewood, Indian agent.
James Goszler.
Charles Calvert.
Janies D. K err.
Henry Beard.
Alfred Chapman.
Lewis Saunsoei, interpreter.
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APPENDIX IX
___ Articles o f treaty made and concluded at Washington, D. C .,on the
Rafi'fieti'i;6Fcb 13
sixth day o f March, A . D . 1865, between the United o f America, by
i86«.
’
’
their commissioners, Clark W. Thompson, Robei't IF. Furnas, and
F°b‘la’ the Omaha tribe o f Italians by their chiefs, E-sta-mah-za, or Joseph
La Flesche, Gra-ta-muh-zhe, or Standing Ilawk; Ga-he-ga-zhinga,
or L ittle Chief; 1'ah-tcah-gah-ha, or Village Maker: Wah-no-ke-ga,
or False; Sha-da-na-ge, or Yellow Smoke: Wasteh-ccnn.-nia-nu, or
Hard Walker; F ad a ga-he, or Fire Chief ; Ta-sv,, or White Cmo;
Ma-ha-nin-ga, or F o Jvnife.

18rc
la
im
c
<
l

thcTnuedbtate^3 £°

A r t i c l e 1, The Omaha tribe of Indians do hereby cede, sell, and
convey to the United States a tract of land from the north side of their
Boundaries.
present reservation, defined and bounded as follows, viz: commencing*
at a point on the M issouri River four miles due south from the north
boundary line of said reservation, thence west ten miles, thence south
four miles, thence west to the western boundary line of the reservation,
thence north to the northern boundary line, thence east to the Missouri
River, and thence south along1 the river to the place of beginning;
and that the said Omaha tribe of Indians will vacate and give posses
sion of the lands ceded bv this treaty immediately after its ratification:
Proviso.
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to include
any of the lands upon which the said Omaha tribe of Indians have now
improvements, or any land or improvements belonging to, connected
with, or used for the benefit of the Missouri school now in existence
upon the Omaha reservation.
OmaKirt how1'to A r t i c l k 2. In consideration of the foregoing cession, the United
be cxpcnited.
States agree to pay to the said Omaha tribe of Indians the sum of fifty
thousand dollars, to be paid upon the ratification of this treaty, and to
be expended by their agent, under the direction of the Commissioner
of Inaian Affairs, for goods, provisions, cattle, horses, construction of
buildings, farm ing implements, breaking up lands, and other improve
ments on their reservation.
Articles offormerA rticle 3. In fu rth er consideration of the foregoing cession, the
trcftt> to coxten* e . u njtecj States agree to extend the provisions of article 8 of the treaty
between the Omaha tribe of Indians and the United States, made on
the 16th day of March, A. D. 1S54, for a term of ten years from and
after the ratification of this treaty; and the United S t a t e s further
agree to pay to the said Omaha tribe of Indians, upon the ratification
i>;iHinges.
of this treaty, the sum of seven thousand dollars as damages in conse
quence of the occupancy of a portion of the Omaha reservation not
hereby ceded, and use and destruction of tim ber by the Winnebago
tribe of Indians while tem porarily residing thereon,
to' btfTuvidecf’rtiriong A rticle 4. The Omaha Indians being desirous of prom oting settled
|»embers°t the tribe habits of industry and enterprise amongst themselves by abolishing
mm.vim >.
tenure in common by which they now hold their lands, and by
assigning limited quantities thereof in severalty to the members of the
tribe, including their half or mixed blood relatives now residing with
them, to be cultivated and improved for their own individual use and
benefit, it is hereby agreed and stipulated th at the remaining portion
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of their present reservation shall be set apart for said purposes; and
that out of the same there shall be assigned to each head of a family
not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, and to each male person,
eighteen years of age and upwards, w ithout family, not exceeding
forty acres of land—to include in every case, as far as practicable, a
reasonable proportion of timber; six hundred and forty acres of said
lands, embracing and surrounding the present agericy improvements,
shall also be set ap art and appropriated to the occupancy and use of
the agency for said Indians. The lands to be so assigned, including
those for the use of the agency, shall be in as regular and compact a
body as possible, and so as to adm it of a distinct and weli-detined
exterior boundary. The whole of the lands, assigned or unassigned,
in severalt}', shall constitute and be known as the Omaha reservation, omnimReservation,
within and over which all laws passed or which may be passed by
Congress, regulating trade and . intercourse with the Indian tribes
shall have full force and effect, and no white person, except such as'v,!\itteh3 t^if.nyr
shall be in the employ of the United States, shall be allowed to reside etc! c er
or go upon any portion of said reservation without the written per
mission of the superintendent of Indian affairs or the agent for the
tribe. Said division and assignment of lands to the Omahas in sever
alty shall be made under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
and when approved by him, shall be final and conclusive. Certificates iJi',cdUfi/ortttr.ict» *.*shall be issued by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the tracts so sis,iedassigned, specifying the names of individuals to whom they have been
assigned respectively, and that they are for the exclusive use and benefit
of themselves, their heirs, and descendants; and said tracts shall not ,,r*7casedbetc1‘unaCo'1
be alienated in fee, leased, or otherwise disposed of except to the
United States or to other members of the tribe, under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the S ecretaiy o f the Interior, and
they shall be exempt from taxation, lev}-, sale, or forfeiture, until
otherwise provided for by Congress.
A r t i c l e 5. It being understood th at the object of the Government
uafi<nfptho
in purchasing the land herein described is for the purpose of locating lo catio n of th e w in n etho Winnebago tribe thereon, now, therefore, should their location JlcacC. Atr<:t:t the,r
there prove detrimental to the peace, quiet, and harmony of the whites
as well as of the two tribes of Indians, then the Omahas shall have the
privilege of repurchasing the land herein ceded upon the same terms
they now sell.
In testimony w hereof, the said C lark W. Thom pson and R obert W.
F urnas, Commissioners as aforesaid, and the said chiefs and delegates
of the Omaha tribe of Indians, have hereunto set th e ir hands and seals
a t the place and on the day and j’car hereinbefore w ritten.
C lark W. Thompson,
R. W . Furnas,
Commissioners.
E-sta-mah-zha, or Joseph La Flesche, his x mark. [ s e a l .
Gra-ta-mah-zho, or Standing Hawk, his x mark.
[s e a l.
Ga-he-ga-zhin-ga, or L ittle Chief, his x mark.
[s e a l.
Tah-wah-ga-ha, or Village M aker, his x mark.
[s e a l.
Wah-no-ke-ga, or Noise, his x mark.
[s e a l.
Sha-da-na-ge, or Yellow Smoke, his x mark.
[s e a l.
Wastch-com-ma-nu, or H ard W alker, his x mark. [ s e a l .
Pad-a-ga-he, or Fire Chief, his x mark.
[s e a l.
Ta-su, or W hite Cow, his x mark.
[ s e a l.'
Ma-ha-nin-ga, or No Knife, his x mark.
[s e a l.
In presence of—
II. Chase, U nited S tates in terp rete r.
Lewis Suunsoci, in terp rete r.
St. A. D. Balcombe, U nited S tates Indian agent.
Geo. N. P ro p p er.
J . N. H. P atrick.
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APPENDIX X

F O R T X -S E V E N T H C O N G R E S S .

Sess.

I.

C h . 434.

1SS2.

C H A P . 4 3 4 . —An a c t t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e s a l e o f a p a r t o f t h o r e s e r v a t i o n o t‘ t h o
O m a h a tr ib e o f In d ia n s in th e S ta te o f N e b ra s k a , a n d fo r o c h e r p u rp o s e s .

A u g u s t 7, l e i - .
• ---------------------------

Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f R epresentatives o f the U nited
States o f A m erica in Congress assembled, T h a t w ith th e c o n se n t o f tb e
Sale of portion
O m ah a tr ib e o f In d ia n s , e x p re sse d in open council, th e S e c re ta ry o f th e of reservation of
I n te r io r be, a n d he h e re b y is, a u th o riz e d to cause to be su rv e y e d , if Omaha radians in
n ecessary , a n d sold, all t h a t p o rtio u o f th e ir re s e rv a tio n in th e S ta te o f A g ^W v auii saio
N e b ra s k a ly in g w e st o f th e r ig h t of w ay g ra n te d by s a id In d ia n s to th e witheouscutoflu*
Sioux Cicy a u d N e b ra s k a R a ilro a d C o m p au y u n d e r th e a g re e m e n t o f diaus, ore.
A p ril n in e te e n th , e ig h te e n h u n d re d a n d e ig h ty , a p p ro v e d b y th e A c tin g
S e c re ta ry o f th e In te rio r, J u l y tw e n ty -se v e n th e ig h te e n h u n d re d an il
eig h ty . T h e s a id la u d s s h a ll be a p p ra ise d , in tra c ts o f fo rty a cre s e a ch ,
.
b y th re e c o m p e te n t co m m issioners, one o f w hom sh a ll be se le c te d b y i u t r a c t s o f loiicroa
th e O m a h a tr ib e o f In d ia n s , a n d th e o th e r tw o sh a ll be a p p o in te d b y by commissioners,
th e S e c re ta ry o f th e In te rio r.
e tc .
S e c . 2. T h a t a fte r th e s u rv e y and a p p ra ise m e n t o f sa id la n d s th e
Urm Hotted lauds
S e c re ta ry o f th e I n te rio r s h a ll b e, a n d he h e re b y is a u th o riz e d to issu e op«aei1 «P 1*or
p ro c la m a tio n to th e effect t h a t u n a llo tte d la n d s a re open for se ttle - ^ d o i i etc.1'
m eu t u n d e r su c h ru le s a n d re g u la tio n s as h e m ay p re sc rib e. T h a t a t
a n y tim e w ith in one y e a r a f te r th e dace o f su c h p ro c la m a tio n , e a c h
b o n a tide s e ttle r, o ccu p y in g a n y p o rtio u o f s a id la u d s, a n d h a v in g m a d e Rights ofsettlera,
v a lu a b le im p ro v e m e n ts th e re o n , o r th e lie irs - a tla w of su c h s e ttle r , w ho etc' ’ to imrcliai5‘sis a c itiz e n o f th e U n ite d S ta te s , o r w ho h a s d e c la re d his iu te n tio n to
becom e su ch , s h a ll be encicled to p u rchase, fo r cash , th ro u g h th e U n ite d
S ta te s p u b lic land-otfice a t N elig h , N e b ra sk a , th e la u d so o ccu p ied a n d
im p ro v ed b y him , n o t to ex ceed one h u n d re d a n d s ix ty acres iu each
case, a c c o rd in g to th e s u rv e y a n d a p p ra is e d v a lu e o f said la u d s as
p ro v id e d fo r in se c tio n one o f th is a c t; Provided, T h a t th e S e c re ta ry o f Proviso.
th e I n te r io r m ay d ispose o f th e sam e upon th e follow ing te rm s a s to p a y - T e r m s of paym en ts, th a t is to say , o n e -th ird o f th e p ric e o f s a id la u d to becom e meat,
due a n d p a y a b le one y e a r from th e d a te o f e n try , o n e -th ird in tw o
y e a rs, a n d o u e -th ird in th re e y e ars, from s a id d a te , w ith in te r e s t a t
th e r a te o f five p e r cen tu m p e r a n n u m ; b u t in case o f d e fa u lt iu e ith e r
of sa id p a y m e n ts th e p e rs o n th u s d e fa u ltin g fo r a p erio d o f s ix ty d a y s Forteicure incase
s h a ll fo rfe it a b so lu te ly h is r ig h t to th e tr a c t w h ich h e h a s p u rc h a s e d of default, etc.
a n d a n y p a y m e n t o r p a y m e n ts h e m ig h t h a v e m a d e : A n d provided f u r -Proviso,
ther, T h a t w h e n e v e r a n y p e rso n sh a ll u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s of th is a c t purchase uot to
s e ttle u p o n a t r a c t c o n ta in in g a frac tio n al e x cess o v e r one h u n d re d a n d he rejected ou acsix ty a c re s, if tb e excess is less th a n fo rty ac re s, is co n tig u o u s, a u d re- count of fractional
su its from in a b ility in s u rv e y to m ake to w n sh ip a u d section lin es cou- escess>eccform to th e b o u n d a ry lines o f th e re se rv a tio n , h is p u rc h a se sh a ll n o t be
re je c te d on a c c o u n t o f su c h excess, b u t sh a ll be allow ed as iu o th e r
c a se s: A n d provided fu rth e r, T h a t no p o rtio n o f s a id la u d sh a ll be so ld Land to i»« sold
a t less t h a n tb e a p p ra ise d v a lu e thereof, a n d in no case for less th a n at appraised valtw o d o lla rs a n d fifty c en ts p e r a c re ; A n d p ro vided fu rth e r, T h a t a ll la n d ue’ H
in to w n sh ip tw en ty -fo u r, ra n g e seven e a st, re m a in in g u n a llo tte d o n .th e
first d a y o f J u u e , e ig h te e n h u n d re d a n d eig h ty -fiv e, sh a ll be a p p ra ise d
a n d so ld a s o th e r la u d s u n d e r th e pro v isio n s o f th is act.
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S e c . 3. T lia t th e pro ceed s of such sale, a lte r p a y in g all e x p e u se s
in c id e n t to a n d n e c e ssa ry fo r c a rry in g out th e p ro v isio n s of th is a c t,
in c lu d in g s u c h clerk h ire as th e S ec reta ry o f th e I n te r io r m ay d ee m
n e c e ssa ry , s h a ll b e p lac ed to th e c re d it o f sa id I n d ia n s in th e T re a s u ry
of th e U n ite d S ta te s , a n d sh a ll b e a r in te re s t a t th e ra te o f five p e r
c en tu m p e r a n n u m , w hich incom e sh all be a n n u a lly e x p e n d e d for th e
b en efit o f s a id In d ia n s , u n d e r th e d irection o f th e S e c re ta ry of th e I n 
te rio r.
S e c . 4. T h a t -when p u rc h a s e rs of sa id lan d s s h a ll h a v e co m p lied w ith
th e p ro v isio n s of th is a c t a s to pay m en t, im p ro v e m e n t, a n d so fo rth ,
p ro o f th e r e o f s h a ll be re c e iv e d b y th e local land-office a t N elig h , N e 
b ra sk a , a n d p a te n ts sh a ll be issu e d as in the ca se o f p u b lic la u d s offered
for s e ttle m e n t u n d e r th e h o m e ste a d a n d p re e m p tio n a c ts : P rovided,
Indian rights in T h a t a n y r ig h t in s e v e ra lty a c q u ire d b y a n y In d ia n u n d e r e x is tin g
severalty u n d e r tre a tie s s h a ll n o t b e a ffe c ted b y th is act.
preserved.Xea 188
S e c . 5. T h a t w ith th e c o n s e n t o f said In d ia n s a s a fo re sa id th e S e c re 
ta r y o f th e I n te r io r be, a n d h e is h e re b y , au th o rized , e ith e r th ro u g h th e
Allotment in sev- a g e n t o f said trib e o r s u c h o th e r p e rso n as h e m ay d e s ig n a te , to a llo t
eralty, etc., distri- th e la n d s ly in g e a s t o f th e r i g h t o f w ay g ra n te d to th e S io o x C ity a n d
bution.
N e b ra sk a K a ilro a d C o m p a n y , u n d e r th e a g re em en t o f A p ril n in e te e n th ,
e ig h teen h u n d re d a n d e ig h ty , ap p ro v e d by th e A c tin g S e c re ta ry o f th e
In te rio r J u ly tw e n ty -se v e n th , eig h te e n h u n d re d a n d e ig h ty , in s e v e ra lty
to th e In d ia n s o f sa id tr ib e in q u a n tity as follow s: T o eac h h e a d o f a
fam ily, one q u a r te r o f a s e c tio n ; to each sin g le p e rs o n o v er e ig h te e n
y e a rs o f ag e, o n e -e ig h th o f a se c tio n ; to each o rp h a n c h ild u n d e r
eig h te e n y e a rs of ag e, o n e -e ig h th o f a section; a n d to eac h o th e r p e rso n
u n d e r e ig h te e n y e a rs o f a g e , one six te e n th o f a s e c tio n ; w h ich a llo t
m e n ts sh a ll be deem ed au d h e ld to be in lieu o f th e a llo tm e n ts o r a ssig n 14 sta*., 068.
m en ts p ro v id e d fo r in th e f o u rth a rtic le of th e tr e a t y w ith th e O m ah a s,
co ncluded M arch s ix th , e ig h te e n h u n d re d a n d six ty -fiv e , a n d fo r w hich,
for th e m o st p a r t, c e rtific a te s in th e nam es of in d iv id u a l In d ia n s to w hom
tr a c ts h a v e been a ssig n e d , h a v e been issu ed b y th e C o m m issio n er of
Proviso .
In d ia n A ffairs, a s in s a id a r tic le p r o v id e d : P ro vid ed , T h a t a n y I n d ia n
to w hom a tr a c t o f la n d h a s b e e n assig n ed aud c e rtific a te issu e d , o r w ho
was e n title d to rec eiv e th e sam e, u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f s a id fo u rth
a rticle, a n d w ho h as m a d e v a lu a b le im p ro v em en ts th e re o n , a n d a n y
In d ia n who b e in g e n title d to a n a ssig n m en t a n d c e rtific a te u n d e r sa id
article, h a s s e ttle d a n d m a d e v a lu a b le im p ro v e m e n ts u p o n a tr a c t
assig n e d to a n y In d ia n w ho h a s n e v e r occupied o r im p ro v e d su c h tr a c t,
sh a ll h a v e a p re fe re n ce r ig h t to se le c t th e tr a c t u p o n w h ic h h is im p ro v e 
m en ts a re s itu a te d , fo r a llo tm e n t u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f th is s e c tio n :
Proviso.
P rovided fu rth e r, T h a t a ll a llo tm e n ts m ade u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f th is
sectiou sh a ll be se le c te d b y th e In d ia n s , h ea d s o f fam ilies se le c tin g for
th e ir m in o r c h ild re n , a n d th e a g e n t sh a ll selec t fo r e a c h o rp h a n c h ild ;
a fte r w hich th e c e rtific a te s is s u e d by the C om m issioner o f I n d ia n A ffa irs
as afo resaid s h a ll b e d e e m e d a u d held to be n u ll a n d void.
Patents for aiS e c . G. T h a t u p o n th e apx^roval o f th e a llo tm e n ts p ro v id e d for in th e
lotted lands to is- p re c e d in g se c tio u b y th e S e c re ta ry of th e In te rio r, h e s h a ll c au se p a te n ts
sue upon approval, j-0 jssue th e re fo r in th e n a m e o f th e allo ttees, w hich p a te n ts sh a ll b e o f th e
heV d ^ y U a L te d
effect a n d d e c la re t h a t th e U n ite d S ta te s does a n d w ill h o k l th e la u d
States in trust for th u s a llo tte d fo r th e p e rio d o f tw enty-five y ea rs in t r u s t fo r th e sole nse
twentv-five years, a n d b en efit of th e In d ia n s to w hom such a llo tm e n t sh a ll h a v e been
0tcm ade, o r in ca se o f his d e c e a se , o f his h eirs ac c o rd in g to th e la w s o f th e
S ta te o f N e b ra sk a , a n d t h a t a t th e e x p iratio n of sa id p e rio d th e U n ite d
S ta te s w ill convey th e sa m e b y p a te n t to sa id In d ia n o r his h e irs as
afo resaid , in fee d is c h a rg e d o f said tr u s t and free o f a ll c h a rg e o r in cu m 
b ran ce w h a tso e v e r. A n d if a n y conveyance sh all b e m ad e o f th e la n d s
•se t a p a r t a n d a llo te d as h e re in p ro v id e r, or an y c o n tr a c t m ad e to u c h in g
th e sam e before th e e x p ira tio n of th e tim e above m en tio u e d , su c h conProviso.
v ey au ce o r c o n tra c t s h a ll b e a b so lu te ly null a u d v o id : P ro vid ed , T h a t,
th e law o f d e sc e n t a n d p a r titio n in force in th e s a id S ta te s h a ll a p p ly
th e re to a fte r p a te n ts th e r e f o r h a v e been ex e cu ted a n d d eliv e re d .
Indiana subject
S e c . T. T h a t u p o n th e co m p letio n of said a llo tm e n ts a n d th e p a te n tto laws, civil and ju g 0f th e la n d s to sa id a llo tte e s , each a n d e v ery m em b er o f sa id trib e
IcSdbt&sla when*
*lu lian s sh a ll h a v e th e b e n e fit of a n d bo su b je c t to th e law s, b o th
civil an d crim inal, o f th e S ta te o f N e b ra sk a ; a u d s a id S ta te sh a ll n o t
p ass or enforce a n y la w d e n y in g a n y In d ia n o f sa id trib e th e e q u a l p ro 
tection o f th e law .
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S e c . 8. T h a t th e re s id u e o f la u d s ly in g e a s t o f th e s a id r ig h t o f w ay
o f th e S ioux C ity a n d N e b r a s k a R a ilro a d , a f te r a ll a llo ttm e n ts h a v e
b een m ad e, a s in th e fifth s e c tio n o f th is a c t p ro v id e d , sh a ll be p a te n te d
to th e sa id O m ah a trib e o f In d ia n s , w hich p a te n t s h a ll bo o f th e le g a l
effect a n d d e c la re t h a t th e U n ite d S ta te s does a n d w ill hold th e la n d
th u s p a te n te d for th e p e rio d o f tw enty-five y e a rs in tr u s t for th e sole
u se a u d b en efit o f th e s a id O m a h a trib e o f In d ia n s , a n d th a t a t th e ex 
p ir a tio n o f sa id period th e U n ite d S ta te s w ill c o n v e y th e sam e by p a t 
ient to s a id O m ah a trib e o f In d ia n s , in fee d is c h a rg e d o f said t r u s t a u d
fre e o f a ll c h a rg e or in c u m b ra n c e w h a ts o e v e r: P rovided, T h a t from th e
Proviso.
re s id u e o f la u d s th u s p a te u te d to th e trib e In com m on, a llo tm e n ts sh a ll i ^ ^ ^ d ^ t o ^ a c h
be u ia d c a n d p a te n te d to each O m a h a c h ild w ho m ay bo b o rn p rio r to omaba^chUd bom
th e e x p ira tio u o f th e tim e d u rin g w hich it is p ro v id e d th a t sa id la u d s d u r i u g a u d p r i o r t o
s h a ll b e h e ld in tr u s t b y th e U n ite d S ta te s , in q u a n tity a n d up o n th e cxpiraeion of time
sa m e c o u d itio u s, re stric tio n s, a n d lim ita tio n s a s are p ro v id e d in sectio n ot «viis#c, «fco.
six o f th is a c t, to u ch in g p a te n ts to a llo tte e s th e r e in m en tio n ed . B u t
s u c h co n d itio n s, re s tric tio n s , a u d lim ita tio n s sh a ll n o t e x te n d b ey o n d
th e e x p ir a tio n o f th e tim e ex p re sse d in th e p a te n t h e rein a u th o riz e d to
b e is s u e d to th e trib e in c o m m o n : A n d p ro vid ed fu rth e r, T h a t th e se p atProvisos.
c u ts , w h e n issu ed , s h a ll o v e rrid e th e p a te n t a u th o riz e d to be issu e d to
th e tr ib e a s aforesaid , a n d sh a ll s e p a ra te th e in d iv id u a l a llo tm e n t from
th e la n d s h e ld in com m on, w hich p ro v iso s h a ll b e in c o rp o ra te d in th e
p a t e n t issued, to th e tr ib e : P rovided, T h a t s a id In d ia n s or a n y p a r t of
th e m m a y , if th e y sh all so elect, se lec t th e la n d w hich sh a ll b e a llo tte d
to th e m in s e v e ra lty in a n y p a r t o f sa id r e s e rv a tio n e ith e r e a s t o r w est
o f s a id r i g h t o f w ay m en tio n ed in th e first se c tio n o f th is act.
S e c . 9. T h a t th e com m issioners to b e a p p o in te d b y th e S e c re ta ry of th e
Commissio n e c s
I n t e r io r u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f th is a c t s h a ll receive com p en satio n for to receive compenth e i r se rv ic e s a t th e r a te o f five d o lla rs fo r ea c h d a y a c tu a lly e n g a g e d 3atloa' e cin th e d u tie s h erein d e sig n a te d , iu a d d itio n to th e a m o u n t p a id b y th em
fo r a c tu a l tra v e lin g a n d o th e r n e cessary ex p en se s.
S e c . ID . T h a t in ad d itio n to th e p u rc h a se , each p u rc h a s e r o f sa id
Fees to register
O m a h a I n d ia n la n d s s h a ll p a y tw o d o lla rs, th e sam e to b e re ta in e d b y aml receiver,
th e re c e iv e r a n d re g is te r o f th e la n d office-at H elig h , N e b ra sk a , as th e ir
fees fo r serv ices re n d e re d .
A p p r o v e d , A u g u s t 7, 1SS2.
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APPENDIX XI

Feb. 8, 1587.
CBLAP. 1 1 9 .—Au act to provide for the allotm ent o f Iaad3 iu severalty to Indians
' — " ' — -------------- on the various reservations, and to exten d the protection of the latvs of the United
States and the Territories over the rudiaos, and for ocher purposes.

Be i t enacted by the Senate and S o u s e o f Representatives o f the UnitedPresideutauthor- States o f A m erica in Congress assem bled, T h a t in. all c a se s w h ere a u y

in^eve-attv'to^n^
o r ^ an(^
In d ia n s h as b e e n , o r s h a ll h e re a fte r b e, lo c ated u p o n
dian s oil i-eserva- ailJ re s e rv a tio n c re a te d fo r th e ir n sc , c ith e r b y tr e a ty s tip u la tio n o r by
tious.
v irtu e o f a n a c t o f C o u g ress o r e x e c u tiv e o rd e r s e ttin g a p a r t th e sam e
for th e ir use, th e P re s id e n t o f th e U n ite d S ta te s be, a n d h e h e re b y is,
a u th o riz e d , w h e n e v e r iu h is o p in io n a n y re se rv a tio u o r a n y p a r t th e re o f
o f su c h I n d ia n s is a d v a n ta g e o u s fo r a g ric u ltu r a l a n d g ra z in g p n rp o se s,
to ca u se sa id re s e rv a tio u , o r a n y p a r t th ereo f, to be su rv e y e d , o r resn rv ey ed if n e c e ssa ry , a n d to a llo t th e la n d s iu said re s e rv a tio n in s e v e r
a lty to a n y In d ia n lo c a te d th e re o n in q u a n titie s as fo llo w s:
jDiscributiou.
T o ea c h h e a d o f a fam ily, o u e -q u a rc e r o f a section ;
T o each siu g le p e rso n o v e r e ig h te e n y e a rs of age, o n e -e ig h th o f a se c 
tion ;
To e a c h .o rp h a n ch ild u n d e r e ig h te e n y e a rs o f age, o n e -e ig h th o f a s e c 
tio u ; a n d
To each o th e r siu g le p e rs o n u n d e r e ig h te e n y ears now liv in g , o r w ho
m ay be b o rn p rio r to th e d a te o f th e o rd e r o f th e P r e s id e n t d ire c tin g au
a llo tm e n t o f th e la n d s e m b ra c e d in a n y re se rv a tio n , o n e -six te e n th o f a '
Trodsoi.
sectio u : P ro v id e d , T h a t iu c a se th e r e is n o t sufficient la n d in a n y o f sa id
A llotm ent p r o re s e rv a tio n s to a llo t la n d s to e a c h in d iv id u a l o f th e c lasses a b o v e n a m ed
sufficient dS m” *a Qu a u ticies as ab o v e p ro v id e d , th e la n d s e m b raced in su c h re s e rv a tio n
o r re s e rv a tio u s s h a ll b e a llo tte d to e a c h in d iv id u a l o f e a c h o f sa id classes
p r o r a t a in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e p ro v isio u s o f th is a c t : A n d ■provided
A l l o t m e n t by fu rth er. T h a t w h e re th e t r e a t y o r a c t o f C ongress s e ttin g a p a r t su c h
ieducefl°r nCC 1106 r e s e rv a ^ 0Q p ro v id e s for th e a llo tm e n t o f la n d s iu se v e ra lty in q u a n titie s
1 ’
in excess o f th o s e h e re in p ro v id e d , th e P re s id e n t, iu m a k iu g a llo tm e n ts
u p o n su c h re s e rv a tio n , sh a ll a llo t th e la n d s to each in d iv id u a l I n d ia n
b e lo n g in g th e re o n in q u a n tity a s sp ecified in su ch t r e a ty o r a c t: A n d
A d diu ou aiallot- pro vid ed fu rth e r, T h a t w h en tire la n d s a llo tte d are o n ly v a lu a b le for
m eat o f lauds fit g ra z in g p u rp o se s, a n a d d itio n a l a llo tm e n t o f such g ra z in g la u d s, in
for gra zing only.
q u a n titie s a s a b o v e p ro v id e d , s h a ll b e m ad e to each in d iv id u a l.
S e c . 2. T h a t a ll a llo tm e n ts s e t a p a r t u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f th is a c t
Selection of al
lotm ents.
s h a ll b e se le c te d by th e I n d ia n a , h e a d s o f fam ilies s e le c tiu g fo r th e ir
m in o r c h ild re n , a n d th e a g e n ts s h a ll s e le c t fo r each o r p h a n ch ild , a n d
in su c h m a n n e r a s to em b ra ce th e im p ro v e m e n ts of th e I n d ia n s m a k iu g
X n i p r o r e m e u f s.
th e sele c tio n . W h e re th e im p ro v e m e n ts o f tw o o r m ore In d ia n s h a v e
b e e n m a d e o n th e sam e le g a l su b d iv is io n o f lau d , u n le ss th e y sh a ll
o th e rw ise a g re e , a p ro v isio n a l lin e m a y bo ru n d iv id in g s a id la u d s b e 
tw een th em , a n d th e a m o u n t to w h ic h each is e n title d s h a ll be e q u a liz e d
in th e a s s ig n m e n t o f th e r e m a in d e r o f th e la n d to w h ic h th e y a re e n ti
P rociao.
tle d u n d e r th is a c t : P ro vid ed , T h a t i f a n y one e n title d to -a n a llo tm e n t
Oa failure to se- s h a ll fa il to m a k e a se le ctio n w ith in fo u r y e a rs a fte r th e P r e s id e n t sh a ll
S ecrecar/0
a llo tm e n ts m ay b e m a d e on a p a rtic u la r re s e rv a tio n , th e SecInterior may direct r e ta r y o f th e I n te r io r m a y d ir e c t th e a g e n t o f such trib e o r b a n d , if
-s e le c tio n .
su c h th e re be, a n d if th e r e be no a g e n t, th e n a sp e cia l a g e n t a p p o in te d
for t h a t p u rp o se , to m ak e a se le c tio n , fo r s a c k In d ia n , w h ich electio n
sh a ll be allo cted as in c ase s w h e re se lec tio n s a re m ad e b y th e In d ia n s,
a n d p a te n ts s h a ll issu e iu lik e m a n n e r.

oJeiS

THE DAWES ACT - FEBRUARY 8, 1887
24 Statutes at Laree 388.
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S e s s . II.

C h. 110.

1SS7.

S e c . 3. T h a t th e a llo tm e n ts p ro v id e d fo r in th is a c t sh a ll be m a d e b y
Allotment* to be
sp e c ia l a g e n ts a p p o in te d by th e P r e s id e n t fo r su c h p u rp o se, a n d th e
jn jja a
a g e n ts in c h a rg e o f th e re sp e c tiv e re s e rv a tio n s on w hich th e a llo tm e n ts a®en ts/
a r e d ire c te d to be m a d e , u n d e r su c h ru le s a n d re g u la tio n s as th e S e c re 
ta r y o f th e I n te r io r m a y from tim e to tim e p re sc rib e , a u d sh a ll b e cerC e rtific a te s ,
tifie d b y su ch a g e u ts to th e C om m issioner o f lu d ia u A ffairs, iu d u p lic a te ,
one copy to be re ta in e d in th e In d ia n Office a n d th e o th e r to be t r a n s 
m itte d to th e S e c re ta ry o f th e In te rio r f o r h is actio n , a n d to be d e p o s
ite d iu th e G e u e ra l L a u d Office.
S e c . 4. Than w h e re a n y In d ia n n o t re s id in g upon a re se rv a tio u , i-rfo r ludLans uot on
w hose trib e no re s e rv a tio n h a s been p ro v id e d b y tre a ty , a c t o f C o n g re ss, ” aerv^ t o 3’ g«i9 cl
o r e x e c u tiv e o rd e r, s h a ll m a k e s e ttle m e n t u p o n a u y su rv ey ed o r u u s u r° u” n c .
v e y e d la n d s o f th e U u ite d S ta te s n o t o th e rw is e a p p ro p ria te d , h e o r sh e lands,
sh a ll be e n title d , u p o n a p p lic a tio n to th e lo c a l laud-office for th e d is tr ic t
in w hich th e la n d s a r e lo c a te d , to h a v e th e sa m e a llo tte d to him o r h e r,
a n d to his o r h e r c h ild re n , in q u a n titie s a n d m a u n e r as p ro v id e d iu th is •
a c t fo r In d ia n s re s id in g u p o u r e s e r v a tio n s ; a u d w hen such s e ttle m e n t is
m a d e u p o n u u s u rv e y e d la u d s , th e g r a n t to s u c h In d ia n s sh a ll be a d 
j u s te d upon th e s u rv e y o f th e la n d s so as to couform th e re to : a u d p a te n ts
s h a ll be issu e d to th e m fo r su ch la u d s in th e m a n n e r a n d ’w ith th o r e 
stric tio n s as herein p ro v id e d . A n d th e fees to w hich th e officers o f s u c h
Fees to bo paid,
lo cal laud-office w o u ld h a v e been e n title d h a d su c h la u d s b e en e n te re d from the Treasury.,
u n d e r th e g e n e ra l la w s fo r th e d isp o sitio n o f th e pu b lic la n d s s h a ll bo
p a id to them , from a n y m oneys in th e T r e a s u r y o f th e U n ite d S ta te s n o t
o th e rw ise a p p ro p ria te d , u p o n a s ta te m e n t o f a n ac c o u n t in th e ir b e h a lf
fo r s u c h fees by th e C o m m issio n er o f th e G e n e ra l L a u d Office, a n d a c e r
tific a tio n o f su ch account- to th e S e c re ta ry o f th e T re a s u ry b y th e S e c re 
t a r y o f th e In te rio r.
S e c . 5. T h a t u p o n th e a p p ro v a l o f th e a llo tm e n ts p ro v id e d for in th is
a c t b y th e S e c re ta ry o f th e In te rio r, h e s h a ll c a u se p a te n ts to issu e th e re - Patent to issue,
fo r in th e n am e o f th e a llo tte e s, w hich p a te u ts s h a ll be of th e le g a l effect,
a n d d e c la re t h a t th e U n ite d S ta te s does a n d w ill h old th e la n d th u s a l
lo tte d , fo r th e p e rio d o f tw enty-five y e a rs , iu t r u s t fo r th e sole u se a n d To be held in
b e n e fit o f th e I n d ia n to w hom su ch a llo tm e n t s h a ll h a v e b ee n m a d e , or,
trust,
in c a se o f h is d ecease, o f h is h e irs a c c o rd in g to th e law s o f th e S ta te o r
T e r r ito r y w h ere s u c h la n d is lo ca te d , a n d t h a t a t th e e x p ira tio n o f s a id
p e rio d th e U n ite d S ta te s w ill convey th e s a m e b y p a te n t to sa id I n d ia n ,
Coaveyauco in
o r h is h e irs a s a fo re sa id , in fee, d is c h a rg e d o f s a id tr u s t a n d fre e o f a ll after 25 rears,
c h a rg e o r in c u m b ra n c e w h a tso e v e r: P ro v id e d , T h a t th e P r e s id e n t o f th o Pracisos.

United States may in any case in his discretion extend the period. And Period may
if any conveyance shall be made of the lands set apart aud allotted as extended.

bo

h e re in p ro v id ed , o r a n y c o n tra c t m a d e to u c h in g th e sam e, b e fo re th e
e x p ira tio n o f th e tim e ab o v e m en tio n e d , su c h co nveyance o r c o n tr a c t

shall be absolutely null an d ro id : Provided, That the law of descent Laws of descent
and partition in-force in the State or Territory where such lands arc aud partition.
situate shall apply thereto after pateuts therefor have been executed
a n d d eliv ered , e x c e p t a s h e re in o th e rw is e p ro v id e d ; a n d th e la w s o f

the State of Kansas regulating the descent and partition of real estate

s h a ll, so fa r a s p ra c tic a b le , a p p ly to a il la u d s in th e In d ia n T e rrito ry
w h ich m ay be a llo tte d in se v e ra lty u n d e r th e p ro v isio u s o f th is a c t-:

And. provided further, That at any time after lauds have been allotted
to all the Indians of any tribe as herein provided, or soouer if iu the
opinion of the President it shall be for the best interests of said tribe,
it shall be lawful for tho Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with Negotiation* for
such Indian tribe for the purchase and release by said tribe, iu conform- purchaso o f lands
ity with the treaty or statute under which such reservation is held, of not allota<1such portions of its reservation not allotted as such tribe shall, from
time to time, consent to sell, on such terms aud conditions as shall be
considered just and equitable between the United States and said tribe
of Indians, which purchase shall not be complete until ratified by Con
gress, and the form and manner of executing such release shall filso be
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Lands so bought p re sc rib e d b y C o n g re s s : P ro v id e d hoxcever, T h a t all la n d s a d a p te d to
to be held for ac- a g ric u ltu re , w ith or w ith o u t ir r ig a tio n so sold o r re le a se d to th e U n ite d

hie. Se

er3i ara" S ta te s by a u y I n d ia n trib e s h a ll b e h e ld b y th e U n ite d S ta te s fo r th e
sole p u rp o se o f se c u rin g h o m e s to a c tu a l se ttle rs au d sh a ll be d isp o se d
of by th e U n ite d S ta te s to a c tu a l a u d b o n a fide s e ttle rs o nly in tra c ts
n o t e x c e e d iu g one h u n d r e d a n d s ix ty a cres to au y o n e p erso n , ou su ch
te rm s a s C o u g re ss sh a ll p re s c rib e , s u b je c t to g r a n ts w h ic h C o u g ress
P atent to issue m ay m a k e iu a id o f e d u c a tio n : A n d p rovided fu rth e r, T h a t uo p a te u ts
tailin ' ’- * 3 ?er3° a sh a ll issu e th e re fo r e x c e p t to th e p e rso n so ta k in g th e sam e a s a u d for
atead5 33
0tne" a h o m estead , o r h is h e irs, a n d a f te r th e e x p ira tio n o f five y e a rs occu
p a n c y th e r e o f as su c h h o m e s te a d ,• a n d ao y co n v ey an ce o f sa id la u d s so
ta k e u a s a h o m e ste a d , o r a n y coutrncc to u c h in g th e sam e, or lien
th e re o n , c re a te d p rio r to th e d a te o f su c h p a te u t, sh a ll b e nu ll a u d void.
Purchase money ^.nti th e su m s a g re e d to be p a id by th e U n ited S ta te s a s p u rc h a se
for Indians111 trUSC m one5' ^o r a n T p o rtio n o f a n y s u c h re se rv a tio n sh a ll be h e ld in th e
T re a su ry o f th e U n ite d S ta te s fo r th e sole use o f th e trib e o r trib e s o f
I n d ia n s ; to w hom su ch re s e rv a tio n s b e lo n g ed ; a u d th e sam o, w ith in 
te re s t th e re o n a t th re e p e r c e n t p e r n u uuin, sh all be a t all tim es su b je c t
to a p p ro p ria tio n by C o u g ress fo r th e e d u ca tio n a u d civ ilizatio u o f su ch
trib e o r trib e s o f In d ia n s o r th e m em bers th ereo f. T h e p a te n ts a fo re sa id
sh all be re co rd ed iu th e G e n e ra l L a u d Office, a u d a fte rw a rd d eliv ere d ,
,
R eligious organ- free o f c h a rg e , to th e a llo tte e e n title d th e re to . A n d if a n y relig io u s
izatioua.
society o r o th e r o rg a n iz a tio n is now o cc u p y in g an y o f th e p u b lic la n d s
to w h ich th is a c t is a p p lic a b le , fo r relig io u s or e d u c a tio n a l w ork am o n g
th e In d ia n s , th e S e c re ta ry o f th e In te r io r is h ere b y a u th o riz e d to c o n 
firm su c h o ccu p atio n to s u c h so c ie ty o r o rg a n iz a tio n , iu q u a n tity u o t
ex ceed in g one h u n d re d a u d s ix ty a c re s in a n y oue tr a c t, so long as th e
sam e s h a ll b e so o ccu p ied , o n su c h te rm s as he sh a ll cleem j u s t ; b u t
n o th in g h e re in c o n ta in e d s h a ll c h a n g e o r a lte r an y claim o f su c h soci
e ty fo r re lig io u s o r e d u c a tio n a l p u rp o se s h e re to fo re g ra n te d b y law .
Indiansselecting A u d h e re a fte r in th e e m p lo y m e n t o f In d ia n police, o r a u y o th e r emIand3 to ba pre- pioyes in th e p u b lic se rv ic e a m o n g a n y of th e Iu d ia u trib e s o r bunds
terred tor police, a g--ec£e(j
£^js ac£j a m i w h e re I n d ia n s can perform th e d u tie s re q u ire d ,
th o se In d ia n s w ho h a v e a v a ile d th e m se lv e s o f th e p ro v isio n s o f this a c t
an d becom e citiz en s o f th e U n ite d S ta te s sh a ll be p re fe rre d .
Citizenship to ba
S e o . 6. T h a t up o n th e c o m p le tio n o f said a llo tm e n ts a n d th e p a te n taccorded to allot- jn nr of th e la n d s to sa id a iio ttc e s , ea ch a u d ev ery m e m b e r of th e read^>9pthi<y civilized sp e c tiv e b a n d s o r trib e s o f I u d ia n s to -w h o m a llo tm e n ts h a v e b e e n ,
life.
°
m ad e sh a ll h a v e th e b e n e fit o f a u d be su b je c t to th e law s, b o th civil
a n d c rim in al, o f tb e S ta te o r T e r r ito r y in w hich th e y m a y re s id e ; a n d
n o T e rrito ry s h a ll pass o r en fo rce a n y law d e n y in g a u y su c h In d ia n
w ith in its ju ris d ic tio n th e e q u a l p ro te c tio n o f tb e law . A n d e v ery I n 
d ia n b o rn w ith in th e te r rito ria l lim its of th e U u ite d S ta te s to whom a llo t
m en ts s h a ll h a v e b een m a d e u n d e r th e pro v isio n s o f th is act, o r u n d e r
an y law o r tr e a ty , a n d e v e ry I n d ia n bo rn w ith in th e te rr ito r ia l lim its of
th e U n ite d S ta te s w ho h a s v o lu n ta r ily ta k e u up, w ith in said lim its, his
resid en ce s e p a ra te a u d a p a r t from a n y trib e o f In d ia n s th e re iu , a n d has
a d o p te d th e h a b its o f c iv iliz e d life, is h ereb y d e c la re d to be a citizen o f
th e U n ite d States* a u d is e n title d to a ll th e rig h ts , p riv ile g e s, a u d im m u 
n ities o f su c h citizen s, w h e th e r sa id In d ia n h as been o r n o t, by b irth o r
o th erw ise, a m em b er of a n y tr ib e o f I n d ia n s w ithin th e te rrito ria l lim its
o f th e U n ite d S ta te s w ith o u t iu a n y m a n n e r im p a irin g o r o th erw ise
affectin g th e r ig h t o f an y s u c h In d ia n to tr ib a l or o th e r p ro p e rty .
Secretary of the
S e c . 7. T h a t in cases w h e re th e u se o f w a te r for irrig a tio n is necesla terior to pre- s a ry to re n d e r th e la n d s w ith in a u y In d ia n re se rv a tio u a v a ila b le for
walera^for'irri* a g ric u ltu ra l p u rp o se s, th e S e c r e ta r y o f th e In te rio r be, an d he is h ereby,
gation.
* a u th o riz e d to p re sc rib e s u c h ru le s a n d re g u la tio n s a s he m ay deem
n e cessary to secu re a j u s t a n d e q u a l d istrib u tio n th e re o f ain o u g th e
In d ia n s re sid in g up o n a n y s u c h re s e rv a tio n s ; au d uo o th e r a p p ro p ria 
tio n o r g r a n t o f w a te r b y a n y r ip a r ia n p ro p rie to r sh a ll b e a u th o riz e d o r
p e rm itte d to th e d a m a g e o f a n y o th e r rip a ria n p ro p rie to r.
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S e c . S. T h a t th e p ro v isio n o f th is a c t s h a ll n o t e x te n d to th e te rriLands excepted.
to r y o ccu p ied b y th e C h e ro k e e s, C reeks, C h o cta w s, C h ick asaw s, Seiuiu o le s, a n d O sage, M iam ies a n d P e o ria s, a n d S a c s a n d F o x es, in th e I n 
d ia n T e rrito ry , n o r to a u y o f th e re s e rv a tio u s o f th e S en e ca N a tio n o f
N e w Y o rk In d ia n s in th e S ta te o f N ew Y o rk , n o r to t h a t s tr ip o f t e r 
r ito r y iu th e S ta te o f N e b ra s k a ad jo in in g th e S io u x N a tio n on th e south,
a d d e d b y e x e c u tiv e o rd e r.
S e c . 9 . T h a t fo r th e p u rp o se o f m a k in g th e s u rv e y s a u d .re su rv e y s Approoriatioufhr
m e n tio n e d in sectio u tw o o f th is a c t, th e re b e, a u d h e re b y is, a p p ro - aurve73p rin te d , o u t o f an y m o n ey s in th e T re a s u ry n o t o th e rw ise a p p ro p ria te d ,
th e su m o f one h u n d re d th o u s a n d d o lla rs, to b e re p a id p ro p o rtio n a te ly
o u t o f th e p ro ceed s o f th e sa le s o f su c h la n d as m ay be a c q u ire d from
th e I n d ia n s u n d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f th is act.
S e c . 10. T h a t n o th in g iu th is a c t c o n ta in e d s h a ll be so c o n s tru e d a s
Rights of way
to a ffe c t th e r ig h t a n d p o w e r o f C o u g ress to g r a n t th e r ig h t o f w ay
artected.
th r o u g h a n y la n d s g r a n te d to a n I n d ia n , o r a trib e o f In d ia n s , for r a il
ro a d s o r o th e r h ig h w a y s, o r te le g ra p h lin e s, fo r th e p u b lic use, o r to
c o n d e m n su c h lan d s to p u b lic uses, u p o n m a k in g j u s t co m p en satio n .
S e c . 11. T h a t n o th in g in th is a c t sh a ll be so c o n stru e d a s to p r e v e n t Southern U t e a
th e re m o v a l o f th e S o u th e rn G te I n d ia n s fro m th e ir p re s e n t re se rv a - m aybe removed to
tio u in S o u th w e ste rn C o lo rad o to a n e w re s e rv a tio u b y a n d w ith th e neTr re3ervatl0uc o n s e n t o f a m a jo rity o f th e a d u lt m ale m e m b e rs o f sa id trib e .
A p p ro v e d , F e b ru a ry S, 1SST,
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